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Abstract 
The Gender Recognition Act 2004 has been hailed as radical
1
 and ground-breaking
2
 
legislation and it can clearly be considered to be a successful piece of legislation because 
between coming into force on 4 April 2005 and the third quarter of financial year 2013/14 
it provided full legal recognition of one’s gender identity to 3,664 individuals and interim 
recognition to 173 individuals; only 180 applications had been refused and 93 applications 
have been withdrawn.
3
 So clearly the law is doing what it was intended to do. However the 
legislation is not without its problems and it is far from perfect. This thesis argues that the 
UK Government, when enacting the legislation, adopted the medical model of 
transsexualism as understood within medicine in 2003/04 which resulted in the legislation 
enacting strong gatekeeper roles for medical professionals and the Gender Recognition 
Panel which means that it is difficult for one to obtain legal recognition of one’s gender 
identity under UK law. The thesis proposes that an alternative model of legal recognition 
based on gender self-declaration is possible and would achieve the same outcome but with 
less difficulties for the individual. 
                                                 
1
 S Jeffreys (2008) ‘They know it when they see it: the UK Gender Recognition Act 2004’ (2008) British 
Journal of Politics & International Relations 10(2):328-345, 328. 
2
 S Cowan ‘Looking back (to)wards the body: medicalization and the GRA’ (2009) Social and Legal Studies 
18(2):247-252, 247. 
3
 Gender Recognition Certificate Statistics: April to June 2014 tables available from 
 <www.gov.uk/government/statistics/gender-recognition-certificate-statistics-april-to-june-2014>accessed 14 
September 2014. 
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Introduction 
Introduction 
The purpose of this thesis is to show that the Gender Recognition Act 2004 (GRA 2004) is 
reliant upon the medical model of transsexualism as it existed in 2004 as the basis of 
providing legal recognition of gender identity and that this approach raises problems which 
need not arise. The thesis argues that the result of basing the legislation on such an 
understanding of transsexualism is that the legislation gives third parties, in particular 
medical professionals and the Gender Recognition Panel (GRP) an unduly strong 
gatekeeper function in relation to the acquisition of legal recognition of one’s gender 
identity. This approach is flawed for a number of reasons namely; (i) the medical 
understanding of transsexualism is dynamic and has already developed beyond that which 
dominated at the time the legislation was enacted, (ii) there are alternative means of 
providing legal recognition both within the Council of Europe member states, as shown by 
Denmark, Malta and Ireland, and globally, as exists in Colombia and Argentina which 
places the emphasis on the individual’s sense of self rather than on the determination of 
medical professionals; the gender self-declaration model, (iii) many of the concerns of the 
legislature when enacting the legislation are no longer valid concerns e.g. avoiding same 
sex marriage, and (iv) recent calls for more diverse gender identity recognition in law other 
than merely male and female and the potential for this to be reflected in law has 
implications for the GRA 2004  which means that it is now an appropriate time to reflect 
on the legislation to determine if it requires reform and if so how.  
 
This thesis argues that rather than use an evolving and dynamic medical model of 
transsexualism as the foundation for the provision of legal recognition of one’s gender 
identity it would have been possible at the time for the UK Government to have enacted 
legislation which has the same outcome: legal recognition, save for certain specified 
exceptions, of those seeking to permanently live as member of the other sex based on 
nothing more than individual self-declaration of gender identity thus avoiding the problems 
which arise as a result of adopting the medical model of transsexualism. Despite the fact 
that the legislation has now been in force for over 10 years it is not too late to reform the 
law to take such an approach. Therefore the thesis is based on three underlying 
propositions which will be proven throughout: (i) that the GRA 2004 is indeed based on a 
particular medical model of transsexualism, (ii) that this medical model is deeply flawed in 
12 
 
relation to its suitability as a foundation for law and (iii) that a better model of providing 
legal recognition of one’s gender identity is possible. 
 
Deriving a Research focus 
This thesis has particular personal importance for myself because the object of enquiry 
derives from numerous conversations with friends from the Scottish transgender 
community. The result of these conversations and discussions highlighted numerous 
difficulties which individuals faced on a daily basis and the fear that many experienced in 
relation to actual or potential discrimination. In addition to this, one common theme 
discussed regularly was the way in which individuals felt they interacted with the medical 
profession, particularly the difficulty of being accepted and the fear of not being able to 
meet the expected diagnostic narrative; a sense of medical professionals having power to 
enable or deny their progress in their quest to find peace with their identities and be able to 
take the necessary steps to be ‘comfortable in their own skin’. These anecdotal examples 
led me to consider whether or not these concerns are reflected in the available literature 
and to see if the concerns expressed by these friends had been experienced by other trans* 
individuals in interaction with the medical profession.
4
  
 
As a legal academic and member of the LGBTQI
5
 community, the experiences of these 
friends concerned me and I sought to explore this from a legal perspective. Having taught 
both family law and medical law for a number of years I was fully aware of the legal 
process of changing one’s sex and also of the consequences of not being able to do so but 
also I was able to appreciate that this particular issue encompassed aspects of medical law 
in addition to other areas of law such as family law and human rights. One of the early 
themes which developed from this perspective was the question ‘what can be done if the 
individual is denied a diagnosis?’ My appreciation of medical law indicated that ultimately 
what the individual would seek to do would be to challenge a clinical decision and this is 
rarely, if ever, entertained by UK courts.
6
 So then this led me on to considering how 
important the diagnosis is within the provisions of the GRA 2004: I began to see that 
without the initial diagnosis the individual cannot progress with their legal change of sex. 
                                                 
4
 Note that trans* is used to cover all identities covered by the transgender umbrella.  
5
 Although traditionally the abbreviation is LGBT which is used to denote Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and 
Transgender I prefer to use the broader abbreviation LGBTQI to highlight the various different identities 
which comprise this diverse spectrum. LGBTQI denotes Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer, and 
Intersex individuals. See <http://lgbt.ucla.edu/documentsLGBTTerminology.pdf>  accessed 25 July 2014. 
6
 See inter alia: R v Secretary of State for Social Services ex parte Hincks (1979) 123 S.J. 436; R v North and 
East Devon Health Authority ex parte Coughlan 2001 QB 213 (CA); R v Secretary of State for Social 
Services ex parte Walker [1987] 3 BMLR 32; R v Cambridge District Health Authority [1995] 25 BMLR 5. 
13 
 
Throughout the process of completing this thesis I have continued to revise and refine my 
area of enquiry and I now believe that I have a much stronger thesis which takes a novel 
approach to the issue of legal recognition of gender identity in the UK. The frustration with 
seeing that the medical profession held the power to enable or deny an individual’s quest to 
have his or her gender identity recognised in law forced me to consider the actual scope of 
my enquiry: was I going to consider all transgender individuals, or was I going to only 
focus on transsexuals? Although the terms transgender and transsexual are quite often used 
interchangeably they do have particular meanings which render this interchangeability 
wrong. Currah et al note that: the term transgender “is now generally used to refer to 
individuals whose gender identity or expression does not conform to the social 
expectations for their assigned sex at birth.”7 
 
This has meant that the term transgender is currently accepted as a broad term used to 
denote the wider trans*
8
 community in general and as such it is an ‘umbrella term’ which 
encompasses the broad spectrum of gender non-conforming individuals.
9
 Stryker explains 
that the term: 
 
refers to all identities or practices that cross over, cut across, move between or 
otherwise queer socially constructed sex/gender boundaries. The term includes, but 
is not limited to, transsexuality, heterosexual transvestism, gay drag, butch 
lesbianism, and such non-European identities as the Native American Berdache or 
the Indian Hijra.
10
 
 
So the defining characteristic of those individuals labelled transgender is that they do not 
conform to expected gender norms and expressions.
11
 What is less clear is that there can be 
considerable movement between these trans* identities and the position which one takes up 
within the trans* community may change at different times of a person’s life. So 
technically the term transgender encompasses this broad spectrum of gender diverse 
individuals “whose lifestyles appear to conflict with the gender norms of society”12 of 
                                                 
7
 P Currah, R M Juang and S P Minter (eds) Transgender Rights (University of Minnesota Press 2006) xiv. 
8
 See M Walker ‘Gender and language: examining the use of diagnostic language in the discussion of gender 
variance’ (2014) International Journal of Child, Youth and Family Studies 5(2): 332-345, fn 3. 
9
 For more on this see inter alia: E M Bodoin, C T Byrd and R K Adler ‘The clinical profile of the male-to-
female transgender person of the 21
st
 century’ (2014) Contemporary Issues in Communication Science & 
Disorders 41:39-54; S Hines (Trans)Forming Gender: Social Change and Transgender Citizenship in E 
Oleksy (ed) Intimate Citizenships: Gender, Sexualities , Politics (Routledge/Taylor & Francis 2009) 79-99. 
10
 S Stryker ‘Gender pluralisms under the transgender umbrella’ in Currah Juang and Minter (n 7) 5. 
11
 V L Bullough ‘Legitimatizing transsexualism’ (2007) International Journal of Transgenderism 10(1):3-13; 
4 
12
 S Whittle, L Turner and M Al-Alami Engendered Penalties: Transgender and Transsexual People’s 
Experiences of Inequality and Discrimination (Equalities Review 2007) 6 
14 
 
which transsexual is merely one position on that spectrum. Therefore the prefix trans* in 
the context of sex (as in transsexual) or gender (transgender) has multiple meanings: to 
cross, to transcend, to go beyond, to transgress. The slippage between the usage of 
transgender and transsexual can somewhat be explained by Ekins and King’s use of the 
term ‘transgendering’. Ekins and King use ‘transgendering’ to refer both to those who seek 
to permanently change sex (transsexuals) to those who transcend conventional 
understandings of sex and gender (transgenders).
13
 In discussion with trans* individuals 
Ekins and King developed four narratives to describe the varieties of trans* experiences: 
migrating (moving from one to the other), oscillating (moving backwards and forwards 
between male and female), erasing (expunging one’s gender altogether) and transcending 
(moving beyond the male/female binary system into a third space). Again Ekins and 
King’s research highlights the diversity of trans* experiences and although oscillating, 
erasing, and transcending are clear examples of transgender individuals, migrating is not: 
migrating from male to female or vice versa implies a desire to permanently move i.e. it is 
more appropriate to use the term transsexual in relation to this specific group. So although 
the terms are often used interchangeably to include all gender variant individuals and 
transsexuals this thesis will continue to use the sub-categories of transsexual, transgender 
and transvestite as these categories become particularly important in the medical and legal 
context as will be shown throughout this thesis. It is the particular group labelled 
transsexual which will be the focus of this thesis. Largely this was determined by the PhD 
project in itself rather than actively by myself because I was primarily concerned with 
those who sought to utilise the GRA 2004 to live full time as members of the opposite sex 
and so I was necessarily limiting my focus to those who identified as transsexual, however 
this in itself has raised the possibility of future research exploring the ways in which 
transgender individuals fit within the UK legal system.
14
 Indeed, as Chapter Six will show 
there is now a growing acknowledgement that law ought to provide recognition for those 
whose gender identity exceeds that currently recognised in law. 
 
This then led me to the question ‘what is the difference between legal and physical sex 
change?’ Although in theory at the start of this PhD process I was aware that one did not 
                                                 
13
 R Ekins and D King ‘Towards a sociology of transgendered bodies’ (1999) The Sociological Review 
47(3):580-602. 
14
 This has formed the basis for two presentations which I have delivered recently: the first titled ‘Law as 
Symbolic Other in the process of achieving transsexual personhood’ was presented at the 2012 Socio-legal 
Studies Association annual conference and the second was called ‘The (Gender)Queer in UK Law: Why 
current protections are insufficient’  which was presented at the 2013 Identity and Belonging workshop held 
at Edinburgh University. 
15 
 
require to change one’s body prior to obtaining a Gender Recognition Certificate (GRC), I 
was not fully appreciative of what this meant. Therefore considerable time was spent 
exploring, and ultimately discarding, the human rights and medical literature on body 
modification. This literature formed an initial point of examination for me but I quickly 
realised that it was largely redundant to the central point of this thesis: whether or not one 
chooses to alter one’s body is completely separate from obtaining a GRC and I was much 
more concerned with the stage before body modification – the diagnosis of gender 
dysphoria because it is this stage which amounts to the gate through which an individual 
must pass before being able to progress in their quest to be accepted as members of the 
opposite sex and have their internal gender identity recognised for legal purposes.  
 
Once the complicated legal issues of body modification had been largely discarded as 
irrelevant to this thesis my focus was becoming much clearer. I then decided it was 
necessary to examine the topic from both a medical and legal perspective because this is 
where I saw the potential problems. So I found it necessary to consider how the medical 
profession deal with transsexual individuals. I explored the development of the condition 
resulting in the contemporary diagnostic criteria and I then explored the constituent parts 
of the medical process of diagnosing and treating transsexualism. On exploring the legal 
aspect of sex change I was struck by how law and medicine, until 2004, took very different 
approaches to transsexual individual: medicine was concerned with ensuring that the 
individual was not harmed and that he or she was provided with whatever treatment best 
suited their needs whereas UK law was, and continues to be, primarily concerned with 
certainty of sex, consistency between judgments and the impact that transsexuals have in 
relation to the wider community. The question of law being involved in the 
acknowledgment of gender identity and of giving rights to transsexuals is largely seen as a 
positive thing as it protects the rights of such individuals. In recent years, as a result of a 
focused legal campaign by individuals regarding rights for transsexuals, in both the UK 
and European Courts
15
 there has been growing recognition, and legal protection,
16
 of the 
                                                 
15
 As evidenced by the cases of Rees v United Kingdom (1987) 9 EHRR 56; B v France (1993) 16 E.H.R.R. 
1; Van Oosterwijck v. Belgium 3 EHRR 557; Goodwin v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 18; Van Kück v 
Germany (2003) 37 EHRR 51; L v Lithuania (2008) 46 EHHR 22; X, Y and Z v United Kingdom (1997) 24 
EHRR 143; Cossey v United Kingdom (1991) 13 EHRR 622; Sheffield and Horsham v United Kingdom 
(1999) 27 EHRR 163. 
16
 Such as the Equal Treatment Directive (76/207/EEC) as interpreted in the case of P v S and Cornwall 
County Council (C13/94 [1996] 2 CMLR 247 as prohibiting discrimination in the workplace on the basis of 
an employee’s sex re-assignment; Council Directive 2006/54/EC; the Gender Recognition Act 2004; The Sex 
Discrimination (Gender Reassignment) Regulations 1999 SI 1999/1102 which amended the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1975; the Sex Discrimination (Amendment of Legislation) Regulations 2009; The 
16 
 
rights of such individuals to be able to live as members of the sex opposite to their birth 
sex and to participate fully in civil, economic and social society as such. Human rights 
laws, such as the right to one’s gender identity (as part of respect for private life under 
Article 8) and the right to marry protected by Article 12 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (ECHR),
17
 are considered by those 
campaigning in this field to be a step towards legal protection of transsexual rights.
18
 
 
So although there has been a growing transsexual rights movement the question of the role 
of the medical profession is only recently being considered. The clinician who is 
responsible for providing a diagnosis to a transsexual individual will either use the 
American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders Fifth Edition (DSM 5) or the World Health Organisation’s International 
Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems 10
th
 Revision (ICD-10). 
The issue of depathologisation
19
 of gender identity by removing it from the DSM and ICD 
was proposed by The Advocate as early as 1996
20
  however the question of the extent to 
which the medical profession should be involved has been a sustained focus of enquiry 
only recently with the revision of the DSM and the ICD. The American Psychiatric 
Association had been involved in the revision of the latest version of the DSM from 1999 
until 2013 and the World Health Organization is currently revising the ICD.
21
 One of the 
issues which was explored in these revision processes was whether or not to remove 
gender identity disorder from DSM 5
22
 and transsexualism from ICD-11.
23
 A side issue 
                                                                                                                                                    
Protection from Harassment Act 1997; the Equality Act 2010 s.7; the Offences (Aggravation by 
Prejudice)(Scotland) Act 2009. 
17
 Van Kück v Germany (2007) 37 EHRR 51; I v United Kingdom (2003) 36 EHRR 53; Goodwin v United 
Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 18. The importance of Articles 8 and 12 ECHR will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapters Two and Three. 
18
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then became if the condition was to be retained in either classification system how should 
it be defined?
24
 Ultimately gender identity disorder as a medical condition was removed 
from DSM 5 however it was replaced by gender dysphoria which retains the medical 
profession’s role in the process of determining one’s gender.25 It remains to be seen 
whether transsexualism will continue to be included in ICD-11 when it is published in 
2018. The issue of the potential depathologisation of transsexualism by its omission from 
DSM 5 and ICD-11 at the start of the process of completing this PhD was merely a 
theoretical possibility and unfortunately it remains as such as a result of the retention of the 
condition, albeit renamed as gender dysphoria in DSM 5. The retention of these medical 
conditions in the diagnostic manuals and therefore their continued pathologisation led me 
to question the difference between pathologisation and medicalisation.  
 
There is considerable literature on medicalisation as an academic discipline and it was 
never my intention to examine this literature in depth as I am not concerned with 
medicalisation per se but rather the involvement of the medical profession in determining 
whether or not an individual can be given a diagnosis of gender dysphoria if the clinician 
is using the DSM 5 or of transsexualism if using the ICD-10. However, it is important at 
this point to clarify what is meant by both medicalisation and pathologisation as these are 
concepts which, although not discussed in any depth in the thesis, underpin much of the 
arguments being made in the thesis. Medicalisation “occurs when previously non-medical 
problems are defined and treated as medical problems, usually in terms of illnesses or 
disorders.”26 Skolbekken claims that one of the characteristics of medicalisation is that it 
results in “the constant widening of categories of symptom-free individuals in need of 
medical attention.”27 Those working in the sociology of medicine and health argue that 
many life experiences have been medicalised. A search of the literature suggests that 
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experiences such as: pain,
28
 childbirth,
29
 breastfeeding,
30
 menstruation,
31
 fertility,
32
 (male) 
circumcision,
33
 eating,
34
 sexual orientation
35
 and indeed behaviour
36
 have all been subject 
to the gaze of medicine and therefore have become medicalised. Indeed Skolbekken argues 
that life itself has become medicalised and he states that this has been as a result of the 
“pathologisation of normality”37 It is important to outline the impact that medicalisation of 
a characteristic, trait or behaviour has on how it is contemporaneously understood. One of 
the major consequences of particular human traits coming under the gaze of medicine is 
that this process, the medicalisation of them, results in how those traits or behaviours are 
perceived. No longer is the trait or behaviour perceived as a normal variant of human 
experience but rather it transforms into a deviation from normality: in the case of 
transsexualism those who identify as members of the sex opposite to their birth sex are not 
generally thought of as merely exhibiting natural gender variance but rather can be 
diagnosed as transsexual and treatment can be provided to alleviate their psychological 
suffering.
38
 
 
This is hugely important because, as Chapter One will show, variance in sexual behaviour, 
which may be thought of as completely normal and natural, was in the 1500s classed as 
deviant and sinful which led to the punishment of those who practices such sexual 
activities. This then led to the identification of a group of people; transsexuals. Over the 
course of almost a century the medical profession continued to refine what this term 
‘transsexual’ actually meant thus taking gender variance (a natural occurrence) and 
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recreating it as a medical concern; a condition, and indeed identity, completely owned by 
the medical profession – one could not be transsexual unless the medical profession, 
applying certain tests and standards, agreed that one was in fact transsexual. 
 
There is a clear link between the medicalisation of human conditions such as gender 
variance and their pathologisation. Medicalization brings it within the realm of medicine 
and pathologisation renders it abnormal. Gender variance is a natural aspect of the human 
condition but through the work of early sexologists it became pathologized i.e. abnormal. 
This pathologisation continued through the 20
th
 century and was further developed in each 
iteration of the diagnostic manuals where transsexualism as a medical condition was 
refined. As Butler writes in relation to gender variance “[t]he [diagnosis of GD] can 
operate in several ways, but one way it can and does operate […] is as an instrument of 
pathologisation”39 and that “[t]o be diagnosed with [GD] is to be found, in some way, to be 
ill, sick, wrong, out of order, abnormal, and to suffer a certain stigmatization as a 
consequence of the diagnosis being given at all.”40 
 
There is an ongoing debate surrounding the cost-benefit of having GD within the 
diagnostic manuals. One the one hand it is argued that removing the diagnosis would result 
in individuals being unable to access the medical procedures they require to transition. 
However on the other there are strong arguments for removing the condition from the 
diagnostic manuals – it is through being in these manuals that what it means to have GD is 
determined and ‘brought into being’ i.e. GD (as a medical condition) does not exist outwith 
the medical profession and the diagnostic manuals. Raymond argued in 1979 that it was 
the medical profession which created transsexualism, and as Chapter One will show, she is 
right. According to Raymond medicine has created an empire around transsexualism 
whereby “a number of medical specialists [combine] to create transsexuals – urologists, 
gynaecologists, endocrinologists, plastic surgeons, and the like.”41 The input of medicine 
has been to ‘create’ a condition and then develop a means of treating it. She claims that 
“without [medicine’s] sovereign intervention, transsexualism would not be a reality.”42 
That is not to say that before medicine identified the condition of transsexualism no one 
experienced feelings of being the opposite sex. Chapter One will clearly show that through 
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the centuries there have been such individuals. However the question then is to what extent 
is gender variance natural or pathological? 
 
A review of literature would suggest that gender variance is not an unnatural act, indeed it 
may well be that those who could be said to be 100% male or 100% female are in the 
minority…if such a thing could actually be determined. It is important to consider at this 
point what is meant by the terms sex and gender. Sex refers to one’s physical body and 
gender refers to one’s physiological identification as male or female. Human beings are, by 
in large, a diamorphic species; either male or female. Howson claims the: 
 
‘natural attitude’ towards sex and gender in the West assumes that people belong to 
one of two possible distinct categories determined on the basis of given biological 
and anatomical characteristic.
43
 
 
However the natural attitude is merely that, an attitude, not a universal truth. This means 
that sex and indeed gender is a spectrum and there are a variety of different ways of 
experiencing one’s gender and living one’s gender. Personally I am of the opinion that 
determining how one identifies as male or female should not be a question for another 
individual to make i.e. a medical professional, or for the law. However it remains the case 
that law and medicine do not support this perspective and in both UK law and worldwide 
medicine transsexualism remains a medical condition. This means then that it is crucial to 
examine it as both a legal and medical issue and to consider the extent to which medicine 
has impacted on the legal ability of UK domiciled transsexuals to have their gender 
identity recognised for legal purposes.  
 
So, although this thesis derived from personal conversations with friends and a personal 
need to fully understand the process of physically and legally changing sex it quickly 
developed into an academic enquiry into the role of law and medicine in relation to the 
issues presented by transsexual individuals. The process of completing the PhD has not 
been easy, that is to be expected, and as noted above a number of sub-topics required to be 
fully explored to ensure that this thesis was as comprehensive as it could be in 100,000 
words. Although several of the sub-topics I explored do not find their way into this thesis 
the time I spent on them and the work I have done in exploring them has not been wasted. 
The wider exploration of the various issues raised have primarily given me a much fuller 
appreciation of the subject of this thesis but it has also provided inspiration for a number of 
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future projects which I have begun to explore. Although the past seven years has seen 
various iterations of this thesis the questions which always remained constant and to which 
I always returned were to what extent has the medicalisation of cross-sex identities 
impacted on the GRA 2004, what are the consequences of this for the individuals involved 
and is it possible to develop a better approach to gender identity recognition in UK law? 
 
This developed into the focus of my research:  to show how the GRA 2004 adopted a 
particular medical model of transsexualism as the basis for the provision of legal 
recognition of gender identity which in turn provides for a particularly strong 
gatekeeper role for medical professionals, that this model upon which the GRA 2004 is 
built is flawed, and that there is a better alternative approach available. 
 
Overview of Chapters 
To examine this the thesis is split into three parts which map to the three underlying 
propositions which are set out above. Part I examines how transsexualism as a medical 
condition emerged from various sexological and medical enquiries in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. Chapter One shows how the medical model of transsexualism which 
underpins the GRA 2004 was, in 2003/4, inevitable as a result of over a century of 
investigation into the causes of gender variance resulting in those individuals who 
expressed gender variance, of any kind, being deemed unwell. Conrad note that this 
process  is one of the key characteristics of medicalisation so in effect it is possible to say 
that the emergence of transsexualism as a medical condition in the late twentieth century 
was a result of the medicalisation of gender variance which occurred over the preceding 
century. The medicalisation of gender variance has resulted in gender variance being 
classified, in a variety of ways, in diagnostic manuals and an entire medical discipline has 
developed to diagnose and treat such individuals. It is only in very recent years, after the 
enactment of the GRA 2004, that calls to both demedicalised – remove any form of 
medical input into the determination of gender identity -  and depathologise – remove 
gender variance from the diagnostic manuals - gender variance have been made.  
 
Once the emergence of transsexualism as a medical condition has been established Chapter 
Two examines the way in which law dealt with those individuals who partook of the 
medical advances which were set out in Chapter One. Through a detailed examination of 
case law, Chapter Two explores the legal consequences for individuals of not being able to 
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acquire legal recognition of their gender identity. The purpose of this is to show the impact 
that non recognition has on those individuals whose gender identity is unrecognised before 
UK law. Chapter Three then explores the possibilities for reform which arise from the case 
of Goodwin.  
 
Chapter Four critically examines the legislation and outlines the provisions of the GRA 
2004 and shows how the GRA 2004 works and what criteria need to be fulfilled to enable 
the individual to acquire legal recognition of his or her gender identity. The focus of this 
chapter is to show how the GRA 2004 specifically legislates based on a medical model of 
transsexualism for the provision of legal recognition of gender identity in two particular 
ways: (i) through the requirement for a diagnosis and (ii) through the test placed on the 
GRP to ensure that only ‘true’ transsexuals are able to acquire legal recognition. The 
requirements that one obtains a diagnosis of GD and also that their application is 
scrutinised by the GRP are fundamental problems because they acts as potential points, 
gatekeeper points, at which the individual may be stopped by a third party from being able 
to access the protections in the GRA 2004.  
 
Part II of the thesis explores the second central proposition – that the medical model in the 
GRA 2004 is deeply flawed in relation to its suitability as a foundation for law. In so doing 
Chapter Five shows how the medical model operates in practice.  The issue of medical 
professionals acting as gatekeepers will be explored. Although the gatekeeper function of 
medical professionals has been long accepted, particularly when considering such medical 
procedures as cosmetic surgery and fertility treatment etc. what is less familiar is the idea 
that medical professionals will act not as gatekeepers to treatment per se but rather the 
GRA 2004 establishes the medical profession as gatekeepers of legal identity because 
without the individual being able to obtain a diagnosis of Gender Dysphoria (GD) as 
required by the legislation the individual cannot then make an application to have his or 
her gender identity recognised in UK law; therefore the diagnostic stage is crucial within 
the current model of legal recognition in the UK. This chapter shows how the diagnosis is 
made and argues that at various points during the diagnostic stage the individual can be 
halted in his or her quest for legal recognition. In addition the chapter explores the 
gatekeeping role placed on the GRP. In doing so the various subsections of s.2 of the GRA 
2004 will be critiqued to show that the law actually requires that the GRP only let those 
pass who could be said to be true transsexuals i.e. those who fit the medical model of 
transsexualism in 2003/4. The key point of this is to show that the various tests in s.2 of the 
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GRA 2004 are potentially very difficult to satisfy because they are not about ensuring that 
everyone who seeks legal recognition will get it but rather their purpose is to limit who 
obtains legal recognition to a proportion of the transgender community – those who seek to 
live forever as a member of the opposite sex. Indeed it could even be said that those who 
are able to pass through the s.2 test are likely to be those who could be called ‘classic’ 
transsexuals i.e. who have already undergone body modification prior to applying for a 
GRC: these issues are explored in depth in Chapter Five. However not only is there a 
problem with the GRA 2004 requiring a diagnosis of GD and requiring that a panel 
scrutinise application but there is also a fundamental problem with basing the law on a 
medicalised approach to gender variance per se. Chapter Five also explores how the 
accepted medical position on gender variance in the 2004 Act is in itself a weak foundation 
for gender identity recognition laws because medical knowledge continues to develop 
beyond that which existed in 2003/4. This chapter shows that the medical understanding of 
gender variance in 2003/4 is substantially different from that in existence in 2015 and the 
changes within medicine fundamentally challenge the UK’s approach to the provision of 
legal recognition of gender identity. Chapter Five outlines how the specific requirements in 
the GRA 2004 places very strict boundaries around who will be able to achieve legal 
recognition of their gender identity and argues that this approach is contrary to the way that 
the medical profession currently understands gender variance. As the GRA 2004 
provisions have remained static while the medical understanding of gender variance has 
developed the GRA 2004 therefore acts in a way which excludes other individuals who do 
not meet the provisions within the Act despite them potentially being able to obtain a 
diagnosis of GD from the medical profession. 
 
Since the issues contained in the Chapter Five undermine the suitability of the medical 
model of transsexualism as a foundation for gender recognition laws it is then necessary to 
examine the possible alternative approach which could be taken. Part III of the thesis turns 
to developing an alternative means of providing legal recognition of gender identity in UK 
law, one in which there is no third party role in determining one’s gender identity. This 
thesis argues that a model of recognition of gender identity which is based on gender self-
declaration is possible and indeed desirable. Chapter Six explores how the self-declaration 
model can give rise to a more inclusive, and thus better, approach to gender identity 
recognition than currently exists in the GRA 2004. When embarking on the research for 
this thesis it was not possible to show that other non-medical models of gender identity 
recognition existed in law however during the process of researching and writing this 
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thesis five jurisdictions amended their legislation: Argentina, Colombia, Denmark, Ireland, 
and Malta. The approach taken in each of these countries is to remove the input of any 
medical professional in the process of individuals being able to acquire legal recognition of 
their gender identity. Indeed they all go further than that and remove any third party 
intervention into the legal process:
44
 this approach, the self-declaration model is, as will be 
argued in Chapter Six, a much better model on which to base legislation because it 
removes the gatekeeper roles of the medical professional and third parties in this process 
and therefore allows the individual’s sense of self as  male or female to be acknowledged 
and recognised in law without first having to be tested for accuracy or underlying causes. 
 
                                                 
44
 Unless the applicant in Ireland in aged 16 or 17 in which case he or she needs parental permission and 
medical intervention. 
25 
 
1. The Emergence of Transsexualism as a Medical 
Condition 
  
Introduction 
Transsexualism as a medical condition first appeared as a distinct condition in the 
American Psychiatric Association’s (APA) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM) in 1980. Although this might suggest its recognition is relatively recent, 
the medical focus on gender variance began in the 1800s and thus as, Sharpe claims, 
contemporary transsexualism has a long and complex genealogy.
45
 This chapter explores 
how transsexualism developed and emerged as a medical condition in the mid 1950s as a 
result of sustained focus on gender variant individuals and homosexual behaviour which 
began to be the concern of sexologists in the late 1800s. The purpose of this chapter is to 
show how gender variance and homosexuality, naturally occurring variances of human 
beings, led to the development of a particular way of thinking about gender variant 
individuals in particular as being unwell. This particular way of thinking about those who 
would become labelled as transsexuals in the 1950s led to the legislation adopting the 
medical model of transsexualism as its basis for legal recognition of gender identity.  It 
should be noted that the contemporary medical condition in DSM 5 is named gender 
dysphoria whereas in earlier versions of the DSM it was referred to as Gender Identity 
Disorder (GID). In the World Health Organisation’s International Classification of 
Diseases and Related Health Problems 10
th
 Revision (ICD-10) the condition is referred to 
as transsexualism. So, where appropriate, the terms transsexualism, GID and GD will be 
used interchangeably.   
 
The history of transsexualism can be split into three distinct periods. The first period began 
in the late 1800s where the primary researchers were sexologists and the focus was on 
homosexual behaviour. The second period was from the 1920s to the 1970s when medical 
science was developing at a fantastic rate, particularly in relation to the identification, and 
artificial creation, of hormones and advances in surgical and aseptic techniques which 
resulted in tensions within medicine itself, particularly between psychiatrists and surgeons 
and endocrinologists in relation to the aetiology of gender variance and its treatment. The 
third distinct period is from 1970 to today which is dominated by the work and influence of 
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pioneering sexologist, Harry Benjamin. This chapter will now explore each of these 
distinct periods in the history of the emergence of transsexualism as a medical condition 
and will show how the medical profession dealt with individuals who presented as, or 
professed to be of, the opposite sex to their birth sex. The purpose of doing this is to show 
how the foundation for the GRA 2004 was created because it was through this medical 
development of the condition of transsexualism that the resultant legislation became 
framed in such a way as to include certain individuals and exclude others, based on a 
medical assessment of their self-defined gender identity.
46
 
 
Stage 1: the initial focus of sexologists on non-procreative 
sexual behaviour 
The contemporary understanding of transsexualism began with the work of nineteenth and 
early twentieth century sexologists working in the field of deviant sexuality. Weeks claims 
that “[f]rom the mid nineteenth century the medical profession began to break down the 
formerly universally execrated forms of non-procreative sex into a number of ‘perversions 
and deviations’”.47 The task of theorists and sexologists was to catalogue the emerging 
deviant sexualities and to find a cause for such behaviour.
48
  The norm was seen as 
heterosexual procreative, or at least potentially procreative, sex. Anything which deviated 
from this supposed norm was seen as a perversion which must have been caused by 
something; it was certainly not seen as natural. The early sexologists were therefore not 
concerned with gender variance per se but with classifying sexual behaviour and 
attempting to argue that it was a result of a person’s nature and not sinful desire. As will be 
seen from the following discussion homosexuality began to emerge as a distinct category 
following this initial research. Once homosexuality was studied and categorised, other 
‘deviant behaviour’ could be distinguished from it. It was from this recognition of 
homosexuality that such behaviours as transvestism were identified and, then later, 
transsexualism. So, while in the early 1800s, transsexual individuals were not considered 
to be a distinct group separate from other minority groups such as homosexuals it was 
through this early work on homosexuality that transsexualism came to be recognised as a 
distinct condition.  Furthermore, as Hill notes, this work identifying a “proliferation of 
“perverse sexuality” was met with a corresponding rise in the social control of sexuality, 
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which was increasingly medical and psychiatric”49 and which will be discussed in more 
detail later this chapter, when the work of the sexologists is examined.  
 
The historical legal context 
The legal context in which the early sexologists were working was such that 
homosexuality was a criminal offence. The anti-homosexuality legislation, which formed 
the basis from which the sexologists in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
would eventually distinguish between homosexuals and transsexuals, derived from anti-
buggery laws, which had much earlier history. Fone writes that: 
 
[i]n 1533, the twenty-fifth year of the reign of Henry VIII, Parliament noted that as 
yet England had no “sufficient” punishment for “the detestable and abominable 
vice of buggery committed with mankinde or beast.”50 
 
So, in 1533, in an effort to provide such a sufficient punishment the Buggery Act was 
passed which criminalised all male homosexual sexual activity alongside other forms of 
sexual behaviour which could be classified as sodomy e.g. heterosexual non-vaginal 
intercourse; the punishment being death.  
 
In 1553 the Buggery Act was repealed by Mary Tudor.
51
 However, in 1558 Queen 
Elizabeth I reinstated the earlier Buggery Laws as passed by Henry VIII.
52
 As will be 
shown throughout this chapter this legacy of criminalisation of such behaviour was to 
continue throughout the centuries with particularly negative implications for those who 
identified not only as homosexual but also for those who identified as members of the sex 
opposite to their birth sex i.e. those who, in the 1950s, came to be called transsexuals. It 
was these initial laws which, centuries later, prompted the research into so-called deviant 
sexuality and the evolution of the medicalisation of transsexualism. 
 
Therefore, buggery and sodomy had been statutory criminal offences in England and 
Wales since the early 1500s. In Scotland, such acts were criminalised under the common 
law crime of lewd, indecent and libidinous practices.
53
 The law in both jurisdictions was 
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concerned with behaviour, not individuals, and was concerned with sexual acts which were 
deemed to be a “sin against nature”.54 As Weeks claims, “all acts of sodomy were equally 
condemned as being ‘against nature’, whether between man and woman, man and beast, or 
man and man.”55 The Buggery Act 1533 was finally repealed by s.1 of the Offences 
Against the Person Act 1828 however the offence was merely replaced by s.15 of the 1828 
Act. The name given to such activities in s.15 of the 1828 Act was sodomy. The death 
penalty for buggery was only abolished in England and Wales in 1861 and in Scotland in 
1889. 
 
However, despite the death penalty as punishment for this behaviour being abolished, the 
law was not about to take a lenient approach to homosexual behaviour. In 1885, the 
Criminal Law Amendment Act (CLAA 1885), by means of the Labouchère Amendment, 
criminalised gross indecency in both England and Wales and Scotland. The Labouchère 
Amendment became s.11 of the CLAA 1885 which provided that: 
 
[a]ny male person who, in public or private, commits, or is a party to the 
commission of, or procures or attempts to procure the commission by any male 
person of any act of gross indecency with another male person, shall be guilty of a 
misdemeanour, and being convicted thereof shall be liable at the discretion of the 
court to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding two years, with or without hard 
labour. 
 
This section was often used to prosecute male homosexual acts,
56
 indeed it has been argued 
that the Labouchère amendment enabled the state to prosecute those who engaged in male 
homosexual behaviour where it was not possible to prove that buggery or attempted 
buggery had taken place.
57
 Those who engaged in particular sexual acts and those who 
were deemed to be cross-dressers (contemporary transsexuals as well as transvestites and 
transgendered individuals) were considered to be sodomites and were severely punished.
58
 
Weeks notes that “[s]odomy was a portmanteau term for any forms of sex that did not have 
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conception as their aim, from homosexual acts to birth control” 59 i.e. a more contemporary 
form of the anti-buggery provisions which the offence of sodomy contained in the s.15 of 
the 1828 Act replaced. Weeks argues that: 
 
[t]he gross-indecency clause of the Criminal Law Amendment Act has to be set 
against a background of a sharpening definition of and hostility towards 
homosexuality in the late nineteenth century, not only in Britain but in other 
European Countries, especially Germany.
60
 
 
It is important that other European countries were criminalising homosexual behaviour at 
this time, as much of the work of early sexologists derived from continental Europe in 
which similar legal and social changes were occurring. For example, in 1870 the Prussian 
Penal Code criminalised male homosexual behaviour (other than mutual masturbation) in 
all German states.
61
 Even in countries where homosexual acts were not illegal per se 
“social hostility sharply increased towards the end of the [nineteenth] century.”62 In the 
United Kingdom, the social condemnation and further criminalisation of homosexual 
behaviour can be traced to the social purity movement of the 1880s.
63
 The social purity 
movement, to simplify, was largely concerned with public sexuality in the form of 
prostitution, particularly as it related to the ‘white slave trade’. However as Weeks claims, 
prostitution and male homosexuality soon became seen as part of the “continuum of 
undifferentiated lust, products of men’s sexual selfishness.”64 In the minds of the moral 
crusaders of the late nineteenth century “the syndromes of schoolboy masturbation, public-
school ‘immorality’ (meaning homosexuality) and prostitution were closely intertwined.”65  
Alongside this condemnation of sexual practices deemed harmful to the social order was 
the increase in dominance of the concept of the family which, according to Weeks, had by 
the 1880s “become the paradigm of a stable society.”66 Inherent within this model of the 
family was heterosexual procreative sex.
67
 At this point in social history, major changes 
were happening such as the calls for children’s protection in the workplace and other calls 
for reform of the law such as those focusing on sex, child protection from neglect and 
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abuse, employment, education etc.
68
 and this influenced the approach taken to 
homosexuality. However, these acts of criminalisation and social condemnation did not 
prevent the behaviour; individuals still practiced non-heterosexual and non-procreative sex 
and some individuals presented as members of the opposite sex as evidenced in the 
literature being explored in this chapter. It was within this context of illegality and social 
condemnation that the early sexologists began to differentiate between homosexuals and 
transsexuals.  
 
The Early Sexology Work: 1880s-1920s  
One of the first sexologists to attempt to classify the sexual impulses of individuals was 
Richard von Krafft-Ebing. In 1877 Krafft-Ebing’s Psychopathia Sexualis was first 
published in which he undertook “a vast taxonomic project”69 which sought to classify 
particular features of a number of case studies he carried out. The study was predicated on 
the belief held by Krafft-Ebing that “any departure from procreative heterosexual 
intercourse represents a form of emotional or physical disease.”70 In fact, according to 
Stryker and Whittle “Krafft-Ebing considered homosexuality to be a form of gender 
variance.”71 Although current understandings of homosexuality and transsexuality would 
clearly make demarcations between both of these identities, for the early sexologists they 
were manifestations of one another and there was no simple separation of homosexuality 
and transsexuality. So, rather than use the word homosexuality to describe the sexual 
desires which he observed in patients Krafft-Ebing used the term antipathic sexual 
instinct.
72
 For Krafft-Ebing one’s gender identity (although he never used this term) 
followed one’s physical development and sexual maturation. He noted that “[i]f the sexual 
development is normal and undisturbed, a definite character, corresponding with the sex, is 
developed.”73 So, all being well, male children mature and develop a male gender identity 
and desire females and vice versa for female children. He continued: 
 
[i]f the original constitution is favourable and normal, and factors injurious to the 
psycho-sexual development exercise no adverse influence, then a psycho-sexual 
personality is developed which is so unchangeable and corresponds so completely 
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and harmoniously with the sex of the individual in question, that subsequent loss of 
the generative organs (as by castration) or the climacterium or senility, cannot 
essentially alter it.
74
 
 
He explored the possibility that development of one’s gender identity, which he termed 
psychosexual development, was influenced by one’s “generative glands”75 i.e. one’s testes 
and ovaries. He concluded that there must be some role for the testes and ovaries, although 
their exact role was unclear to him.
76
 The fact that such a role was unclear in the late 
nineteenth century when Krafft-Ebing was conducting his study is not a surprise. As will 
be discussed below, it was only in the early twentieth century that hormones were 
discovered by scientists and their role in psychosexual development began to be theorised 
and explored. However, for Krafft-Ebing gender identity was not solely determined by 
physiology. He observed: 
 
that the physical processes taking place in the genital organs are only co-operative 
and not the exclusive factors, in the process of development of the psycho-sexual 
character, is shown by the fact that, notwithstanding a normal anatomical and 
physiological state of these organs, a sexual instinct may be developed which is the 
exact opposite of that characteristic of the sex to which the individual belongs.
77
 
 
Therefore the term antipathic sexual instinct was used to describe these individuals whose 
gender identity was opposite to that which could be expected. Of these individuals he 
stated that: 
 
since in nearly all such cases, the individual tainted with antipathic sexual instinct 
displays a neuropathic predisposition in several directions, and the latter may be 
brought into relation with hereditary degenerate conditions, this anomaly of 
psycho-sexual feeling may be called, clinically, a functional sign of degeneration.
78
 
 
This is important. The classification of those who would today be called transsexuals 
within the heading of antipathic sexual instinct meant that for the first time those who 
identified as members of the opposite sex were considered to be ill. He determined that 
there were two types of antipathic sexual instinct: acquired and congenital.
79
 Of congenital 
antipathic sexual instinct he stated: 
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[t]his inverted sexuality appears spontaneously, without external cause, with the 
development of sexual life, as an individual manifestation of an abnormal form of 
the sexual life.
80
 
 
Of acquired antipathic sexual instinct he stated “it develops upon a sexuality the beginning 
of which was normal, as a result of very definite injurious influences.”81 It is the congenital 
antipathic sexual instinct which, for Krafft-Ebing, gave rise to a condition which included 
those covered by the term metamorphosis sexualis paranoica
82
 which was considered “the 
most extreme, and therefore the most pathological, form of gender deviation in Krafft-
Ebing’s conceptual framework.”83 It is this group, first identified by Krafft-Ebing as 
exhibiting a pathological sexual preference, which we now understand as transsexuals; 
those with a desire to change their bodies to appear as members of the opposite sex. So, as 
can be seen Krafft-Ebing’s work was really the beginning of a sustained enquiry into 
deviant sexuality which gave rise to identifying different forms of antipathic sexual instinct 
which, when further explored and delineated gave rise to the possibility of transsexuals 
emerging as a distinct category of individuals in the sexology literature at a later date. 
 
Therefore it can be seen that in the era in which Krafft-Ebing was writing and carrying out 
his study transsexuals, as contemporaneously understood, were not a separate category of 
individuals but rather represented a category of homosexuals who were deemed to have a 
pathological sexual preference. Indeed Stryker and Whittle argue that those individuals 
identified by Krafft-Ebing as comprising the metamorphosis sexualis paranoica sub-group 
of homosexuals were, according to him “profoundly disturbed, and [he] considered their 
desire for self-affirming transformation to be psychotic.”84  
 
Following on the work of Krafft-Ebing was that of Magnus Hirschfeld’s famous Die 
Transvestiten: eine untersuchung über den erotischen verleidungstrieb
85
 which was first 
published in 1910. Whereas in its contemporary usage ‘transvestite’ denotes an individual 
who, usually male, dresses as a member of the opposite sex and who, normally, 
experiences sexual arousal from this cross-dressing Hirschfeld did not distinguish between 
transvestites and transsexuals but rather he used the term ‘transvestite’ to refer to both 
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groups; those who cross-dressed for sexual pleasure and those who claimed to be a 
member of the opposite sex. Indeed Lukianowicz notes that “Hirschfeld uses several 
different criteria in his classification of transvestism.”86 It is this complex system of 
categorisation of transvestites which enables Hirschfeld to encapsulate both erotic cross-
dressers and contemporary transsexuals within the one term. According to Lukianowicz it 
is possible to identify 10 sub-categories of transvestite within Hirschfeld’s Die 
Transvestiten only one of which corresponds to the contemporary understanding of 
‘transsexual’: Hirschfeld’s ‘complete’ transvestite who seeks to have his sex changed. 
These are the same individuals who Krafft-Ebing referred to in the late nineteenth century 
as exhibiting metamorphosis sexualis paranoica.
87
 It was at this point that transsexuals 
really began to emerge in sexology literature as a distinct group separate from 
homosexuals and cross-dressers and it was this work which separated those who could be 
called ‘complete transvestites’ in Hirschfeld’s lexicon or those exhibiting metamorphosis 
sexualis paranoica in Krafft-Ebing’s who would continue to be the focus of so much 
research into the nature and causes of this identification.
88
  
 
In this period transsexuals began to be described as ‘inverts’ which implied that there was 
a mistake in the natural order of biological body and psychological identity. Ellis, writing 
in the mid twentieth century, claims that female inverts possessed a “masculine 
straightforwardness and sense of honor”89 whereas Krafft-Ebing, writing at the end of the 
nineteenth century, claimed that such female inverts have a “dislike and sometimes 
incapacity for needlework”90 and “an inclination and taste for the sciences.”91 Within the 
work of these early sexologists was a prevailing biological determinism; men and women 
behaved in a particular manner appropriate to their biological sex, anyone who did not 
behave in a gender appropriate manner was an invert. These non-normative preferences 
and identities became medicalised due to the focus on classifying individual’s various 
behaviours, preferences and identities.  Once medicalised by being placed within the 
domain of medical science and psychiatry the ‘perversions’ e.g. homosexuality, 
transsexuality, transvestism etc., became pathologised. As noted in the Introduction to this 
thesis the link between medicalisation and pathologisation is a close one and often when 
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characteristics, traits and behaviours become medicalised this results in their 
pathologisation i.e. being judged against an accepted norm. The pathologisation of these 
behaviours will be noted below when an examination of the diagnostic manuals is given. 
 
This period in the history of the emergence of transsexuality as a medical condition was 
dominated by the medicalisation of gender variant behaviour which was examined as a 
means of developing a taxonomy of sexual behaviours. The enquiry into gender variant 
behaviours in this period in history is, therefore, an offshoot of a preoccupation with 
studying, classifying and pronouncing on human sexual behaviour. This work was ground-
breaking at the time but was not without its flaws.
92
 Hill notes that “[s]exologists were 
clearly making things up as they went along, guided by theories, clinical observations, and 
existing wisdom.”93 One of the consequences of this early stage work was that transsexuals 
began to be thought of as ill rather than as deviant and it was this label of illness which 
resulted in the pathologisation of gender variant behaviour in later years. Following on 
from the work of sexologists in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was the 
development of medical science, particularly in relation to discovery of hormones and the 
development of aseptic and anaesthetic techniques which further developed the 
medicalisation of gender variance and further strengthened the medical model of 
transsexualism. The following section details the impact that developments in medical 
science had on enabling the emergence of transsexuals as a focus of medicine and the 
tension which subsequently arose between general medicine and psychiatry.  
 
Stage 2: the 1920s – 1970s and the battle between general 
medicine and psychiatry 
Advances in medical science played a crucial part in the realisation of transsexual identity. 
While conceptually transsexuals had begun to be separated from homosexuals in the work 
of the sexologists as outlined above, medicine made it possible for those with cross-sex 
identities to alter their bodies in such a way to enable a permanent change from one sex to 
the other. A combination of surgical advances regarding anaesthesia and aseptic 
techniques, and developments in medical science concerning hormone production and 
understanding their influence on gender identity and secondary sex characteristics, along 
with advances in the development of electrolysis, enabled the treatment of those who 
identified as members of the sex opposite to their birth sex.  
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Discovery of hormones and anaesthetics 
As noted above, in the early stages of investigation into gender variance, Krafft-Ebing 
posited that gender variant behaviour was in some way influenced by what he called 
‘generative glands’, but which are contemporaneously known as gonads i.e. testes and 
ovaries. At the time Krafft-Ebing was writing the role of testes and ovaries in the 
production of sex hormones was unknown and therefore the link between gender variant 
behaviour and physiological factors was merely an idea. An investigation into the effects 
of, what were then called, internal ‘secretions’ began in the 1880s and was well advanced 
by the 1940s. This led to the identification of hormones. Initial experiments on animals 
aided a deeper understanding of how hormones influence the development of one’s gender 
identity.
94
 In 1929, the female sex hormone estrone (a form of estrogen) was identified by 
American scientists Edgar Allen and Edward A Doisy and separately by German scientist 
Adolf Butenandt.
95
 By 1931 it was possible to produce estrone artificially; this was done in 
both the USA and Germany. Progesterone was then isolated in 1934 and testosterone in 
1935. According to Bullough “[t]he availability of injectable hormones allowed a large 
number of investigators to carry out extensive studies with sex hormones on animals and 
also on humans.”96 
 
Therefore, it was now becoming possible to provide treatment, by means of body 
modification, for those who identified as cross-sex by providing surgical and/or hormonal 
interventions. In this period in the history of the emergence of transsexualism as a medical 
condition, the dominant model for characterising what was later to become known as 
Gender Identity Disorder (GID), then transsexualism and currently as Gender Dysphoria 
(GD) was the biological model
97
 which sought to highlight that those individuals whose 
gender identity (and gender expression)
98
 deviated from the norm were suffering from a 
condition which had its roots in the physical body. 
 
Although surgical, and indeed endocrinological, treatment was possible, early sex re-
assignment surgery was not wholly accepted by the medical profession, in particular 
psychiatry, which relied upon a psychological root cause of the condition which 
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necessitated a psychiatric treatment. For example, in 1953 in the Journal of the American 
Medical Association Weideman
99
 and Ostow
100
 advocated psychotherapy as the means to 
treat such individuals; a call to treat the mind rather than the body; it is the important 
interaction between psychiatry and psychoanalysis on the one hand and surgery and 
endocrinology on the other which will now be focused on because whereas for psychiatry 
the aim was to treat the individual’s mind in an attempt to reconcile the individual with the 
reality of his or her body the aim of general medicine, including surgery and 
endocrinology, was to provide a means of alleviating the dysphoria experienced by the 
patient through altering the individual’s body to correspond with his or her gender identity.  
 
Building on the work of sexologists the 1950s to 1970s marked a period in the history of 
the development of transsexualism as a medical condition which was dominated by 
psychiatry and psychology. By the start of this period psychological based literature, often 
displaying a Freudian psychoanalytic perspective, highlighted a link between transsexual 
identity and cross-dressing
101
 or, particularly in the case of male-to-female (MTF) 
transsexuals, with an over-close maternal relationship and a paternal relationship 
characterised by distance.
102
 One such theorist was Robert Stoller, an American 
psychoanalyst who, writing in the 1960s, “believed that male-to-female transsexuality was 
a pathology of psychosexual development”103 which originated in childhood as a result of 
the child’s relationship with his mother and father. 
 
Once of the first pieces of work to take this approach was David Cauldwell’s Psychopathia 
Transsexualis which was published in 1949.
104
 It is thought that Cauldwell was the first to 
use the term ‘transsexual’ in the way it is currently used.105 In this article Cauldwell 
presents the case of ‘Earl’: a female who identified as, and sought medical intervention to 
become, male. In relation to the cause of transsexualism Cauldwell wrote that “[t]heir 
condition usually arises from a poor hereditary background and a highly unfavourable 
childhood environment.”106 This is reminiscent of the case studies presented by Krafft-
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Ebing in the late nineteenth century. In Earl’s case Cauldwell identified poor familial 
relationships. For example the paternal grandfather was a successful man however the 
“father was a spoiled son, petted and spoiled by his mother and sisters.”107 One older 
brother was making a successful life away from the family but the other older brother was 
“feebleminded, never learned to talk, and while in his 20’s was committed to a state 
institution.”108 Earl was “impressed with the adulation with which the men of the family 
were showered […] Frequently she was dressed as a boy.”109 Earl sought surgical 
procedures to create a penis and was reportedly incensed with the claim that requested 
procedures such as these amounted to criminal action by the surgeons. 
 
From the overview of the background and family history of Earl presented by Cauldwell it 
is clear to see that, for him, transsexualism derives from one’s psychology and upbringing. 
At the time of Cauldwell’s interaction with Earl the legality of sex re-assignment surgery 
was being debated in the USA as a result of the sex re-assignment of Christine 
Jorgensen.
110
 Jorgensen was a USA national who underwent sex re-assignment surgery in 
Denmark in 1952 and then returned to the USA. Psychiatrists Weideman and Ostow wrote 
that she ought to have been treated by psychotherapy rather than surgery. The comments 
by Weideman
111
 and Ostow
112
 are not surprising given that at the time Jorgensen had her 
sex re-assignment surgery such procedures were relatively new and indeed transsexuality 
per se was only just becoming noticed by the medical profession at large. The idea that an 
individual should receive psychiatric interventions to enable them to change their gender 
identity to correspond with their bodies contrasted with the willingness of some medical 
professionals to alter the individual’s body to correspond with their gender identity. This 
contrast of approaches to such individuals, according to Bullough, “marked the beginning 
of a turf war”113 between psychiatry and surgery regarding the best way to provide 
treatment for transsexualism. In addition to the disagreement between surgeons and 
psychiatrists regarding the preference for psychotherapy or surgery, there was also 
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disagreement between groups of physicians some of whom questioned the desirability of 
doctors engaging in what was seen as “deliberate mutilation”114 of patients.  
 
It was the “hostile reactions of psychoanalysts”115 to the possibility of body modification 
procedures for what they viewed as “undifferentiated perversions”116 in opposition to the 
work being carried out by surgeons and endocrinologists which created the impasse in the 
1950s and 1960s. The opinion of the psychoanalysts at the time was that surgery to alter 
one’s secondary sex characteristics was untherapeutic.117 For Volkan and Bhatti such 
requests for surgery amounted to a “surgical acting out of psychosis”118 and, in the opinion 
of Meerloo, surgeons who operated on such patients were “guilty of collaboration with 
psychosis.”119 Transsexual individuals during this period were characterised by 
psychoanalysts as borderline psychotics
120
 or as victims of “paranoid schizophrenic 
psychosis”.121 Although sexologists at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the 
twentieth centuries had begun to distinguish between transsexuals and homosexuals and 
between transsexuals and transvestites by the end of the 1960s the difference between the 
groups remained controversial, at least within the psychoanalytic community of the time. 
In 1968 in the introduction to a special edition of the Journal of Nervous and Mental 
Diseases which sought to explore the phenomenon of transsexualism and sex re-
assignment procedures Kubie and Mackie noted that what was meant by transsexualism “in 
contradistinction to “transvestite” or “homosexual” is not clear.”122 So despite the work of 
early sexologists in beginning to delineate between these groups of people, the differences 
were not being fully appreciated by the wider medical community who often failed to 
distinguish between transsexuals and transvestites and between transsexuals and 
homosexuals. As Billings and Urban put it, it was this “professional opposition to sex-
change surgery and disputes over its legality [which] inhibited recognition of 
transsexualism as a disease for several years.”123 It was the pioneering work of sexologist 
Harry Benjamin which drove forward the endocrinal and surgical treatment for individuals 
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who identified as members of the opposite sex and it was ultimately Benjamin’s work 
which led to the development of diagnostic and treatment protocols which led to the 
wholesale medicalisation of gender variance, and its impact on the current law in the UK. 
 
Stage 3: 1970 - 2003 
Following on from the work of Cauldwell Borras et al claim that Harry Benjamin then 
“delimitated the framework of this disorder and was the first to apprehend it as an 
autonomous entity, as distinct from psychosis, homosexuality, or sexual perversions.”124 
Benjamin himself first used the term ‘transsexual’ in an article in the International Journal 
of Sexology
125
 in 1953 where it was used to apply to those individuals who exhibited such 
severe gender dysphoria that sex re-assignment surgery and hormonal therapy to enable the 
individual to change their body was deemed the appropriate course of treatment.
126
 
Therefore, according to Richard Ekins, Harry Benjamin “is the founding father of 
contemporary western transsexualism.”127 It was Harry Benjamin who “took the 
revolutionary step of seeking to secure ‘sex change’ surgery for suitable applicants”128 and 
who pioneered research into transsexualism, establishing the first Gender Identity Clinic at 
Johns Hopkins University. As such, “Benjamin’s influence was paramount.”129 Benjamin 
was a sexologist, not a research scientist or a theorist. He was “part of what might be called 
the liberal wing of sexology which was tolerant of sexual variation and diversity.”130  He 
began his work from the perspective of aiding those individuals who claimed to be trapped 
in the wrong body. He posited that there were three groups of transsexual; firstly those who 
did not seek surgery, secondly those with moderate intensity desire to alter their bodies and 
finally those with high intensity desire for surgery. He created a sex orientation scale 
which, in his opinion, represented the sexed identity of the human population. His scale 
consisted of his three types of transsexual further categorised by six subcategories as 
follows: 
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Transsexual Group Type Diagnosis 
--------- 0 Normal  
1 1 Pseudo transvestite 
2 Fetishistic transvestite 
3 True transvestite 
2 4 Transsexual – non surgical 
3 5 Transsexual – moderate intensity 
6 Transsexual – high intensity. 
 
Although Benjamin acknowledged the influence of environmental factors, he was of the 
opinion that the root cause of transsexualism was biological; if the possibility for 
transsexualism did not occur in the body, then environmental factors would be of little 
influence.
 131
  Benjamin wrote “[i]f the [body] is healthy and normal no severe case of 
transsexualism, transvestism or homosexuality is likely to develop in spite of all 
provocations.”132 
 
Therefore, Benjamin adhered to the nature plus nurture model of transsexualism, although 
his primary emphasis was firmly on nature. Benjamin believed that the crucial stage in the 
development of transsexualism was when the individual was in utero where exposure to 
certain sex hormones influenced the (sexed) brain development of the unborn child. This in 
utero development provided the building blocks, the predisposition to a particular identity 
which the child’s environment would either enable or repress. Benjamin was critical of 
‘nature only’ advocates such as the US psychiatrists of the 1940s and 1950s.133 What was 
ground-breaking about Benjamin’s work was the fact that he advocated surgical 
intervention for those who could be considered in need of it. Ekins writes that: 
 
[w]hereas other health professionals had wanted to treat the ‘psychopathology’ by 
seeking to cure the patient of his wish for ‘sex change’, Benjamin [...] took the 
revolutionary step of advocating a change of body for select patients.
134
 
 
Benjamin’s focus and drive to understand transsexualism and to advocate for a surgical 
means to ‘cure’ it meant that he developed a clinical sub-specialism; the science of gender 
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dysphoria.
135
 The development of a medical model of transsexualism, which began in the 
late nineteenth century with the work of sexologists keen to understand what, at the time, 
amounted to perverse sexualities and which then continued through to the work of Harry 
Benjamin, meant that the patients could be provided with a means of altering their bodies 
to alleviate their dysphoria, but more importantly, it also meant that those who were 
previously considered deviant were now considered ill. The early sexology work sought to 
understand those who participated in homosexual and non-procreative heterosexual 
practices but it was from this work that the category of transsexual began to emerge. It was 
therefore this early work which created the conditions whereby it was possible not only for 
transsexuals as a group to emerge but also transsexualism as a medical condition to be 
developed. The work of the early sexologists which sought to provide an understanding of 
why individuals engaged in non-procreative heterosexual activities largely determined that 
a small number of such individuals engaged in such activities because they were more like 
members of the opposite sex than their birth sex; thus the category of transsexual was born 
(although not fully named until the 1950s). However it was in this stage of the emergence 
of transsexualism as a medical condition that the medicalisation of gender variance really 
took hold; had the work of the early sexologists taken a different track then it could be 
argued, although not proven, that the development of transsexualism would have been very 
different. It may well be argued that the separation of those who could be classed as 
transsexual and those who could be classed as homosexual would not have happened and 
that those who identified as members of the opposite sex would have continued to be 
considered to be homosexual. However this is merely supposition; transsexualism began to 
emerge at the end of the 1800s as a distinct phenomenon which merited further 
investigation by the medical and scientific communities. As noted above this resulted in 
links between hormones and gender identity being developed and it also resulted in an 
aetiological dispute arising: did gender variance occur as a result of one’s abnormal 
physiology or one’s abnormal psychology (or indeed a combination of both)? What is 
important to take from this medical and scientific enquiry into cross-sex identification was 
that it was deemed contrary to normal psychosexual development and therefore must occur 
as a result of a defect within the individual. By the time Harry Benjamin began his research 
the category of transsexual was firmly established albeit that there was dispute within 
medicine as to its aetiology. However, the work by Benjamin was ultimately self-fulfilling. 
As he interviewed clients and determined who was or was not transsexual he, perhaps 
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unwittingly, reinforced his own theory as to the causes of transsexualism thereby 
strengthening the medicalisation of gender variance. As Ekins notes: 
 
[a]s sex-reassignment surgery became more widely available given certain 
(heteronormative) criteria, there is little doubt that clients began to conform to these 
criteria in their presentations of themselves.
136
 
 
As Benjamin’s theories on transsexualism developed and became more widely available a 
model of what it meant to be transsexual began to develop and, some have argued, this led 
to individuals who sought access to body modification procedures adopting the narrative 
which Benjamin expected to hear
137
 which continues to have an impact on who is 
considered transsexual by the medical profession and therefore impacts on who can access 
the provisions in the GRA 2004.   
 
Gender variance becomes pathologised: the diagnostic manuals  
The work of Benjamin was crucial not only in fully medicalising gender variance but also 
in pathologising it. His work resulted in gender variant behaviour being included in 
medical diagnostic manuals, thereby fully pathologising it, and his work also resulted in an 
entire industry growing to support the diagnosis and treatment of such individuals. The two 
diagnostic manuals which contain classifications used to diagnose transsexualism were 
mentioned in the Introductory chapter to this thesis but to recap these are the World Health 
Organisation’s International Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems 
currently in its tenth edition (ICD-10)
138
 and the American Psychiatric Association’s 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders currently in its fifth edition (DSM 
5).
139
 The DSM “delineates the authoritative nomenclature of psychiatric nosology within 
the western world.”140  As such, it is used as a diagnostic classificatory authority by a 
number of groups, in particular psychiatrists and general practitioners.
141
 The ICD is an 
international classificatory system which can be used alongside the DSM or as an 
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alternative to the DSM. Following the work of Benjamin, as outlined above, 
transsexualism first appeared in the ICD-9 in 1975 followed shortly thereafter by its 
inclusion in the DSM-III in 1980.
142
 Drescher notes that prior to 1975 there had been no 
mention of transsexualism in previous versions of the ICD and although ICD-8, published 
in 1965, included a category of transvestitism it is not clear that this referred to 
contemporary transsexualism because “[d]efinitions of diagnostic categories were not 
provided in the ICD-8.”143 This conceptual uncertainty is not a surprise given that at this 
time there were debates and disputes within medicine itself concerning transsexualism as a 
medical condition particularly in relation to the aetiology, as will be shown below. In 
addition there were disputes surrounding the most appropriate means of providing 
treatment to such individuals as already noted above in the discussion surrounding the 
dispute between psychiatry and general medicine.  
 
With its inclusion in the two diagnostic manuals in 1975 and 1980 gender variance had 
become a specific medical concern whereby the patient has a desire to change his body to 
live full time as the opposite sex. In placing transsexualism in these diagnostic manuals 
those who expressed any form of gender variance and indeed cross-sex identification 
became firmly pathologised. As noted in the Introductory chapter the link between 
medicine and pathologisation is strong: medicalisation occurs when human traits, 
behaviours and characteristics become the focus of the medical profession such that it 
becomes almost impossible to conceive of them as anything other than a medical process 
or a medical condition and they become pathologised when compared to a norm. In 
relation to transsexualism, cross-sex identification was not seen as a form of natural gender 
variance whereby gender expression and experience of one’s gender exists on a spectrum 
but rather it was, by 1975, fully accepted as a deviation from the norm which must have 
occurred as a result of a problematic psychosexual development and thus transsexualism as 
a delineated medical condition was born which had complex diagnostic criteria which were 
outlined in the DSM-III and ICD-9, and subsequent versions, and an industry began to 
develop to care for and treat such individuals: the medical model of transsexualism was 
being established and then strengthened through these developments. 
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Aetiology of Transsexualism 
So, although by 2004 the diagnostic requirements were clearly established there was 
considerable debate concerning the aetiology of transsexualism.
144
 In determining the 
aetiology of transsexualism, common themes began to emerge. As discussed above the 
1940s to 1970s was dominated by a ‘turf war’ between psychiatrists and physicians 
regarding the appropriate means of treating the cross-sex identifying patients. This 
disagreement arose, to some extent, from differing opinions regarding the aetiology of the 
condition. It is possible to theme the literature on aetiology into that which proposes a 
physiological cause (nature), a psychological cause (nurture), or a combination of both 
(nature and nurture).
145
 Not only was there debate surrounding the most appropriate means 
of treating those who exhibited gender variance as outlined above, it can also be observed 
from the thousands of articles on the aetiology of gender variance there was also 
considerable debate concerning the causes of the condition itself. It is the development of 
aetiological research which will now be considered as, despite the thousands of articles 
written on this subject, it remains impossible to provide consensus on the aetiology of 
transsexual identification which in turn highlights that the medical model, although 
outwardly appearing to be coherent, in fact can be undermined from within medicine itself 
by production and examination of counter-narratives such as the work on aetiology as will 
now be shown and indeed as the following chapter will show the debate surrounding 
aetiology was crucial in the cases before the European Court of Human Rights in the 1980s 
and 1990s.  
 
Studies have highlighted various connections between a patient’s physiology and their 
gender variance. It has regularly been posited that transsexual identification can occur as a 
result of exposure to certain hormones during foetal development. Although the foetus will 
be exposed to certain hormones from the mother during pregnancy, endogenous hormone 
exposure, and this may potentially impact on the individual’s psychosexual development 
the research focused primarily on exogenous hormone exposure. Hormones were 
artificially administered during pregnancy as part of medical treatment from the middle of 
the twentieth century although the long term impact of this was not foreseeable in all 
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respects: one such impact of artificially administering hormones in this way was the 
possible link with the child developing a transsexual identity, which only began to come to 
light decades later. In 1981 Beral and Colwell reported on an experiment carried out in 
1950 which sought to evaluate the effect of “high doses of stilboestrol and ethisterone on 
the outcome of pregnancy of diabetic mothers.”146 The aim of the original study was to 
determine whether or not administering oestrogens and progestogens during pregnancy 
reduced the rate of miscarriage and stillbirth. The report by Beral and Colwell was a 27 
year follow up in relation to the earlier study. They note that “[o]ver the years it has 
become increasingly clear that in utero exposure to exogenous sex hormones may have 
adverse long-term effects.”147 As evidence of this, for example in 1958 Wilkins et al 
reported the masculinisation of the genitalia of female children exposed to exogenous 
progestins in utero.
148
 In 1959 Kaplan reported feminisation of male children exposed to 
female hormones in utero.
149
  
 
It is clear from these studies then that exposure to hormones in utero can have a physical 
effect on the foetus. However, for the purpose of this thesis the link between cross-sex 
hormone exposure in utero and its impact on the individual’s psychosexual development 
needs to be explored. The link was theorised as early as the 1950s.
150
 Research by Phoenix 
et al in 1959, which has been described by Diamond as the “classic experimental research 
on the influence of testosterone”,151 demonstrates that exposure to sex hormones in utero 
can affect the behaviour of the resultant offspring. The study by Phoenix et al showed that 
when testosterone was administered to pregnant guinea pigs, female offspring behaved, in 
terms of attempted mating behaviour, as though they were male.
152
  Almost 30 years later 
Goy et al showed that administration of testosterone during pregnancy in primates resulted 
in female offspring behaving as male even if there was no external evidence of the 
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treatment.
153
 It would appear that the effect of hormones in utero can impact on the 
behaviour of the resultant offspring despite there being no physical masculinisation of the 
anatomy of a female or feminisation of a male. Yalom et al have also argued that there is 
evidence that sex hormones influence both the behavioural and anatomical masculinity and 
femininity of individuals.
154
 They note that:  
 
[h]uman females exposed in utero to androgenic hormones, whether exogenously 
introduced to the pregnant woman as progestins to avert abortion or endogenously 
produced as in the andrenogenital syndrome, are both anatomically virilised and 
behaviourally masculinised.
155
 
 
At the time Yalom et al reported their findings, not much information was available in 
relation to the effect on the male foetus of exposure to estrogen, particularly in relation to 
humans.
156
 As with the report of Beral and Colwell, noted above, Yalom et al sought to 
explore the impact of treating pregnant diabetic women by means of exogenous 
administration of estrogen and progesterone. Yalom et al asked “[w]hat is the 
psychosexual picture of the male offspring at different developmental time points who 
were exposed prenatally to these hormones?”157 To answer the question they sought to 
compare a group of six year old boys and a group of sixteen year old boys who had been 
exposed to exogenous estrogen and progesterone in utero with control groups. It was found 
that the group exposed to the hormones in utero were “significantly less “masculine” than 
the contrast […] sample.”158 In relation to heterosexual development and masculine 
interests Yalom et al noted that there was a trend “for the experimental subjects to have 
had less heterosexual experience and fewer masculine interests than either of the contrast 
groups.”159 They also note that in relation to the aggression-assertion measurements of the 
experimental groups the “experimental subjects are less aggressive-assertive than the 
contrast […] populations.”160 The Yalom et al study indicated that in utero exposure to 
exogenous cross-sex hormones is likely to have an impact on the psychosexual 
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development of the child; this assertion has been repeated in numerous studies.
161
 
Although these reports were of the administration of exogenous sex hormones, 
masculinisation of female foetuses and feminisation of male foetuses can occur as a result 
of endogenous cross-sex hormones where the mother may naturally produce abnormal 
levels of sex hormones during pregnancy which, it has been posited, may impact on the 
child’s later psychosexual development. Nevertheless, despite the research outlined above, 
Lish et al reported in 1992 that in a follow-up study of 60 women exposed to 
diethylstilbestrol in utero there were no demonstrable effects of the hormones in relation to 
the women’s behavioural masculinisation or defeminisation162 Diethylstilbestrol is “a very 
potent nonsteroidal estrogen”163 and at the time of the study the link between exposure to 
sex hormones and the subsequent development of the foetus’ central nervous system 
(CNS) and the sex differentiation of the genitalia was being explored though numerous 
studies.  It was clear at the time that testosterone had a role to play in the development of 
the genitalia and the CNS.
164
 However the Lish et al study found that, at the low doses 
studies, there was little long-term impact on the child in terms of either masculinisation or 
defeminisation of their play or in relation to the their adult gender-role behaviour. 
Therefore the science remains uncertain in relation to the effects in utero exposure to 
cross-sex hormones can have on the foetus’ psychosexual development and more studies 
would be required to demonstrate if there is any clear correlation for different hormones, 
levels and timing of their influence on such development. 
 
Not only has endocrinology been considered as a potential cause of transsexualism, brain 
development has also been studied by scientists researching in this area and it has been 
                                                 
161
 See for example: J M Reinish, M Ziemba-Davis and S A Sanders ‘Hormonal contributions to sexually 
dimorphic behavioural development in humans’ (1991) Psychoneuroendocrinology 16(1-3):213–278; H F L 
Meyer-Bahlburg, A A Ehrhardt, J F Feldman, L R Rosen, N P Veridiano and I Zimmerman ‘The 
development of gender-related behavior in females following prenatal exposure to diethylstilbestrol’ (1989) 
Hormones and Behavior 23(4): 526-541; P Kester, R Green, S J Finch, and K Williams ‘Prenatal ‘female 
hormone’ administration and psychosexual development in human males’ (1980) Psychoneuroendocrinology 
5(4):269-285; J Money and D Matthews ‘Prenatal exposure to virilizing progestins: an adult follow-up study 
of twelve women’ (1982) Archives of Sexual Behavior 11(1):73-83; S A Berenbaum and M Hines ‘Early 
androgens are related to childhood sex-typed toy preferences’ (1992) Psychological Science 3(3):203-206; A 
A Ehrhardt ‘Behavioral effects of estrogen treatment in the human female’ (1978) Pediatrics 62:1166-1170 
and H F L Meyer-Bahlburg ‘Behavioral effects  of estrogen treatment in human males’ (1978) Pediatrics 
62:1171-1177. 
162
 J D Lish, H F L Meyer-Bahlburg , A A Ehrhardt, B G Travis and G Veridiano ‘Prenatal exposure to 
diethylstilbestrol (DES): childhood play behavior and adult gender role behavior in women’ (1992) Archives 
of  Sexual Behavior 21(5):423–441. 
163
 ibid 424. 
164
 ibid. 
48 
 
reported numerous times that the brain is sexed as either male or female.
165
 Recent medical 
studies, specifically those involving scientific research on brain composition, support the 
theory that transsexual identification is a condition with its root cause in the body’s 
physiology.
166
 Kruijver et al suggest that cross-sex identification, which manifests itself by 
a differentiation in the size of the bed nucleus of the stria terminalis (BST), appears to be 
unaffected by adult hormone ingestion.
167
 The results of the research show that male-to-
female (MTF) transsexuals' BST is akin to that of heterosexual, genetic females' BST.
168
 
Likewise, the single female-to-male (FTM) transsexual in the study had a BST that was 
similar in size to that of heterosexual, genetic males.
169
 The Kruijver et al study indicates 
that in the case of transsexualism the BST has a sex-reversed structure.
170
 In 1995 Zhou et 
al argued that transsexualism was caused by an interaction between the developing foetal 
brain and sex hormones.
171
 Zhou et al claim that MTF transsexuals had a female sized 
central subdivision of the bed nucleus of the stria terminalis; the area of the brain 
responsible for sexual behaviour.
172
 The problem with this research is that it can only be 
carried out post-mortem and therefore cannot be used to determine whether or not the live 
individual should be considered male or female. It would appear, however, that the brain 
sex theory of gender variance has continued through to the present day as it has been 
mentioned in contemporary case law.  
 
                                                 
165
 E Gould, C S Wooley and B S McEwan ‘The hippocampal formation: morphological changes induced by 
thyroid, gonadal and adrenal hormones’ (1991) Psychoneuroendocrinology 16(1-3):67-84; J M Juraska ‘Sex 
differences in “cognitive” regions of the rat brain’ (1991) Psychoneuroendocrinology 16(1-3):105-119; M 
Hines, L S Allen and R A Gorski ‘Sex differences in subregions of the medial nucleus of the amygdala and 
the bed nucleus of the stria terminalis of the rat’ (1992) Brain Research 579(2):321-326; D F Swaab, E Fliers 
and T S Partiman ‘The suprachiasmatic nucleus of the human brain in relationship to sex, age and senile 
dementia’ (1985) Brain Research 342(1):37-44; D Constant and H Rutter ‘Sexual dimorphism in the human 
corpus callosum? a comparison of methodologies’ (1996) 727(1-2):99-106; L S Allen, M Hines, J E Shryne 
and R A Gorski ‘Two sexually dimorphic cell groups in the human brain’ (1989) The Journal of 
Neuroscience 9(2):497-506; L S Allen and R A Gorski ‘Sexual dimorphism of the anterior commissure and 
massa intermedia of the human brain’ (1991) Journal of Comparative Neurology 312(1):97-104; A Bao and 
D F Swaab ‘Sex differences in the brain, behavior, and neuropsychiatric disorders’ (2010) Neuroscientist 
16(5):550-565.  
166
 F P M Kruijver, J-N Zhou, C W Pool, M A Hofman, L J G Gooren and D F Swaab ‘Male-to-female 
transsexuals have female neuron numbers in limbic nucleus’ (2000) The Journal of Clinical Endocrinology 
and Metabolism 85(5): 2034-41 
167
 ibid. See also F P M Kruijver, A Fernández-Guasti, M Fodor, E M Kraan and D F Swaab, ‘Sex 
differences in androgen receptors of the human mamillary bodies are related to endocrine status rather than to 
sexual orientation or transsexuality’ (2001) The Journal of Clinical Endocrinology and Metabolism 86(2): 
818-27. 
168
 Kruijver, Zhou, Pool, Hofman, Gooren and Swaab (n 167) 2034. 
169
 ibid 2038. 
170
 ibid.  
171
 J Zhou, M A Hofman, L J G Gooren and D F Swaab ‘A Sex Difference in the Human Brain and its 
Relation to Transsexuality’ (1995) Nature 378(6552):68-70 
172
 ibid 68. 
49 
 
In addition to arguments that the individual is predisposed to identifying as male or female 
as a result of foetal brain development and exposure to sex hormones in utero there has 
been research which suggests that genetic abnormalities may play a role in cross-sex 
identification. A genetic aetiology for transsexual identity has been proposed by Sadeghi 
and Fakhrai, who claim that their study of female monozygotic twins suggests that there 
may well be a genetic cause for the condition.
173
 Links have also been made with 
conditions such as Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH).
174
  In addition to CAH Yalom 
et al note that other conditions such as Androgen Insensitivity Disorder (AID) may result 
in behavioural changes in relation to the male foetus’ adult interactions and sense of self. 
AID is a metabolic condition which results in the male foetus being “unable to utilize 
androgen being secreted by the testes.”175 The child is born appearing to be female 
however the child’s genetic makeup is 44 + XY indicating a male genetic complement. 
The children also have “intra-abdominal testes and no ovaries.”176 Therefore the child 
appears to be female and is raised female and yet is genetically male. This research may 
lead to the conclusion that the condition is a biological condition, one which some medical 
experts suggest results in transsexuals being born with a ‘birth defect’ because their bodies 
are not in line with their internally felt sexed identity
177
 therefore necessitating treatment of 
a physiological nature to alter the body. What is becoming clear from these various studies 
is that it is not possible to say with any degree of certainty why an individual develops a 
cross sex identity, or indeed any degree of gender variance.  
 
However not all researchers agree that the cause of one’s GD/transsexualism begins in the 
body and propose therefore a psychological cause; one more based in the mind or as a 
result of upbringing. In relation to psychological factors and impact of upbringing on the 
development of transsexual identity Cohen-Kettenis and Gooren observe that: 
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[p]arental influences, such as extreme closeness to the mother (“blissful 
symbiosis”), atypical psychosexual development of the parents, father absence, or 
parental dynamics (such as a maternal wish for a daughter) have been held 
responsible for the development of [GD].
178
 
 
This perspective has been developed by others.
179
 One of the earliest theorists adopting the 
position that transsexual identity is caused by one’s psychology, including the impact that 
parents have on their child’s psychosexual development was Robert Stoller, referred to 
earlier.
180
 In 1979 Stoller posited that transsexuality was caused by parental psychology 
when raising the child.
181
 Stoller argued that MTF transsexuals have powerful masculine 
mothers, often women who regret not having changed sex and weak, absent fathers.
182
 In 
1982 Jones and Tinker made the claim that “[a]lthough most professionals agree that 
family dynamics are associated with gender identity conflicts, the exact nature of this 
association is unclear and subjective.”183 In exploring the link between family dynamics, 
psychology and transsexualism numerous theories have been presented.
184
 One study 
carried out in 2003 sought to explore the link between transsexualism and childhood 
trauma resulting in adult dissociation. Kersting et al utilised the Interview for Dissociative 
Disorders (SCID-D-R), the Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES) and the Childhood 
Trauma Questionnaire (CTQ) to compare the samples. They found that the transsexual 
group reported a higher DES result than the psychiatric inpatient group and that this was 
down to one factor: emotional maltreatment. Therefore, these papers would suggest that 
childhood experience and attachment with care-givers may have a role to play in an 
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individual developing a cross-gender identity and that the causes of transsexualism are 
complex. 
 
As the above section has shown, the aetiology of transsexualism as a medical condition is 
constantly evolving as new research uncovers new possible causes of the condition. At the 
time the legislation was drafted, it was not possible to determine with any certainty the 
reasons why individuals developed transsexual identities and this remains the case. This 
has implications for any law which is built upon such an uncertain and ever changing 
foundation: if transsexual identity within medicine was a condition which did not evolve 
and change as medical and scientific knowledge evolves and changes then it is arguable 
that it may be appropriate to base a legal response on this model. However, Chapter Five 
will show that the continued research into the transsexual condition itself continues to 
undermine the certainty of the contemporary medical model as a foundation for law 
because the contemporary medical model of transsexualism is continuing to evolve. For 
this reason it will be argued in subsequent chapters that any model of legal recognition 
which is underpinned by the medical model of transsexualism requires itself to be dynamic 
and able to respond to changes in the medical knowledge which constitutes the medical 
model of transsexualism at any given point in time. It will be argued that law taking such a 
responsive approach is undesirable because it would require regular reform and revision as 
and when the state of medical knowledge changed. For that purpose subsequent chapters 
will show that it is possible to base legal recognition not on a medical model of 
transsexualism but rather on a human rights based model which acknowledges that one’s 
gender identity is a deeply held sense of oneself not knowable to others without disclosure 
from the individual himself or herself; such models are beginning to appear in jurisdictions 
worldwide. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown how transsexualism as a modern day medical condition developed 
throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The chapter showed how the early 
criminalisation of non-procreative sexual activity led to the development of research into 
those who were initially identified as sodomites and, later, as homosexuals. Although 
homosexuality and transsexualism are very distinct identities and are in no way related it 
was this early focus on homosexuality which enabled the development of research into 
transsexual identification, initially as a manifestation of homosexuality, and then later 
recognised as representing individuals who identified as members of the opposite sex. 
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Therefore this chapter has shown that it is not possible to fully appreciate the modern day 
medical model of transsexualism without fully understanding the roots of the phenomenon 
and without having an appreciation of the conditions which enabled its emergence. By the 
time Harry Benjamin began researching transsexualism the condition was fully within the 
realm of medicine and it became impossible to conceptualise it as anything other than a 
medical condition which needed treatment, either by psychotherapy to ‘cure’ the mind or 
by surgery and endocrinology to alleviate the patient’s dysphoria. As was noted in this 
chapter the work of Harry Benjamin was instrumental in developing a treatment model 
which discounted attempts to ‘cure’ the patient by means of psychotherapy but rather 
which favoured physical intervention to reconcile mind and body. Benjamin’s sustained 
research on transsexualism resulted in the inclusion of transsexualism within the third 
version of the American Psychiatric Association’s (APA) Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) and the World Health Organisation’s International 
Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD) and then in later editions of 
both diagnostic manuals to the present day. Despite the calls for depathologisation of the 
condition made by Trans* activists as outlined in the Introduction to this thesis, the current 
prevailing medical consensus is that transsexual identity cannot be thought of as a choice 
of the individual but rather a result of abnormal psychosexual development. As will be 
shown throughout this thesis, this model is one upon which current law is based because by 
the time the legislation was being debated the medical model of transsexualism was fully 
accepted as truth and was almost impossible to think of those with cross sex identity as 
anything other than transsexual. With the label ‘transsexual’ came the whole medical and 
psychiatric profession and placed the individual within a system of knowledge which 
placed boundaries around his or her sense of self which impacted on how the law 
approached such individuals. The following chapter will outline how UK law dealt with 
those who engaged with this medical model of transsexualism and transitioned from the 
sex registered at birth to the opposite sex. 
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2. The Historical Quest for Legal Recognition of 
Gender Identity: UK Law’s (non)Response to 
Medical Developments 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter outlined how transsexualism emerged as a medical condition which 
meant that only those who met the strict diagnostic criteria could be considered to be 
transsexual and receive treatment to alleviate the dysphoria they experienced when their 
gender identity did not match their physical sex. In so doing medicine created a category of 
person; an identity, the transsexual. These developments in medicine, however, had a legal 
impact on those who transitioned as law did not develop at the same pace as medicine in 
this area. As a result those who partook of these medical developments and transitioned 
found themselves in a difficult position of having to seek recognition of their transition 
from the law which historically was not forthcoming thereby placing these individuals in 
the position of appearing to be one sex while legally being classified as the opposite and 
this caused numerous difficulties for these individuals. This chapter, through a thorough 
examination of case law from 1957
185
 until 2001,
186
 will show how law dealt with the 
medical developments outlined in the previous chapter.  
 
Legal Sex in UK Law 
In UK law one is either male or female. One’s legal sex is “determined at birth, using 
genital, gonadal and chromosomal factors.”187 However the situation is a lot less complex: 
the reality is that one’s sex is usually determined at birth upon no more than a cursory 
glance at the child’s anatomy. Therefore, the appearance of particular genitalia is the main 
way by which an individual is attributed a physical sex in the UK.
188
 The individual 
acquires a legal sex on registration of their birth in an appropriate register. Historically, the 
only mechanism by which a legal sex could be changed was by allowing an alteration to be 
made to the particular register only if a mistake had been made on initial registration of 
that person’s birth as was established in X, Petitioner outlined below.  
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X, Petitioner189  
This case provides a particularly useful example from which to gather an understanding of 
the ability to alter one’s legal sex as opposed to one’s physical sex. The case itself was not 
about legal recognition per se but rather about amending entries in the Register under the 
Registration of Births, Deaths and Marriages (Scotland) Act 1854 (the 1854 Act) where the 
individual had undergone sex re-assignment procedures. The case said nothing in itself 
about how the law determines the legal sex of an individual but it did provide that 
registered sex cannot be changed unless an error was made when initially registering the 
child’s birth or if a mistake had been noticed subsequently i.e. if the individual was 
intersex but this was not apparent when the birth was registered. In X, Petitioner the 
petitioner was born male and was registered as such in 1907. When X was born there was 
no ambiguity as to her
190
 sex therefore the registration of her as male was correct.  X 
married a woman in 1939, fathered two children and then in 1945 separated from her wife. 
Thereafter X sought to live as a woman and underwent some physical changes to appear 
female. She then sought to alter her entry in the Register of Births, Deaths and Marriages, 
in particular to change her name and her sex. The Secretary of the Registrar-General’s 
Office brought a petition seeking authority to amend the entry in this Register relating to 
X. The law on amending Register entries was at the time governed by the 1854 Act s.63 
which provided that: 
 
[i]f any error shall be discovered to have been committed in the entry of any birth 
in any such Register it shall be lawful for the Sheriff, upon coming to knowledge of 
such erroneous entry, to summon before him any person concerned in the making 
of such erroneous entry, or any person interested in the effect of such erroneous 
entry, and if the Sheriff is satisfied that any error has been committed in any such 
entry, he shall direct a corrected entry of the birth, in relation to which such error 
has been committed, to be made in a separate Register book, to be called ‘The 
Register of Corrected Entries’. 
 
It was argued that the sex re-assignment operation should enable an amendment of the 
Register. However sheriff-substitute Prain disagreed, holding that to amend the Register 
following sex change was not within the ambit of s.63.  He stated that: 
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[s]ection 63 is directed towards the correction of an entry which is erroneous as at 
the date which the information was given. I do not think that it gives any sanction 
for recording changes which have subsequently occurred.
191
  
 
Stating what was to become the mantra in applications for amendments of birth certificates 
following sex re-assignment surgery, sheriff-substitute Prain further stated that “[t]he 
Register is essentially a record of fact at a fixed time; it is not, and is not intended to be, a 
narrative of events.”192 Prain spent one paragraph of the judgment discussing the medical 
evidence in the case and noted that: 
 
[i]n the medical information before me it is said that since childhood X's interests 
and attitudes have been markedly feminine, and that he “had to make conscious 
efforts to play the role of a male and to suppress spontaneous behaviour which 
would betray his effeminacy and bring him into ridicule.” […] The medical reports 
state that X is absolutely and fixedly convinced that he should be a woman, and that 
there is no evidence of any unsoundness of mind.
193
 
 
Although the discussion of the medical evidence in this case is very weak Prain did 
highlight that it was medical opinion that the petitioner firmly believed that she was a 
woman and that this belief did not appear to be derived from any mental abnormality.
194
 
This is an important distinction to make because X, Petitioner predated the medical 
acknowledgment of the importance of mental pathology in relation to cross-sex 
identification as medicine had not fully articulated this until transsexualism appeared for 
the first time in the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders (DSM) in 1980.  Prain then re-examined the wording of s.63 and 
restated that it is clear that the wording allows corrections to be made where a mistake had 
been made on registering the birth. He stated however: 
 
the changes which have so far been noted in the condition of X would not justify a 
correction of the Register even if that course were competent. The doctors are 
careful to stress that this is not a case of hermaphrodism, but is a genuine case of 
the very rare condition of trans-sexualism
195
. 
 
Although having some degree of sympathy towards X, the sheriff-substitute was unwilling 
to accept that X had indeed changed from male to female. He took a biological approach to 
determining X’s sex and claimed that: 
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skin and blood tests still show X’s basic sex to be male and that the changes have 
not reached the deepest level of sex determination. It seems to me accordingly that 
while X could be described as an abnormal male, it would not be possible to 
describe him as a female.
196
 
 
The consequence for X was that she was constrained by the law to appear as a physical 
female but remain legally male. The position established in X, Petitioner continues to be 
the default position, one’s sex remains that registered at birth unless it can be established 
that a mistake has been made on registering the child’s sex, or currently following the 
enactment of the GRA 2004 a full Gender Recognition Certificate (GRC) has been issued. 
X, Petitioner was heard at a time when sex re-assignment surgery was largely a new 
phenomenon, as was shown in Chapter One, and this case began the long process of 
transsexuals seeking legal recognition of their post-operative identity. As the remainder of 
the chapter shows this had serious implications for the individuals in relation to various 
aspects of their lives. The law established in X, Petitioner was further clarified in the 
unreported case of Forbes-Sempill.  
 
Forbes-Sempill 
In this case, decided in 1967, the court was asked to determine whether the second 
petitioner, Ewan Forbes-Sempill was male or female. The facts of the case were as follows: 
the second petitioner was registered as female and was named Elizabeth. In 1952, or 
thereabouts, Elizabeth Forbes-Sempill sought to utilise s.63 of the 1854 Act to amend the 
entry in the Register of Births substituting the female name Elizabeth for the male one, 
Ewan, and also substituting the sex designation registered as ‘F’ for ‘M’. The application 
was based on the argument that although the petitioner had been raised as female 
subsequent examination found her to be male. The actual issue under dispute was whether 
or not Ewan Forbes-Sempill could succeed to the Baronetcy of Forbes of Craigievar which 
descended to male heirs. If Ewan was male he would succeed however if he was female 
then his cousin, John, the first petitioner, would succeed to the Baronetcy. Lord Hunter 
sought guidance from Civil Law and noted that the sex to be assigned to someone in the 
situation of Ewan Forbes-Sempill i.e. someone who today would be labelled as intersex, is 
the sex which prevails or predominates. Lord Hunter accepted that Ewan Forbes-Sempill 
was intersex, although the word used then was hermaphrodite, that the male sex 
characteristics predominated and therefore he ought to be legally male. This case, along 
with the case of X, Petitioner, outlined above, further strengthens the legal separation of 
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those who could be given a change of legal sex and those who could not: those who were 
transsexual could not change legal sex as their sex at birth had been correctly registered 
whereas those who were intersex could obtain such a legal change as their identity did not 
become apparent until some time after their sex was registered and therefore it could be 
argued that the initial registration was wrong and the subsequent change of the Register of 
Births was merely a corrective action. By this point in the late 1960s Scots law had begun 
to lay the foundations for a very restrictive approach to be taken to those who were starting 
to undertake the procedures being developed in medicine which were outlined in the 
previous chapter: those who underwent medical procedures to appear as the opposite sex 
would not be able to change their legal sex but those who could be considered to be 
intersex were provided with a means of changing legal sex.  
 
Between this case and the next case, Corbett v Corbett,
197
 medical advances continued and 
people continued to undergo medical procedures to change their bodies and then request 
that the law recognise the physical changes. In Corbett the Court was asked, once again, to 
recognise the sex re-assignment of one of the parties but this time for the purpose of 
entering into a valid marriage under English law.  
 
Corbett v Corbett 
Although medicine continued to develop there were no legal developments
198
 between the 
case of X, Petitioner and Corbett  which was according to Sharpe, “[t]he first common law 
decision to consider the sex claims of a transgender person for purposes of marriage”199  
and it is arguably the case which was most damaging to the transsexual recognition 
movement. However the Corbett judgment is of its time i.e. 1970. The issue is that at the 
time the case was decided there was no complete agreement between medical professionals 
regarding the causes and treatment for transsexualism, as can be seen from the discussion 
in Chapter One, and therefore already the medical model of transsexualism was showing 
itself to lack internal coherence and certainty which has to be borne in mind when 
evaluating Ormrod J’s judgment below. In addition the Corbett judgment was a specific 
judgment concerning one specific legal issue: could a male-to-female (MTF) transsexual 
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enter into a valid marriage with a biological man? Ormrod J’s judgment in Corbett, 
although troublesome for transsexuals who later sought legal recognition in the UK courts, 
was a thorough examination of transsexualism as understood at the time and of the law of 
marriage in England. In examining how the law ought to respond to the purported marriage 
between an MTF transsexual and a biological male Ormrod J stated that “[t]he 
fundamental purpose of law is the regulation of the relations between persons, and between 
persons and the state or community.”200 This is important because the issue of the rights of 
the individual seeking legal recognition and the rights and interests of third parties became 
a key debate in the quest for said legal recognition during the debates surrounding the 
GRA 2004.
201
 In making this statement about the purpose of law Ormrod J was 
highlighting an important function of the law in this area; that legal recognition of post-
operative transsexuals is not just about the individual himself or herself but how that 
individual interacts with wider society. As will be seen in the discussion surrounding the 
Bellinger case
202
 later in this chapter and in Chapter Three the UK courts became very 
aware of the wider implications of using common law to provide legal recognition of post-
operative transsexuals’ sex particularly in relation to other areas of law and the rights and 
interests of others. 
 
Importantly in Corbett Ormrod J separated the law into three key areas regarding the 
importance, or not, of one’s sex. He stated: 
 
[f]or the limited purposes of this case, legal relations can be classified into those in 
which the sex of the individuals concerned is either irrelevant, relevant or an 
essential determinant of the nature of the relationship.
203
  
 
He continued that largely the law is unconcerned with the sex of an individual
204
 i.e. that 
one’s sex is usually not a material factor in relation to many areas of law. This is of 
fundamental importance in relation to the quest for transsexual legal recognition: to what 
extent is one’s sex a material factor in relation to the legal relationship which one seeks to 
enter into? This became an important point in subsequent cases before the UK courts, 
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namely in the area of family law. Ormrod J stated that in most contractual and tortious 
obligations and most of the criminal law sex is immaterial.
205
 However in relation to some 
issues of contract law such as life assurance, employment, taxation and pensions sex 
becomes a relevant, although not an essential factor.
206
 Sex is not an essential factor in 
these instances because:  
 
there is nothing to prevent the parties to a contract of insurance or a pension 
scheme from agreeing that the person concerned should be treated as a man or as a 
woman, as the case may be.
207
 
 
However in relation to marriage Ormrod J stated that: 
 
[o]n the other hand sex is clearly an essential determinant of the relationship called 
marriage because it is and always has been recognised as the union of man and 
woman. It is the institution on which the family is built, and in which the capacity 
for natural hetero-sexual intercourse is an essential element.
208
 
 
He continued “the characteristics which distinguish [marriage] from all other relationships 
can only be met by two persons of the opposite sex.”209 So Ormrod J had established that 
marriage is different from most legal relationships because of the intimate nature of the 
relationship. The categorisation of legal relationships into these three categories had an 
impact on UK courts in later cases but was less important before the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) which, as will be seen 
below, decided the cases before themselves on different legal principles and concepts than 
did the UK courts. The areas in which the UK courts refused to recognise the post-
operative sex of individuals can be classified as areas in which the sex of the individual is 
an essential element: criminal laws in which sex is an important aspect of the offence
210
 
and in family law particularly in relation to marriage.
211
 Although Corbett was never 
intended to be the test for determination of one’s legal sex the judgment became such and 
had a detrimental impact on individuals in a number of areas of personal life for decades 
following as will be shown below. Some commentators note the anomaly of the Corbett 
judgment becoming such an important piece of law given the court in which it was heard 
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and the lack of appeal and therefore its lack of precedential strength however this did not 
prevent the Corbett case from providing the test for determining legal sex then and now.
212
  
 
The facts of Corbett were as follows: Arthur Cameron Corbett and April Ashley 
participated in a marriage ceremony in Gibraltar on September 10 1963. The petitioner, 
Corbett, later sought a declaration that the marriage ceremony, in which he partook 
voluntarily and in full knowledge of Ashley’s sex re-assignment from male to female, be 
declared null and void because the respondent was legally male at the time of the marriage. 
Failing that, the petitioner alternatively sought a decree of nullity on the basis that the 
marriage was never consummated. The respondent, Ashley, denied being male and denied 
that she was unable or unwilling to consummate the marriage, but also sought a decree of 
nullity on the grounds that Corbett was so unable or unwilling to consummate the 
marriage. This case then centred on the determination of Ashley’s sex. It is imperative that 
one’s legal sex was determined for the purpose of marriage because the law in the UK at 
the time was clear; if a same sex couple married in a marriage ceremony then the marriage 
was void ab initio.
213
  
 
The basis for the position adopted by Ormrod J as his starting point that marriage is 
heterosexual is attributed to the dicta of Lord Penzance in the 1866 case of Hyde v Hyde 
and Woodmansee.
214
 In Hyde Lord Penzance was faced with deciding whether the English 
Courts of Probate and Divorce would recognise, for the purpose of dissolution, a 
potentially polygamous marriage entered into by a Mormon couple in Utah. In determining 
this, Lord Penzance stated that “I conceive that marriage, as understood in Christendom, 
may for this purpose be defined as the voluntary union for life of one man and one woman, 
to the exclusion of all others.”215   
 
The Corbett case was decided on two main points; firstly whether an MTF transsexual 
could be considered as a woman for the purpose of English marriage law and secondly 
whether an MTF transsexual was capable of consummating a marriage. This raises two 
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particular issues: firstly, given medical advances since the Hyde judgment, how one 
determines the factors which make someone a man or a woman for the purpose of 
marriage, and indeed the related issue of whether or not marriage is sufficiently different 
from other legal relationships, such that determining sex for marriage takes on special 
significance which is not apparent in relation to non-intimate legal relationships such as 
those regulated by contract law, for example.  
 
The issue of similarity of marriage and other legal relationships was raised briefly in the 
case where it was argued by counsel for Ashley that as she was treated as female in society 
then it would be illogical not to treat her as such for the purpose of marriage. Ormrod J 
responded that “[t]he illogicality would only arise if marriage were substantially similar in 
character to national insurance and other social situations, but the differences are obviously 
fundamental.”216 Ormrod J claimed that the submissions of Ashley’s counsel as to the 
illogicality “in effect, confuse sex with gender”217 and that “[m]arriage is a relationship 
which depends on sex and not on gender.”218 The second issue faced by the Court 
concerned the legalities of consummation of marriage and therefore whether or not a post-
operative MTF transsexual was capable of consummating a marriage with a biological 
man.
219
  
 
The focus of the next section will be on how the Court determined Ashley’s sex for legal 
purposes, as the dicta of Ormrod J has been heavily relied upon since in determining how 
UK law should determine the sex of those seeking legal recognition of their gender 
identity. The strict physiological test established in this case by Ormrod J had a serious 
negative impact on those seeking legal recognition in the years to follow as will be shown 
later in this chapter. 
 
Determining the legal sex of April Ashley 
Bearing in mind the dictum of Lord Penzance in Hyde the question faced by Ormrod J was 
whether or not the union between Corbett and Ashley could be considered a heterosexual 
union; if it could not then the ‘marriage’ would be void. Not surprisingly, counsel for 
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Corbett and Ashley disagreed on the factors determining sex for the purpose of marriage. 
Corbett’s lawyers argued that:  
 
[t]he first question to be answered, a unique one, is whether there is anything 
matrimonial about a ceremony between two men and whether it can have legal 
consequences. Can two male homosexuals (or lesbians) go through a ceremony of 
marriage and thereby create the legal consequences of a marriage? How they regard 
one another is irrelevant. The test for that purpose should not be a subjective one.
220
 
 
Counsel for Corbett relied upon the classic definition of marriage established by Lord 
Penzance in the case of Hyde, as noted above, and argued that primary sex characteristics 
at the moment of birth and secondary sex characteristics developing naturally at puberty 
ought  to be the basis for determining the sex of Ashley. Therefore the substance, form and 
function of Ashley’s genitalia were considered fundamental to whether or not she could be 
deemed a woman for the purpose of marriage to Corbett. Counsel for Corbett argued that 
in relation to Ashley’s genitalia that there was a fundamental difference between Ashley’s 
vagina which was wholly constructed and a surgically altered vagina of a person who had 
been born female. Corbett was arguing that the respondent was not a naturally born woman 
but “was and is a castrated male who has a passage in the form of an artificial vagina 
constructed for him but who has not and never has had ovaries or a uterus.”221 Regarding 
the legal sex of Ashley, counsel for Corbett argued that: 
 
[w]hen there is a problem as to the sex of a party it seems absurd to look at the 
matter as at the date of the marriage. In the ordinary case, which this is, one must 
take the date of birth as the relevant date for investigation. By "ordinary" case is 
meant a case where the first three criteria of sex are all one way, i.e., excluding 
psychological factors. A woman is a person chromosomally XX with female 
gonads and whose apparent sex is feminine. It is accepted that external and internal 
genitalia must be of the utmost importance.
222
 
 
On the other hand Ashley’s lawyers argued that she had been diagnosed intersex and was, 
for all other legal purposes, classed as female;
223
 her lawyers argued that the Court ought to 
recognise the medical profession’s diagnosis of intersex and declare that the marriage 
between Ashley and Corbett was indeed valid.  Her lawyers contended that: 
 
[m]anhood and womanhood is not decided on the presence or otherwise of a penis 
or other sexual organs. Sex is the sum of a number of things both external and 
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internal and pertaining to both body and mind. Consideration must be given to 
hormonal make up, the person's psychological condition and chromosomal 
factors.
224
 
 
The lawyers highlighted that as Ashley had been born intersexed the operation to feminise 
her body was appropriate. The argument was that she was not transsexual but had been 
mis-identified as male at birth when she was in actual fact female. Counsel for Ashley 
noted that one’s identity as male or female is based on a number of criteria “pertaining to 
both body and mind”225 and that “[i]t is superficial, dangerous and illogical to have regard 
simply to external genitalia.”226 
 
So, the basic arguments put forward in this case is that sex is essentially fixed at birth and 
dependent upon one’s primary sex characteristics and which are supported by the natural 
development of secondary sex characteristics on puberty versus the argument that sex is 
more complicated than biology and includes aspects of one’s psychological identification 
which ought to be recognised by the law.
227
  
 
Establishing the test for determining one’s true legal sex 
Ormrod J was at pains to determine Ashley’s true sex because, as noted above, according 
to him the existence of a valid marriage was dependent upon this.
228
 From the remainder of 
his judgment it becomes clear that for Ormrod J true sex meant the respondent’s biological 
rather than her psychological sex. The Court heard the expert testimony of several medical 
professionals and Ormrod J observed that according to the medical experts “there are at 
least four criteria for assessing the sexual condition of an individual.”229 These were 
identified as chromosomes, gonads, genitals and psychology.
230
 In addition Ormrod J 
stated that some of the medical experts who led evidence in the case would also add a fifth: 
 
[h]ormonal factors or secondary sexual characteristics (such as distribution of hair, 
breast development, physique etc., which are thought to reflect the balance between 
the male and female sex hormones in the body).
231
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Despite the medical evidence which was presented Ormrod J determined that it was for the 
court and not the medical profession to determine Ashely’s sex. He stated that these 
medical criteria: 
 
have been evolved by doctors, for the purposes of systematising medical 
knowledge and assisting in the difficult task of deciding the best way of managing 
the unfortunate patients who suffer, either physically or psychologically, from 
sexual abnormalities. […] These criteria are, of course relevant to, but do not 
necessarily decide, the legal basis of sex determination.
232
 
 
In considering whether or not Ashley had been correctly sexed at birth i.e. was she intersex 
or transsexual Ormrod J, after weighing up the medical evidence presented, concluded that 
“the respondent is correctly described as a male transsexual, possibly with some 
comparatively minor physical abnormality.”233 This is an important distinction to make. 
Had Ashley been intersex then it would have been possible to assign her the female legal 
sex based on the dicta of Prain in X, Petitioner in relation to being able to correct mistakes 
made when initially registering a child’s sex but because her sex at birth was unambiguous 
she had been correctly assigned the male sex at birth making her a transsexual and thereby 
denying her the possibility of altering her birth certificate or indeed her legal sex for all 
purposes. After declaring Ashley transsexual Ormrod J continued: 
 
[t]he question then becomes, what is meant by the word “woman” in the context of 
a marriage, for I am not concerned to determine the “legal sex” of the respondent at 
large. Having regard to the essentially hetero-sexual characteristic of the 
relationship which is called marriage, the criteria must, in my judgment, be 
biological, for even the most extreme degree of transsexualism in a male or the 
most severe hormonal imbalance which can exist in a person with male 
chromosomes, male gonads and male genitalia cannot reproduce a person who is 
naturally capable of performing the essential role of a woman in marriage.
234
  
 
In determining how the law should deal with the criteria used by medicine when 
determining sex i.e. chromosomes, gonads, genitals, psychology and secondary sex 
characteristics Ormrod J stated that: 
 
the law should adopt [...] the first three of the doctor’s criteria, i.e., the 
chromosomal, gonadal and genital tests, and if all three are congruent, determine 
sex for the purpose of marriage accordingly, and ignore any operative 
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interventions.”235  
 
So clearly then legal sex for the purpose of marriage law was intrinsically related to 
biological sex which was physiologically determined at birth and could not “be changed, 
either by the natural development of organs of the opposite sex, or by medical or surgical 
means.”236 The approach taken in Corbett was a much narrower interpretation of the 
criteria used by medicine which, according to Professor Dewhurst providing evidence in  
Corbett, medicine use not to determine with absolute certainty a person’s sex but rather to 
“determine the sex in which it is best for the individual to live.”237 This highlights an 
important distinction: law requires certainty of sex because, to return to Ormrod J’s 
statement about the role of law, the law is concerned with regulating “the relations between 
persons, and between persons and the state or community.”238 Medicine, on the other hand, 
had a different role and even at the time of Corbett in the 1970s when, as was shown in the 
previous chapter, medicine as a whole was only just accepting transsexualism, medicine 
was not concerned with determining one’s sex for all purposes and with any degree of 
absolute certainty but rather medicine was, on the whole, more concerned with easing the 
dysphoria experienced by patients whose bodies and psychosexual identities were not 
congruent. It was here that Ormrod J established the test which would be used by the law 
to determine one’s sex which relied upon physiological criteria alone where the 
physiological criteria were congruent; it was only where there was some disparity between 
physiological criteria that the individual’s sense of self as male or female i.e. their 
psychological identification could be taken into consideration.  
 
Because, for Ormrod J legal sex is fixed at birth and unchangeable he held that Ashely was 
“not a woman for the purpose of marriage but is a biological male and [had] been so since 
birth.”239 Although Ashley had been diagnosed as transsexual, and this was recognised by 
Ormrod J when considering her psychological sex, he denied this important aspect of her 
identity as being irrelevant in law when chromosomes, genitals and gonads are congruent 
at birth. Accordingly the marriage between Ashley and Corbett was declared void on the 
basis that both parties were male at the time of the marriage ceremony.  
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The Corbett judgment has had a massive impact on legal sex determination and 
consequently on the lives of transsexual individuals and families who sought recognition, 
rights and protection in law. Cowan argues that one particularly important legal outcome of 
the Corbett case was that the law confirmed that “sex is not a matter of choice in law; 
rather it is an essential biological characteristic.”240 Bell argues that when courts adopt this 
approach and begin their enquiry with the question of whether a man “who has surgery to 
change his physical characteristics is still just a man”241 rather than the more inquisitive 
enquiry of what is the applicant’s “sex after surgery, hormonal therapy, and psychiatric 
counselling”242 then “the court's formulation of the question determines the outcome.”243 
By adopting the more inquisitive approach and framing their narrative in the latter form, 
the courts would open up the possibility of finding that someone who has undergone 
surgery to modify his or her body to make it congruent with his or her gender identity has 
in fact changed sex. UK Courts, however, as will be shown throughout this chapter, were 
unwilling to take this approach.  The Corbett decision highlights what Bell terms the 
court’s “adherence to essentialist modes of inquiry”244  so that the courts rely upon “a stark 
distinction between “natural” and “man-made” organs, thus treating sex/gender as truly 
existing in a single, universal form.”245 Corbett was a judgment which allowed for 
predictability in determination of sex but it was also “the basis of the separation of sex 
from gender in transsexuality cases.”246 As Cowan argues, “UK courts have adhered to this 
division [of sex and gender], treating gender as a social/psychological factor that can 
always be trumped by biological sex (particularly chromosomes).”247 This is an important 
issue. Although it may seem that sex and gender can be used interchangeably, and indeed 
the terms are often confused, each term has a specific meaning. ‘Sex’ is understood as a 
person’s biological make-up which ranges from chromosomal make-up, possession of a 
particular type of gonad to widely differing secondary sex characteristics such as body 
hair. Ormrod J was unable to determine that Ashley was anything other than male because 
he applied biological criteria to legal sex determination. Ashley could alter her secondary 
sex characteristics, which indeed she did. She could alter, to some degree, her gonads 
through castration; however she would never be able to create ovaries to replace the 
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removed testes. She could never alter her chromosomal pattern; Ashley would always be 
legally male because her 23
rd
 chromosome pairing was XY rather than XX. However 
biology is not the only means of determining whether or not someone is male or female. 
The Corbett judgment completely ignored Ashley’s gender identity. Whereas ‘sex’ refers 
to biology, ‘gender’ refers to psychology and is therefore not as easy to determine 
definitively as sex. However had the Court been more willing to consider the importance 
of gender identity and psychological identification then it is arguable that Ashley would 
have been recognised as female and her ‘marriage’ to Corbett would have been deemed 
valid although in doing so the test established by Ormrod J would have been less certain.
248
  
 
However, to return to the question which was posed at the beginning of the discussion of 
the Corbett case: marriage, then, is different from other legal relationships in that the law is 
very much concerned with which bodies individuals inhabit and how these bodies interact 
with each other in a sexual manner. To a certain extent the law regarding sex determination 
for the purpose of intimate relationships must be about more than merely the right of the 
individual who identifies as a member of the opposite sex; the law would appear also to be 
concerned with the rights of those who intimately interact with that individual and who 
may be affected on a deep, personal psychological level due to the nature of the 
relationship between the parties. Although the Corbett case was about a relationship in 
which sex was considered an essential element, some subsequent cases strayed into the 
other two categories of legal relationship i.e. where sex is considered irrelevant or where it 
is considered relevant but not essential. As noted earlier, this categorisation of the 
importance of sex within these legal relationships provides some explanation of why 
transsexuals were given recognition and protection in some areas of life but not in others as 
can be seen when examining the Corbett legacy.  
 
Therefore Corbett strengthened the legal position: one might well be able to take 
advantage of the medical advances and alter one’s body but, based on X, Petitioner, this 
did not mean that one’s sex had been incorrectly registered at birth, therefore a new birth 
certificate could not be issued. In addition the result of Corbett was that the law fully 
adopted the position that the changes one made to one’s body in an attempt to ease the 
dysphoria which one experienced were inconsequential to one’s legal status: the law 
continued to provide that one’s initially registered sex was one’s sex for all legal purposes 
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unless it could be shown that a mistake had been made on initial registration. In this 
context a mistake could amount to an administrative mistake or indeed later revelations 
that the individual was intersex: being transsexual and altering one’s body did not amount 
to evidence that the initially registered sex was wrong.  
 
This then raises two further questions what was the impact of Corbett and how did the law 
deal with Ormrod J’s classifications of the importance of sex when faced with transsexual 
individuals? The impact of Corbett was much more far reaching than perhaps it ought to 
have been given the relative weakness of its precedential strength.
249
 Both of these 
questions will be explored throughout the remainder of this chapter. 
 
1970s: developments in EU equal treatment law 
Between Corbett and the next UK case which concerned the legal recognition of an 
individual’s gender identity250 the UK Government, in response to developments in EU 
law, enacted the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (SDA 1975) which made it unlawful to 
discriminate on the ground of sex in employment, education and the provision of housing, 
goods, facilities and services and stemmed from EU equal treatment directives. The SDA 
1975 formed the basis for the application in White v British Sugar Corporation,
251
 which, 
because it was an employment discrimination case, ostensibly fell within Ormrod J’s 
irrelevant category of sex for legal purposes, or at least sex as relevant but not essential. 
However, it quickly becomes apparent that despite this case seemingly falling within the 
sex as irrelevant, or at least sex as relevant but not essential category the sex of the 
individual was a material factor in this case because of the specific provisions in the 
relevant legislation at the time as will be shown below. 
 
In White the appellant was born, and registered as, female. There was no question 
regarding the appellant’s physical sex, there was no question of the individual being 
intersex and no steps had been taken to undergo sex re-assignment. However, he identified 
as male, dressed in male clothing, used a male name and masculine prefix and wanted to be 
treated as male. It is clear from this presentation of facts that White was not a post-
operative transsexual. He gained employment as an electrician’s mate which involved 
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some work on Sundays. While in employment, he used the male toilets and changing 
facilities at work. However, rumours about him being female began and he was dismissed. 
The industrial tribunal held that he was female for the purposes of the SDA 1975. In 
relation to determining White’s sex the Chairman of the Industrial Tribunal, John Else, 
stated that the dictionary “defines male as of or belonging to the sex which begets 
offspring or performs the fecundatory function.”252 He noted that the dictionary also 
defines “female as belonging to the sex which bears offspring.”253 He stated that in the 
present case, “the applicant […] does not have male reproductive organs and there was no 
evidence that she could not bear children.”254 As a result of this poor determination of legal 
sex using dictionary definitions, and paying no consideration to the test established by 
Ormrod J in Corbett, the Industrial Tribunal held that White was female in terms of the 
SDA 1975. It has to be noted that had the Industrial Tribunal acknowledged the Corbett 
test the outcome would have been the same but at least there would have been a legal 
rather than linguistic basis for this determination. 
 
The tribunal determined that had a legal male presenting as female been employed as a 
female and used the female facilities then she too would have been dismissed. Therefore, 
there was no difference in treatment between White and a male person in that situation. 
The tribunal also determined that as the Factories Act 1961 s.7(2)(f) prohibited females 
from working on a Sunday then being male was a genuine occupational requirement 
thereby making this a case in which the sex of the individual was an essential element of 
the legal relationship. So, as a result of not taking psychological identity into consideration 
when determining the sex of this individual it was deemed that his employer’s treatment of 
him was not discriminatory. At the time of this case it would have been unlikely that the 
courts would have taken psychological identity without corresponding body modifications 
into consideration based on Ormrod J’s clear proclamation in Corbett that sex in law is 
determined by biology and it is only where biology is incongruent that psychology may 
become a factor. Despite medicine acknowledging that psychological factors influence 
one’s sex law firmly adhered to the Corbett test which only acknowledged the person’s 
chromosomes, gonads and genitals at birth. In so ignoring psychology the law was 
strengthening the Corbett test with each subsequent judgment and thereby distancing itself 
from medical developments. 
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White had sought to rely on the SDA 1975. However there was no provision in the 
legislation which dealt with transsexuals, pre-operative or post-operative, so the SDA 1975 
was no help to him. However it has to be noted that the SDA 1975 derived from the 
provisions in the Treaty of Rome 1957 in relation to equal pay for men and women 
therefore the roots of the legislation was in ensuring that men and women were treated 
equally and therefore was not about transsexuals at all. So, it is not surprising that this 
legislation provided no help to White or other transsexual individuals and therefore these 
equality based laws from the EU were of little help to transsexuals at this time. Although a 
few years later as will be shown below, in the case of P v S and Cornwall County 
Council,
255
 it was this strand of law which would first provide an acknowledgement of sex 
re-assignment surgery for legal purposes in relation to employment and later in the 
provision of goods and services.  
 
Corbett: from marriage law to the criminal law 
Not only had the Corbett judgment negatively impacted on the ability of post-operative 
transsexuals to enter into a marriage with a member of the sex opposite to their post-
operative sex it also had an impact in relation to the criminal law even though Corbett 
ought to have been very much restricted in its impact, as discussed above, because of its 
weak precedential strength and the very narrow aspect of law on which it was centred.  
 
The first case from criminal law to consider a post-operative transsexual individual’s legal 
sex was R v Tan
256
 which confirmed the Corbett test. Tan is particularly interesting 
because the Court spent some time considering the need to maintain consistency in law in 
relation to subsequent cases and also the need for certainty in this area of law which would 
be in distinction to the lack of need for certainty in medicine in relation to an individual’s 
sex. At the time of this case medicine was continuing its development in this area such that 
there was flexibility within the medical approach to transsexuals to recognise that some 
individuals identified as members of the opposite sex for reasons not fully known or 
understood. In addition, as a result of the work of key people in this field, notably Harry 
Benjamin, it was acknowledged in medicine by the 1980s that the most appropriate 
treatment for such individuals was not to insist that because their chromosomes, gonads 
and genitals at birth were congruent therefore they had to undergo psychological therapies 
to reconcile mind and body rather medicine acknowledged that it was more appropriate to 
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alter the person’s physical body, where possible, suitable and required, to correspond with 
the person’s sense of self as male or female. Despite this flexibility in medicine, law 
continued to maintain the need for consistency between judgments and certainty of legal 
sex. This divergence of approaches can be explained by the functions and roles of the two 
systems: as mentioned briefly above the function of medicine was to determine in which 
sex it was most appropriate that the individual would live because the role of medicine was 
to ease the dysphoria experienced by the patient. Whereas the function of law was to 
definitively determine which legal sex one should be classified as because the role of law 
was to regulate “the relations between persons, and between persons and the state or 
community”257 So the separation of the roles and functions of the two systems which began 
to be articulated by Ormrod J in Corbett becomes clearer through the analysis of the 
Court’s judgment in Tan. 
 
In R v Tan  Moira Tan had been convicted, along with the other appellant, Gloria Greaves, 
of keeping a disorderly house. Greaves was also convicted of living on the earnings of 
prostitution contrary to s.30 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 s.30 which provided that “[i]t 
is an offence for a man knowingly to live wholly or in part on the earnings of prostitution.” 
 
Tan, a prostitute, would, for payment, subject men to “humiliating and perverted sexual 
treatment”258 in a flat she had leased from Greaves. Greaves used other premises for 
similar purposes. The issue was that Greaves had been born male but had undergone sex 
re-assignment and was accepted socially as female. It was argued that Greaves should not 
be considered a man for the purpose of s.30; this submission was rejected and the parties 
were convicted. The appeal against conviction was similarly rejected. The Court of Appeal 
noted that “[a]n essential element of the offences […] was that Gloria Greaves was a 
man.”259 In determining that Greaves was a man the Court of Appeal stated that: 
 
[i]n our judgment both common sense and the desirability of certainty and 
consistency demand that the decision in Corbett v Corbett should apply for the 
purpose not only of marriage but also for a charge under section 30 of the Sexual 
Offences Act 1956 or section 5 of the Sexual Offences Act 1967.
260
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This was the first time the appeal to consistency was made. The Court considered the 
implications of adopting other factors when determining Greave’s legal sex and noted that: 
 
[i]f the criteria were biological, there was evidence that Gloria Greaves was and 
had always been male. If she was judged on the social and psychological factors 
she was undoubtedly a woman. To decide that she is a man is inappropriate in the 
light of the social and psychological factors. If one defines sex biologically, the 
biological test is the right test to apply. In terms of gender role, emotional feelings 
and sexual behaviour, Gloria Greaves is female. In terms of the genital and 
chromosomal tests she is male.
261
 
  
Therefore the Court acknowledged the uncertainty that could arise by adopting different 
means to determine Greave’s legal sex and thus importantly the Court continued: 
 
[t]his is an uncertain area of the law and clearly in an area of this kind the law 
should be certain. When the issue of sexual identity is raised it should not be left to 
the jury to determine. One jury might wish to apply the biological criteria, while 
another jury dealing with the same defendant and with the same factors as Gloria 
Greaves might come to a different conclusion. In this matter, which should be a 
matter of law, guidance should be given by the court so that consistency will 
arise.
262
 
 
Consequently Greaves was male for the purpose of the legislation and therefore her 
conviction was competent.  
 
Two legal factors became apparent in R v Tan which were less apparent in the Corbett 
judgment: certainty and consistency. So even this early in the quest for legal recognition it 
is becoming apparent that law and medicine are two separate systems each with different 
motivations: law seeks to provide certainty and consistency whereas medicine seeks to 
“determine the sex in which it is best for the individual to live.”263  
 
So the UK courts were very reluctant to provide any legal recognition of sex re-assignment 
surgery because of the need for certainty and consistency in law and therefore they were 
not willing to depart from Corbett in any way consistently stating that Corbett reflected the 
law’s approach to determining the sex of an individual for legal purposes. The result of UK 
law’s refusal to recognise sex re-assignment procedures for legal purposes resulted in 
several applications to the ECtHR.  
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1980s and 1990s: transsexual applicants in the European 
Court of Human Rights 
In 1986 there began a long campaign in the ECtHR brought by transsexual applicants 
against the UK Government.
264
 These cases primarily concerned the rights of the 
applicants under Article 8 ECHR subsection 1 of which provides that “[e]veryone has the 
right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence” subject to 
the provisions in Article 8(2). Therefore Article 8 does not give anyone absolute rights but 
rather there is always a balancing act to be performed between the alleged violation and the 
provisions set out in Article 8(2). 
 
In addition most of the cases also alleged violations of Article 12 which provides that 
“[m]en and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family, 
according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right.” Therefore the right to 
marriage contained in Article 12 is also a qualified right such that it is subject to the 
national laws governing the right to marry which at the time, in relation to the sex of the 
parties, were contained in s.5(4)(e) of the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977 and s.11(c) of the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.  
 
All of the cases in the ECtHR alleged that these violations resulted from the refusal of the 
UK Government to allow post-operative transsexuals to amend their birth certificates and 
to marry as members of the sex opposite to their birth sex. All of the cases brought by UK 
domiciled individuals during this period failed in their quest to have the sex re-assignment 
of the applicants recognised for legal purposes. 
 
Despite these cases failing, one of the important aspects of this strand of case law was that 
it introduced new legal concepts into the equation; the ECtHR was not bound by Ormrod 
J’s classification of the importance of sex as essential, irrelevant, or relevant but not 
essential and nor was it bound by the test which he established for determining one’s legal 
sex. Rather the ECtHR introduced concepts such as the positive obligations on states in 
relation to the protection of individuals’ Convention rights, the consensus throughout 
contracting states in particular matters and how this impacted on individual contracting 
states depending on whether the state was afforded a wide or narrow margin of 
appreciation. In addition the balance of rights of applicants against others became 
particularly important as did the right of individuals to be able to develop their personal 
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identity and, as will be shown in Chapter Three it was these concepts which enabled the 
legal recognition of transsexuals to emerge in the case of Goodwin v United Kingdom.
265
  
 
The facts of the cases are as follows: in Rees v United Kingdom
266
  Rees was a female-to-
male (FTM) transsexual. He was born female in 1942 and was registered as such and 
named Brenda. In his early childhood he exhibited masculine behaviour. He sought 
treatment for transsexualism in 1970, he began hormone therapy and developed male 
secondary sex characteristics and began living as a man. In 1971 he changed his name. 
Over the following years he changed his name on all official documents to reflect his male 
identity. In 1974 he began surgical treatment to alter his body to appear as male and this 
was provided by the National Health Service (NHS). At the time of the case Rees was 
living fully, and was socially accepted, as male. The facts of Cossey
267
 were very similar to 
those in Rees, apart from the fact that Caroline Cossey had been born male and transitioned 
to female i.e. she was a male-to-female (MTF) transsexual. X, Y & Z v United Kingdom
268
 
concerned three applicants. The first applicant was a FTM transsexual, the second 
applicant was a biological female with whom the first applicant was in a relationship and 
the third applicant was the child of the second applicant. The third applicant had been 
conceived by means of Artificial Insemination by Donor (AID). The first and second 
applicants had obtained private fertility treatment to conceive their child. As part of the 
process for obtaining fertility treatment the first applicant was asked to acknowledge 
himself as the child’s father under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990. The 
second applicant became pregnant in January 1992 and the child was born on 13 October 
1992.The first applicant was then denied the ability to register as the child’s father because 
he was not a biological man. The child was allowed to be registered using the first 
applicant’s surname. In Sheffield and Horsham v United Kingdom269 Sheffield and 
Horsham were MTF transsexuals. In each of these cases the ECtHR held that there were no 
violations of either Article 8 or Article 12. However, as time passed between each case the 
margin of those voting in favour of a violation versus those voting against narrowed. In 
Rees the court voted twelve to three that there was no violation of Article 8 and 
unanimously that there was no violation of Article 12. In Cossey, although the eventual 
outcome was the same there was one small positive aspect of the decision: the majority 
decreased. In Cossey the majority finding that there was no violation of article 8 was ten to 
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eight and in relation to the Article 12 claim the majority had decreased from a unanimous 
decision in Rees to fourteen to four. So, in the four years between the judgments there 
would appear to be some, albeit very small, degree of judicial movement towards 
recognising the rights of transsexual applicants. In X, Y & Z v United Kingdom it was held 
14 votes to six that there was no violation of Article 8 and in Sheffield and Horsham v 
United Kingdom the margin was 11 votes to nine that there was no violation of Article 8 
and 18 votes to two that there was no violation of Article 12.  
 
The Article 8 decisions 
Two issues had particular importance in the Court’s determination of the Rees application 
in 1986; firstly the extent of the positive obligation owed by the state to transsexuals and 
secondly the width of the state’s margin of appreciation in such cases. The ECtHR began 
by reiterating the essence of Article 8 as being concerned with the protection of individuals 
against arbitrary state interference.
270
 However it continued that “there may in addition be 
positive obligations inherent in an effective respect for private life, albeit subject to the 
[s]tate’s margin of appreciation.”271 The Court, however, was tasked with determining the 
existence and scope of the UK’s positive obligation in this area because it was noted that 
“[t]he mere refusal to alter the register of births or to issue birth certificates whose contents 
and nature differ from those of the birth register cannot be considered as interferences.”272 
 
The fact of not altering birth certificates was not, therefore in the opinion of the ECtHR, 
per se a violation of Article 8. In order to amount to a violation it had to be shown that 
through not allowing changes to be made to the system of registration of births the UK was 
under a positive obligation to recognise post-operative transsexuals’ sex for legal purposes 
which in itself was dependent upon many factors, for example the margin of appreciation 
and the balance of rights and interests of the applicant and others. 
 
In relation to the margin of appreciation it was argued by the applicant that it should only 
apply in relation to the methods adopted by the state to facilitate transsexual legal 
recognition not in relation to whether or not there should be legal recognition at all.
273
 The 
Government argued that “the whole matter depended on the balance that had to be struck 
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between the competing interests of the individual and of society as a whole.”274 So the 
question remained, was there a positive obligation on the UK to recognise transsexuals and 
if so what was the extent and scope of the margin of appreciation. On the question of 
‘respect’ contained in Article 8 the ECtHR related this to practice of contracting states in 
general saying that:  
 
the notion of ‘respect’ is not clear-cut, especially as far as those positive obligations 
are concerned: having regard to the diversity of practices followed and the 
situations obtaining in the Contracting States, the notion’s requirements will vary 
considerably from case to case.
275
  
 
On considering the situation throughout the contracting states the ECtHR observed a wide 
variation in practice and therefore determined that there was a wide margin of appreciation 
to be applied. This wide margin of appreciation therefore would benefit the UK 
Government rather than the applicant. In relation to the positive obligation owed by the 
UK Government to the applicant specifically, and transsexual individuals in general, the 
Court noted: 
 
[i]n determining whether or not a positive obligation exists, regard must be had to 
the fair balance that has to be struck between the general interests of the community 
and the interests of the individual, the search for which balance is inherent in the 
whole of the Convention. In striking this balance the aims mentioned in the second 
paragraph of Article 8 may be of a certain relevance, although this provision refers 
in terms only to ‘interference’ with the right protected by the first paragraph – in 
other words is concerned with the negative obligations flowing therefrom.
276
 
 
The Court observed that “[t]he governing authorities in the United Kingdom are fully 
entitled, in the exercise of their margin of appreciation, to take account of the requirements 
of the situation pertaining there in determining what measures to adopt.”277 The purpose of 
this statement was to reiterate that at the time of the case, as there was no consensus among 
the contracting states regarding legal recognition of transsexuals, there was no onus on the 
UK to adopt any of the measures which existed in any of the other states. The Court 
continued: 
 
[w]hile the requirement of striking a fair balance […] may possibly, in the interests 
of persons in the applicant’s situation, call for incidental adjustments to the existing 
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system, it cannot give rise to any direct obligation on the United Kingdom to alter 
the very basis thereof.
278
 
 
The Court considered the applicant’s request in detail, particularly as it related to privacy 
of the individual and the concomitant effect this could have on the general public. One of 
the issues regarding legal recognition of sex change is the impact such a personal issue has 
on other people with whom the individual interacts. Not only was Rees seeking that the UK 
system of registration of births should be altered to allow individuals such as himself to 
change their legal sex, he was also seeking that the sex re-assignment and amendments to 
birth certificates should be kept secret from third parties.
279
 On the issue of privacy and the 
interaction of transsexuals with third parties the Court stated that: 
 
[s]uch secrecy could not be achieved without first modifying fundamentally the 
present system for keeping the register of births, so as to prohibit public access to 
entries made before the annotation. Secrecy could also have considerable 
unintended results and could prejudice the purpose and function of the birth register 
by complicating factual issues arising in, inter alia, the fields of family and 
succession law. Furthermore no account would be taken of the position of third 
parties, including public authorities (e.g. the armed services) or private bodies (e.g. 
life insurance companies) in that they would be deprived of information which they 
had a legitimate interest to receive.
280
 
 
So the issue was more complicated than merely declaring that the UK had violated the 
applicant’s right to respect for his private life by failing to allow him to be declared legally 
male; in addition to the rights of the applicant the Court had to consider the rights of wider 
society also. The Court therefore had a particularly delicate balancing act to perform in this 
case and so, as can be seen from the Rees case, the cases in the ECtHR were wider in scope 
than those in the UK courts which, on the whole, were only tasked with determining 
whether to apply the Corbett test or to depart from it.  
 
In particular the ECtHR had to consider the rights of the individual to privacy but also the 
rights of third parties to know with whom they were interacting in a variety of situations. 
The Court observed that: 
 
[i]n order to overcome these difficulties there would have to be detailed legislation 
as to the effects of the change in various contexts and as to the circumstances in 
which secrecy should yield to the public interest. Having regard to the wide margin 
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of appreciation to be afforded the State in this area and to the relevance of 
protecting the interests of others in striking the requisite balance, the positive 
obligations arising from Article 8 cannot be held to extend that far.
281
 
 
Although in Rees the court ultimately determined that there was no violation of Article 8 it 
was noted that the UK had to keep the situation under review “having regard particularly to 
scientific and societal developments”282 which, history shows, the UK failed to do. When 
Cossey was decided the outcome was exactly the same as that in Rees and the reasoning of 
the court in the two cases was very similar. Again, one of the key issues was the rights of 
the individual to be balanced with the rights of the general public.
283
 The Court considered 
the privacy of the individual against the wider public interest and noted, again, that 
complete confidentiality of the registration of births system may have negative adverse 
consequences.
284
 The Court reiterated that, as a result of the little common ground between 
contracting states, there remained a wide margin of appreciation to be applied in favour of 
the respondent state.
285
 Again, as in Rees the UK was admonished to keep the situation 
under consideration in light of social and scientific development. 
 
In X, Y & Z v United Kingdom one of the decisive factors in the ECtHR’s judgment was 
the margin of appreciation. The ECtHR noted that family life within the Article 
encompasses families deriving from a marital relationship but also other de facto families 
where members are not necessarily related to one another through law.
286
 Due to the nature 
of the relationship between the three applicants it could be said that they were a de facto 
family and therefore prima facie enjoyed the protection of family life under Article 8. 
However the ECtHR reiterated that when considering the extent of the state’s positive 
obligations under Article 8 the state enjoys a certain margin of appreciation.
287
 This case 
was different from the previous transsexual recognition cases because the applicants did 
not argue that UK law breached their rights to private life by not affording the transsexual 
applicant legal recognition of his post-operative sex. Rather the applicants in this case 
sought to argue that UK law breached their family life because it did not allow the 
transsexual applicant to be registered as the father of the child created through AID 
whereas a biological male in the same situation as the transsexual applicant would have 
been able to legally register as the child’s father. The Court noted that there was no 
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European consensus regarding parental rights for transsexuals thereby strengthening the 
UK’s margin of appreciation by showing that there was no common ground throughout the 
contracting states.
288
 In addition the Court was once again, as in all of the previous cases, 
then tasked with balancing the interests of the state and other citizens in relation to having 
a stable coherent system of family law, albeit with the disadvantages alleged by the 
applicant. It was observed that the alleged legal hardships could be overcome easily; for 
example the father could make a will to overcome the issue of his daughter having no 
automatic right of inheritance,
289
 in relation to immigration and nationality the daughter 
was a British citizen herself so would suffer no hardship.
290
 In addition, there was nothing 
in UK law which prevented the transsexual applicant from acting as the child’s father in a 
social sense
291
 and that it was permissible under English law for the mother and father to 
apply for a joint residence order which would give the father rights and responsibilities in 
relation to his daughter.
292
 When balancing the interests of the individual with the interests 
of the wider community, the wide margin of appreciation to be applied and as there were 
remedies already existing in English law to address the alleged difficulties it was 
determined that there was no breach of the applicant’s Article 8 right to family life.  
 
In Sheffield and Horsham v United Kingdom again, one of the decisive factors was the 
application of the margin of appreciation which, when applied resulted in a finding that 
there was no violation of the applicants’ rights. 
 
Article 12 decisions 
In relation to the applicant’s Article 12 claim the Court held that there was no violation 
because in their opinion “the right to marry guaranteed by Article 12 refers to the 
traditional marriage between persons of opposite biological sex.”293 In addition, the rights 
contained in Article 12 are specifically subject to the national laws which govern those 
rights i.e. in the instant case the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 s.11(c). Therefore states 
enjoy a particularly wide margin of appreciation in relation to matrimonial law subject to 
the proviso that domestic laws cannot “restrict or reduce the right in such a way or to such 
an extent that the very essence of the right in impaired.”294 Restricting marriage to an 
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institution which can only be entered into by opposite sex couples was not, and indeed still 
is not,
295
 an action which impairs the essence of the right to marry therefore the Court held 
unanimously that there was no violation of the applicant’s Article 12 rights.  
 
In relation to Cossey’s Article 12 rights she claimed that she was in effect prevented from 
marrying anyone at all. She argued that as a woman she could not marry another woman 
and yet the law would not let her marry a man. The issue here is that this claim by Cossey 
is confused; Cossey, although looking like a woman, was not legally a woman and 
therefore would have been able to marry a woman: the fact that she did not want to marry a 
woman did not mean that the law prevented her from doing so therefore she was not 
prevented from marrying at all, just prevented from marrying someone she would wish to 
marry. The Court noted that: 
 
[a]s to the applicant’s inability to marry a woman, this does not stem from any legal 
impediment and in this respect it cannot be said that the right to marry has been 
impaired as a consequence of the provisions of domestic law.
296
 
 
As regards the question of whether Cossey should be able to marry a man it was noted that 
“the criteria adopted by English law are in this respect in conformity with the concept of 
marriage to which the right guaranteed by Article 12 refers”297 therefore there was no 
violation of the applicant’s right to marry. 
 
The interesting thing about Sheffield and Horsham was that it highlighted the territorial 
scope of the UK’s refusal to give legal recognition to a physical change of sex. In this case, 
a UK domiciled MTF transsexual was prohibited from marrying her male partner, although 
both lived in the Netherlands and Dutch law would permit the marriage. Since the 
applicant was domiciled in England, it was deemed that English marriage law applied to 
determine who she was legally permitted to marry. 
 
So, it has been observed in the discussion of the above cases that throughout the 1980s and 
1990s the ECtHR was not willing to find in favour of transsexual applicants when the 
cases challenged provisions in UK domestic law.  
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B v France298  
Cossey and Rees both derived from the position of the UK Government not allowing post-
operative transsexuals to alter their birth certificates to reflect their sex re-assignment 
operations and not allowing post-operative transsexuals to marry members of the sex 
opposite to their post-operative sex. At this time however, UK law did permit post-
operative transsexuals to change their names on all official documentation apart from their 
birth certificates. Although changing one’s name did not change one’s legal sex it did 
afford some degree of privacy for the individuals involved. One very important 
development in the ECtHR at this time was B v France and, although not originating in the 
UK, it is important to discuss this case because it shows that the ECtHR was willing, as 
early as 1992, to afford rights under Article 8 to post-operative transsexuals. It was 
possible for the ECtHR to find in favour of the UK and against France on the same issue 
because of the factors which the Court used to make its determination. In B v France the 
applicant was a MTF transsexual who had undergone hormone and surgical treatment and 
lived as a woman. However, French law did not recognise her as female. The applicant 
sought that an annotation be made on her birth certificate to note that she was female. 
French law permitted annotations to birth certificates to reflect, for example, 
acknowledgment of an illegitimate child, adoption, marriage, divorce and death. Space was 
to be left on birth certificates for such annotations to be made. However French authorities 
refused to acknowledge a change of sex. In addition the French authorities refused to 
amend the applicant’s identity papers. The applicant argued that this refusal by the French 
authorities resulted in her having to reveal personal information to third parties i.e. that she 
was born male. The ECtHR held by a majority of fifteen votes to six that there had been a 
violation of the applicant’s Article 8 rights. In determining that the applicant’s Article 8 
rights had been breached the ECtHR departed from the previous decisions in Cossey and 
Rees. There were three particularly important factors which enabled the Court to depart 
from the previous decisions. Firstly the legal system in France itself allowed departure. 
The system in France allowed for amendments to birth certificates for a number of reasons. 
This meant that the system was not, as in the UK, a static system of historical record as 
was established in X, Petitioner.
299
 In the UK, legislation would have had to have been 
passed to enable the change that Rees and Cossey required; in France the system was 
already sufficiently flexible to make the required amendment without undue burden being 
placed on the French authorities, a factor which in Rees and Cossey was determinative in 
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the Court deciding that their rights under Article 8 had not been violated.
300
 Secondly, 
French authorities had refused to allow the applicant to change her forename to reflect her 
female identity whereas the law in the UK had allowed such a change of name. Thirdly the 
ECtHR considered the extent to which the applicant’s private life was impacted by the fact 
that her birth sex was indicated on official documents. Therefore the interferences and 
inconveniences that the applicant was forced to endure on a daily basis reached “a 
sufficient degree of seriousness to be taken into account for the purposes of Article 8.”301 It 
was these three factors which enabled the ECtHR to distinguish B v France from the 
earlier cases of Rees v United Kingdom and Cossey v United Kingdom. However, as a 
result of the lack of formal precedential system in the ECtHR and the wide margin of 
appreciation to be afforded to contracting states in the area of transsexual legal recognition 
B v France ultimately did not affect the law in the UK nor the ECtHR’s determination of 
subsequent cases raised by UK domiciled individuals as will be seen in the discussion of 
the following cases. 
 
In addition to these cases arising in the ECtHR, other cases continued in the UK courts 
during this time. In January 1996 the case of J v ST went before the Family Division of the 
High Court.
302
 This case concerned a marriage between a biological female and a FTM 
transsexual. The couple married in 1977 however the husband had been born female, had 
undergone a double mastectomy, received testosterone injections and used a prosthetic 
penis. In 1981 the wife discovered that her husband was using a prosthetic penis and 
“thereafter sexual intercourse only took place perhaps twice a year.”303 A number of years 
later, as a result of artificial insemination, the couple had two children. The wife petitioned 
for divorce in 1994 and, it was claimed, that it was only during the divorce proceedings 
that her husband’s birth certificate was made available and that she discovered that her 
husband had been born female. Therefore on this ground rather than divorce she applied 
for and was granted a decree of nullity. In relation to financial provision the wife argued 
that the husband should be barred from making a claim on public policy grounds. The 
Family Division noted that the Court had discretion under s.23 and s.24 of the Matrimonial 
Causes Act 1973 in relation to financial and property provisions on divorce or nullity. 
Rather than bar the husband from making a claim the Court limited his claim to that of an 
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unmarried cohabitant. The case does not consider, in depth, how legal sex is determined. 
However, Russell LJ observed that medical evidence which provided that there may well 
be a psychological or brain differentiation reason for transsexualism “may indeed be 
correct but that will not do so far as capacity to marry is concerned in England and 
Wales.”304 Russell LJ observed the developments in the ECtHR jurisprudence, as discussed 
in depth above, and noted that these “are not binding upon me but seem, at any rate up to 
the present, to sustain the law in England and Wales as far as marriage is concerned when 
dealing with transsexuals.”305 He continued “[i]t may well be that in many respects a 
transsexual should be and is treated as having acquired a different gender but not so far as 
marriage is concerned in this country.”306 In making this claim Russell LJ is restating the 
Corbett position that marriage is a legal relationship in which the sex of the parties is an 
essential element of that relationship and so it was appropriate in the context of marriage to 
fail to recognise the post-operative sex of the individual in question. The case was then 
appealed to the Court of Appeal later in 1996
307
 which affirmed the Family Division 
judgment and restated that the correct test in law was that established in Corbett.
308
  
 
Whereas the ECtHR and domestic courts were reluctant to find in favour of transsexual 
individuals through the 1980s and 1990s it is clear that the cases concerning employment 
rights of transsexuals took a particularly positive path in the late 1990s as a result of further 
developments in EU law impacting on UK employment law. 
 
Further developments in EU anti-discrimination law 
1996 is notable as it was the year in which the ECJ delivered its judgment in what has 
since become one of the landmark transsexual rights cases in which it was clarified that the 
SDA 1975 applied to transsexuals. In P v S and Cornwall County Council
309
  P was a MTF 
transsexual who was dismissed from her job when she informed her employer that she 
would be undergoing sex re-assignment. P raised an action against her employer based on 
sex discrimination. The Industrial Tribunal held that the SDA 1975 did not cover P’s 
situation as there was no sex discrimination since P would have been treated in exactly the 
same way had she been born female and was seeking sex re-assignment to become male. 
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One of the problems faced by the UK Industrial Tribunal was the question of whether or 
not the Equal Treatment Directive could apply in the present case and a preliminary ruling 
was sought from the ECJ on that matter. P v S and Cornwall County Council
310
 was a 
fundamentally important case in the process of transsexuals achieving legal recognition of 
their post-operative sex because it established that equal treatment laws had to also apply 
to them.  
 
The ECJ held that the general right of all citizens not to be discriminated against was a 
fundamental human right. Advocate General Tesauro noted that: 
 
[t]o tolerate such discrimination [on the grounds of sex re-assignment] would be 
tantamount, as regards such a person, to a failure to respect the dignity and freedom 
to which he or she is entitled, and which the Court has a duty to safeguard.
311
 
 
This reinforced the rights of EU citizens to be free from discrimination and underlined the 
EU equal treatment policy. In terms of the scope of the Equal Treatment Directive in 
relation to transsexuals he noted that: 
 
the scope of the directive cannot be confined simply to discrimination based on the 
fact that a person is of one or other sex. In view of its purpose and the nature of the 
rights which is seeks to safe guard, the scope of the directive is also such as to 
apply to discrimination arising, as in this case, from the [sex re-assignment] of the 
person concerned.
312
 
 
The reasoning of Advocate General Tesauro was that to dismiss someone who was 
undergoing sex re-assignment amounted to less favourable treatment between that person 
and someone of their birth sex
313
 and that therefore this was contrary to the Equal 
Treatment Directive.
314
 Therefore the legal position which determined the decision in 
White, as discussed above i.e. that the SDA 1975 did not protect transsexuals, was 
seriously undermined by the ECJ’s decision in P v S and Cornwall County Council. 
 
Following P v S and Cornwall County Council, in Chessington World of Adventures Ltd v 
Reed
315
 Reed was a biological male who intended to undergo sex re-assignment. She 
informed her employer, Chessington World of Adventures, and was subsequently the 
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subject of prolonged and serious harassment from her male colleagues. Reed commenced a 
period of absence from work on the basis of ill-health in March 1994, and her employment 
was terminated in July 1994 on the grounds that she was incapable of carrying out the 
duties of her employment. Reed complained to the company on numerous occasions that 
she was being harassed by colleagues. However, these allegations were not investigated by 
her employers and no disciplinary action was ever taken against those accused of harassing 
her. Reed then married her female partner and was registered on the marriage certificate as 
male which was appropriate as she continued to be legally male at this time. Reed then 
made a complaint of sex discrimination at an industrial tribunal in October 1994. She 
claimed that she had been discriminated against on the basis of her sex and cited the SDA 
1975 s. 1(1)(a) and 6(2)(b). The tribunal upheld her complaint and Chessington World of 
Adventure appealed. The basis for the appeal was that they claimed that the SDA 1975 did 
not apply where the complainant relied upon less favourable treatment following notice of 
intention to undergo sex re-assignment. In a landmark ruling for transsexual employment 
rights the appeal was dismissed. The case established that there was no need for a 
male/female comparator when considering the issue of discrimination on the grounds of 
sex re-assignment. The tribunal had correctly ascertained that discrimination on the 
grounds of sex re-assignment amounted to discrimination on the grounds of a person’s sex 
and therefore the SDA 1975 could apply to those individuals who sought to undergo sex 
re-assignment or who were undergoing sex re-assignment. The Employment Appeal 
Tribunal (EAT) held that the correct interpretation of s.1(1)(a) of the SDA 1975, in line 
with the Equal Treatment Directive, was that the Act applied not only to those people who 
suffered discrimination based on the fact of their sex but it also applied to those individuals 
who were undergoing sex re-assignment.
316
 
 
As a result of the clarification of the role of EU equal treatment law in protecting 
transsexuals from employment discrimination in P v S and Cornwall County Council and 
Chessington World of Adventures v Reed the Sex Discrimination (Gender Reassignment) 
Regulations 1999 were passed. These regulations amended the SDA 1975 by inserting 
s.2A, which provided that transsexuals were protected from discrimination in the 
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workplace and in relation to vocational training. Despite these changes, the employment 
discrimination cases which followed were of mixed success.
317
 Arguably though, these 
cases were not determined using the Corbett test but rather on the basis of EU equal 
treatment laws. In addition to this the Corbett test, had it been applied, may not have been 
as determinative as it had been in the family law cases because of how the employment 
relationships would have been classified in Ormrod J’s classifications of the importance of 
sex in legal relationships: essential, irrelevant or as relevant but not essential. It is argued 
therefore that the success in employment law cases is as a result of two factors: EU law 
prohibiting discrimination and the fact that sex was rarely considered to be an essential 
element of the employment contract.
318
 So, to some extent, progress was being made in 
relation to legal recognition of post-operative transsexuals’ sex but this recognition was 
piecemeal and derived from different sources of law and thereby began to create 
inconsistency for transsexuals before UK law; in family law situations the individuals’ 
post-operative sex was not recognised whereas in employment law protection against 
discrimination began at a pre-operative stage when the individual expressed an intention to 
undergo sex re-assignment.   
 
Bellinger v Bellinger in the Court of Appeal 
The issue of transsexual legal recognition before the UK courts reached its climax in the 
case of Bellinger v Bellinger. This section will mention the Family Division
319
 decision 
and then discuss the Court of Appeal judgment
320
 outlining the facts of the case, the 
majority opinion and also the dissenting opinion of Thorpe LJ. It is important to outline 
Thorpe LJ’s dissenting opinion as, although a departure from the accepted legal position, 
his judgment was in fact progressive as it challenged the Corbett ruling that sex is fixed at 
birth and that psychological factors play a very limited role in determining one’s legal sex 
and in so doing Thorpe LJ paved the way for a different model of legal sex determination 
to evolve and his dissenting judgment indicated the way in which the law would develop 
over the coming few years.  
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The Bellinger Facts 
Elizabeth Bellinger was born on 7 September 1946 and registered as male. However, it was 
argued throughout the initial petition and subsequent appeals that she had always felt 
herself to be female. At the age of twenty-one she married a woman however the 
relationship broke down and the couple divorced in 1971. Following the divorce Elizabeth 
began living and dressing as a woman and underwent sex re-assignment surgery which was 
complete by 1981. On 2 May 1981 Elizabeth married Michael Bellinger. Elizabeth was not 
asked, nor did she provide, any information regarding her sex at the time of the marriage. 
Since the date of the marriage Elizabeth and Michael continued to live together as husband 
and wife notwithstanding that Elizabeth was registered as male. She raised a petition on 16 
November 1998, with the support of her husband, the respondent, seeking a declaration 
that her marriage to Michael was valid from the date of the ceremony and was subsisting. 
In the Family Division, Elizabeth argued that at the time of her marriage she was female
321
 
and that Corbett “was wrongly decided or should be reconsidered in light of changed social 
conditions and improved medical knowledge.”322 
 
On 2 November 2000 the petition was refused by the Family Division and it was deemed 
that Elizabeth remained legally male therefore the marriage was not valid. Although 
Johnson J in the Family Division recognised that social attitudes to transsexuals had 
progressed since the Corbett judgment and that there was some merit in the argument that 
identity as male or female may be linked to one’s brain development it was not possible to 
move away from the Corbett criteria.
 323
  
 
So Johnston J reaffirmed the Corbett biological criteria for legal sex determination which 
meant that the marriage between Elizabeth and Michael was void as both parties were 
legally male.  
 
On 26 November 2000 Elizabeth appealed the decision of Johnston J to the Court of 
Appeal on the basis that he: 
had erred in concluding that the criteria in Corbett v Corbett […] were still 
determinants of legal sex despite clear evidence that the test was no longer valid or 
appropriate and failed to give effect to the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 in a way 
                                                 
321
 Bellinger (n 320) 733[e]. 
322
 ibid 733[f]. 
323
 ibid 747[c]-[d]. 
88 
 
that was compatible with European Convention rights in breach of articles 3 and 
8.
324
  
 
Laura Cox, QC and Ashley Bayston for the petitioner argued that definitions for ‘male’ 
and ‘female’ in s.11(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 are not given in the legislation 
and that consequently the meaning in the 1973 statute has been interpreted following the 
judgment of Ormrod J in Corbett
325
 as meaning the biological sex of an individual rather 
than the psychological gender identity of the individual. However, counsel for the 
petitioner also argued that the reasoning on which the Corbett decision was reached “no 
longer adequately reflect the state of society and science in the 21
st
 century.”326 It was 
argued that: 
 
[t]he terms “male” and “female” in section 11(c) of the 1973 Act are deliberately 
left undefined to enable courts to interpret them in the light of societal 
development. The Court should therefore not just have regard to sex in the 
biological and anatomical sense but to gender in the broader sense, including 
culturally and socially specific expectations of behaviour and attitude, an important 
part of which is self-recognition.
327
 
 
Therefore, counsel for the petitioner was seeking to rely on the science which will was 
outlined in Chapter One which outlines the importance of brain sex and the psychological 
aspects of one’s identity as male or female to argue that “male” and “female” in the 
marriage legislation were not fixed concepts but rather open to interpretation based on 
developments in medical science and knowledge. Therefore it was argued: 
 
[i]n the past 30 years medical knowledge and understanding have developed to 
show that psychological and hormonal factors should be included as additional 
important criteria in the determination of a person’s sex. It is now known that 
sexual differentiation occurs in several stages. Transsexualism or gender dysphoria 
occurs where sex differentiation in the brain does not match the previous 
physiological development and, since sex differentiation is not complete in the 
brain until the age of two or three, it is impossible to identify gender at birth.
328
 
 
Counsel for the Attorney General argued that the Corbett test remained valid law and that 
“surgical and other treatments do not change a person’s sex.”329 It was also argued that: 
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[t]here is insufficient evidence to justify the conclusion that the sex of the brain is 
the determinative factor; nor is it currently possible to ascertain the sex of the brain 
during a person’s life. There have been no developments, either of jurisprudence or 
medical science, to justify or require a different approach being taken by the courts 
other than the biological determinants.
330
 
 
So the question before the Court of Appeal was whether or not Elizabeth Bellinger could 
be said to be “female” for the purpose of s.11(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973; the 
consequence of the answer to the former question determining the validity of her marriage 
to Michael Bellinger.  
 
The Bellinger Judgment 
The judgment was delivered by Dame Butler-Sloss and Walker LJ who stated that behind 
the bare facts of the case: 
 
lies a human problem, which deeply affects a small minority of the population. In 
considering the difficult medical and legal issues facing this court […] we are very 
much aware of the plight of those who, like the petitioner, are locked into the 
medical condition of transsexualism.
331
 
 
It was reiterated that the petitioner had been correctly assigned the male sex at birth and 
that she was not intersexed.
332
 After discussing the Corbett judgment Dame Butler-Sloss 
and Walker LJ turned to the argument made by Ms Cox, counsel for Elizabeth Bellinger, 
that “male” and “female” are not defined in legislation so as to enable a dynamic 
interpretation of these terms as society changes. The Court, in determining how to interpret 
the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 s.11(c), noted that it had to apply the Corbett criteria.
333
 
Dame Butler-Sloss and Walker LJ noted that: 
 
[i]t is clear that the three criteria relied upon by Ormrod, J in Corbett’s case […] 
remain the only basis upon which to decide upon the gender of a child at birth. […] 
Other than in the case of a person who is inter-sexed, the biological criteria point at 
that stage conclusively to a decision whether the child is male or female. At birth 
therefore the Corbett criteria remain valid today.
334
 
 
Therefore the appeal was dismissed and the marriage between the Bellingers was void; 
although Elizabeth had altered her body to appear as female, had been accepted socially as 
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female and identified as female because her birth sex was male as per the Corbett criteria 
outlined by Ormrod, J in 1971 she was, for all legal purposes, male. 
 
Thorpe LJ’s Dissenting opinion 
Although the appeal was dismissed and therefore Thorpe LJ’s dissenting opinion is of no 
legal consequence it is important to consider the reasons for his dissent as, as will be 
shown in more detail in Chapter Three, one of the main thrusts of his argument, the 
importance of psychological factors in determining legal status, became hugely important 
in the ECtHR judgment in Goodwin v United Kingdom
335
 one year later.  
 
Thorpe LJ was sceptical that the judgment of Ormrod J in Corbett should still stand some 
30 years after it was first handed down. In reaching his dissenting opinion Thorpe LJ 
considered in depth the judgment of Johnson J in the Family Division.
336
 Johnson J had 
decided that, based on medical evidence, the Corbett criteria of gonads, chromosomes and 
genitalia were “the only criteria for determining the gender of an individual.”337 Thorpe LJ 
argued that much of Johnson J’s decision was based on “his erroneous citation of Professor 
Green”338, one of the medical experts in the case who in fact had stated in evidence that the 
Corbett criteria were “too reductionist” in contemporary times for the purpose of 
determining one’s gender.339 According to Thorpe LJ the decision of Johnson J in the 
Family Division was fundamentally flawed and “his ultimate conclusion that the medical 
opinion that guided Ormrod J remained unchanged might be said to erode the validity of 
the conclusion.”340 However, rather than undermine Johnson J’s judgment Thorpe LJ 
sought to question the validity of the Corbett judgment as relevant in present times. He 
stated: 
 
[i]n my opinion the key to this appeal lies not so much in a scrutiny of his judgment 
as in a fresh appraisal of the extent to which the passage of 30 years requires the 
revision of the propositions of law, of medical science and of social policy upon 
which Ormrod J founded his judgment in Corbett’s case.341 
 
So Thorpe LJ was concerned with how medical science and social policy ought to 
influence the development of law in this area. His judgment, although dissenting, is 
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therefore not only hugely interesting but also progressive in that he sought to find a means 
of reforming the law while mindful of the role of the courts in relation to the legislature. 
Thorpe LJ provided a detailed analysis of the state of medical science in 2001 regarding 
the aetiology of transsexualism and noted that there was a growing trend to consider the 
importance of psychological factors as well as brain differentiation.
342
 On consideration of 
the evidence of experts in the field of gender dysphoria Thorpe LJ reached the conclusion 
that “medical opinion no longer accepts the three Corbett factors for the determination of 
sex”343 and that the situation is much more indeterminate than the Corbett judgment would 
suggest.
344
 It should be noted that medical opinion at the time of Corbett was not quite as 
Thorpe LJ implies in this statement. As was shown in Chapter One, and as shown above in 
the discussion of Corbett, medical opinion in the 1970s was such that it was acknowledged 
that sex determination was based on much more than the three criteria established by 
Ormrod J in Corbett.  
 
The judgment of Thorpe LJ therefore raises a number of themes surrounding divergence of 
opinion within the medical and scientific communities regarding the aetiology of 
transsexualism. Thorpe LJ reached the same conclusion in Bellinger in the Court of Appeal 
as was reached in Chapter One of this thesis: that the causes of transsexualism are 
unknown but may include a number of factors which encompass the biological, 
physiological and psychological.  
 
Advances in medical knowledge played an important role in Thorpe LJ’s dissenting 
opinion and, as Chapter Three will show, the state of that knowledge continues to develop 
and our understanding of transsexualism as a medical condition continues to deepen and 
strengthen.  So, with this in mind, Thorpe LJ stated that “a fundamental question raised by 
this appeal is whether this court in 2001 should approve and apply the reasoning in 
Corbett’s case.”345 In answering his own question Thorpe LJ stated that there were four 
propositions within Ormrod J’s judgment which influenced his decision in Corbett: firstly 
that biological sex is fixed at birth at the latest; secondly that marriage is a union of one 
man and one woman; thirdly that of the four criteria
346
 for sex determination the law 
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should adopt the first three for the purpose of marriage law and fourthly that marriage 
depends on sex not gender.
347
 
 
Taking the propositions one at a time Thorpe LJ noted that in 2001 medical knowledge 
was such that, although representing the expert evidence at the time of Corbett, the first 
proposition that sex is fixed at birth at the latest “30 years on, is rejected by the three 
experts in the present case”.348 It is simply no longer the case that medicine and science 
accept that sex is fixed at birth as was shown in the examination of the literature in Chapter 
One. In relation to the second proposition which underpinned the Corbett decision, that 
marriage is a union of one man and one woman Thorpe LJ noted that “the world that 
engendered those classic definitions has long since gone.”349 He acknowledged that the 
world had changed considerably from the time of Lindo v Belisario
350
 in 1795 in which it 
was determined that marriage is a special type of union which “is a contract according to 
the law of nature, antecedent to civil institution”.351 In addition, the classic definition of 
marriage taken from the judgment of Lord Penzance in Hyde
352
 which is taken as authority 
that marriage is a lifelong, heterosexual union was also challenged by Thorpe LJ who 
stated that “[t]he intervening 130 years have seen huge social and scientific changes”353 
which impact on marriage. So, according to Thorpe LJ marriage should be redefined “as a 
contract for which the parties elect but which is regulated by the state, both in its formation 
and in its termination by divorce, because it affects status upon which depend a variety of 
entitlements, benefits and obligations.”354 So, the fact that society had changed 
fundamentally since the time of the early definitions of marriage provided justification for 
Thorpe LJ to consider departing from this precedent.
 355
  
 
In relation to the fourth proposition, that marriage is dependent upon sex and not gender 
Thorpe LJ stated that “[t]he proposition seems to me to be now of very doubtful 
validity.”356 He based this pronouncement on the fact that procreative sex is now no longer 
considered an inherent part of marriage. In addition Ormrod J in Corbett refused to 
acknowledge the validity of sexual relations between a male and a MTF transsexual which, 
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according to Thorpe LJ was “at odds with the decision of this court in SY v SY (orse W) 
[1963] P 37”357 which concerned the validity of a marriage of a man with a woman who 
was only able to engage in sexual intercourse following surgery to lengthen her vagina. In 
relation to the sexual aspect of marriage which formed an important part of Ormrod J’s 
judgment in Corbett Thorpe LJ stated: 
 
[w]ithin any marriage there may be physical factors on either or both sides that 
require acknowledgement and accommodation in the sexual relationship of the 
parties. But that accommodation does not rob the result of its essential 
characteristic, namely the sexual dimension of the couple’s relationship.358 
 
For Thorpe LJ sexual relations were no less sexual as a result of their non-conformity to 
the norm. He stated that although he acknowledged that sexual relations between a couple 
was a “dimension of cardinal importance”359 he “would nevertheless conclude that in cases 
such as the present it is sufficiently fulfilled”360 thereby undermining Ormrod J’s opinion 
in Corbett that sex between a male and a MTF transsexual could not be considered sex. 
 
So three of the four propositions upon which Ormrod J reached his conclusion in Corbett 
had been considered, explored and repudiated by Thorpe LJ. The final proposition, actually 
the third upon which the Corbett judgment was reached, was that only the first three of the 
four Corbett criteria should be used to determine legal sex. It was this proposition which, 
in the opinion of Thorpe LJ, had, “the most direct bearing on the outcome of the 
appeal.”361 In considering this Thorpe LJ stated: 
 
[i]n my opinion the test that is confined to physiological factors, whilst attractive 
for its simplicity and apparent certainty of outcome, is manifestly incomplete. 
There is no logic or principle in excluding one vital component of personality, the 
psyche. That its admission imports the difficulties of application that may lead to 
less certainty of outcome is an inevitable consequence. But we should prefer 
complexity to superficiality in that the psychological self is the product of an 
extremely complex process, although not fully understood.
362
 
 
Weighing up the analysis of the four propositions upon which the Corbett judgment was 
based Thorpe LJ stated that “the foundations of Ormrod J’s judgment are no longer 
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secure”363 and that it “served its time well but its time has passed.”364 He stated that 
“Ormrod J’s monumental judgment in Corbett v Corbett […] was undoubtedly right when 
given on 2 February 1970. It is only subsequent developments, both medical and social, 
that render it wrong in 2001.”365 Thorpe LJ was careful in his dissenting opinion to not 
criticise Ormrod J but he clearly noted that the Corbett judgment was not binding on the 
Court of Appeal in the present case and that, in his opinion, it ought not to be followed.
366
 
 
As noted above the dissenting opinion of Thorpe LJ is of no legal consequence in the Court 
of Appeal decision in Bellinger however, as will be shown later in this thesis, his thoughts 
on the importance of the psychological aspects of identity became a fundamental part of 
the decision of the ECtHR in Goodwin v United Kingdom
367
 and therefore can be 
considered progressive and, with hindsight, an indicator of the way in which the law would 
develop in the years immediately following the Court of Appeal’s judgment.  
 
The Corbett judgment, which was upheld by the Court of Appeal in Bellinger, is weak in 
light of contemporary knowledge on the aetiology of transsexualism, which was outlined 
in Chapter One, which includes an appreciation of the psychological aspects of gender 
identity. Had law followed the state of medical science in this respect and Thorpe LJ’s 
judgment represented the majority opinion rather than a dissenting viewpoint the wider 
medical understanding of transsexualism as having a psychological element could have 
influenced the law much earlier than it eventually did. Had law followed medical 
knowledge, without accepting it as determinative of legal sex, then the medical 
appreciation of transsexualism in 2002 which was much wider than that in 1971 could have 
enabled the Court of Appeal in Bellinger to depart from the Corbett decision and develop a 
new means of determining the legal sex of individuals; however, as will be shown in 
Chapter Three when the Bellinger appeal in the House of Lords is discussed, such an 
approach by the Court of Appeal would not have been without its problems, particularly in 
relation to certainty of legal sex in law and consistency between judgments and indeed 
different areas of law – two of the factors which influenced the initial decision in Corbett 
and which were maintained as important in subsequent cases discussed above. Although 
Thorpe LJ’s dissenting opinion could have paved the way for an acknowledgment of post-
operative sex for legal purposes such a position was not to be and the majority in the Court 
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of Appeal adhered to Corbett. It was not until 2002 that transsexual legal recognition took 
a monumental leap forward in the case of Goodwin which formed the culmination of the 
human rights quest for legal recognition and, although not as transformative as it could 
have been, certainly provided the impetus to change UK law.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown how UK law dealt with those individuals who underwent medical 
procedures to modify their bodies to appear, as much as possible, to be members of the sex 
opposite to their birth sex. The purpose of them doing so was to ease the dysphoria which 
arose as a result of the medical condition, transsexualism.  Clearly UK law was reluctant to 
provide any means of legal recognition of gender identity, insisting that one remained the 
sex assigned at birth despite any steps take to physically change sex. However there were 
some areas in which law did provide a degree of recognition to transsexuals; mostly post-
operative transsexuals. In areas of law which were influenced by EC law post-operative 
transsexuals were provided with protection as a result of equal treatment legislation in the 
field of employment. This protection spread to other areas such as in the provision of 
goods and services. However, the dicta of Ormrod J in Corbett continued to reflect the law 
throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-first. The impact of Corbett was that 
one’s legal sex was assigned at birth based on physiological factors and any attempt to 
alter one’s primary or secondary sex characteristics had no legal impact. This placed post-
operative transsexuals in a legal limbo where socially they were accepted as members of 
one sex but legally were classed as the opposite. This gave rise to a number of problems 
for people in their day-to-day lives and indeed in terms of the legal relationships which 
they sought to enter into, for example marriage. As no progress was made in the domestic 
courts a number of applications were made to the ECtHR, beginning in the 1980s. 
However this strand of case law was to prove ineffectual for the transsexual applicants as 
the ECtHR continually held that there was no positive obligation on the UK to alter their 
system of birth registrations and that the approach taken by the UK was within the state’s 
margin of appreciation. A number of factors proved detrimental to the applicants in these 
cases, namely the lack of European consensus on recognising transsexuals, the lack of 
medical consensus regarding aetiology and the abovementioned margin of appreciation.  
Little change was made between the 1950s and 2001 and it was only towards the end of 
this period that dissenting opinions, namely Judge Martens in Cossey and Thorpe LJ in 
Bellinger in the Court of Appeal, started to be progressive and started to raise the 
possibility of change in this area of the law. However this change was not forthcoming and 
96 
 
it was not until the cases of Bellinger in the House of Lords and Goodwin in the ECtHR 
that pressure was put on the Government to reform this area of law. These cases will be 
discussed in depth in the following chapter. 
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3. Goodwin v United Kingdom and its impact on UK 
Law: Towards Legal Recognition of Transsexuals 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter outlined how UK law was reluctant to provide legal recognition for 
transsexuals in areas where an individual’s sex could be considered to be an essential 
element of the legal relationship which the individual sought to enter. This meant that on 
the whole transsexuals who had changed their bodies were in legal limbo; appearing to be 
one sex but legally being classified as the opposite. The situation began to change in July 
2002 with the European Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) judgment in Goodwin v United 
Kingdom
368
 which held that non-recognition of post-operative transsexuals was a violation 
of Articles 8 and 12 ECHR. The change towards recognition continued in the domestic 
courts. The cases of Bellinger,
369
 Croft v Royal Mail Group Plc,
370
 and A v Chief Constable 
of West Yorkshire
371
 which were decided in April 2003, July 2003, and May 2004 
respectively opened the possibility of providing legal recognition of transsexuals at 
different stages in the transition process. In each of these three cases there was some 
departure from the medical involvement and a move towards a human rights based 
approach which necessitated a change in UK law. This chapter will explore each of these 
cases in turn to show how pressure was put on the UK Government to enact legislation to 
give legal recognition to transsexuals and the conditions by which such legal recognition 
could be given as a result of these three cases. 
 
The Goodwin facts 
Goodwin is arguably the most important case in relation to transsexual legal recognition, 
other than Corbett,
372
 as it influenced the decisions of the House of Lords in Bellinger, and 
the of the Court of Appeal in Croft and A v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire.
373
 In 
Goodwin Christine Goodwin was a male-to-female (MTF) transsexual who alleged the 
following: sexual harassment by male work colleagues; dismissal from her previous 
employment because she was transsexual; that her new employer had been able to use her 
NI number to trace her details and discover that she was born male and that this had led to 
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problems at work; that she was told that she was ineligible to receive a state pension at 60, 
the age at which a female at the time received her state pension; that she was materially 
disadvantaged in any instance where she would be required to produce her birth certificate; 
and she would have to continue to pay higher insurance premiums. She argued that these 
difficulties arose as a result of UK law which refused to allow her to obtain a new birth 
certificate and that this amounted to a violation of her Article 8 rights. She argued that 
“rapid changes, in respect of the scientific understanding of, and the social attitude towards 
transsexualism were taking place not only across Europe but elsewhere.”374 The 
implication was that the UK Government should no longer be able to rely upon their 
margin of appreciation to justify the continued non-recognition of transsexuals’ change of 
sex for the purpose of UK law. In addition Goodwin alleged that non-recognition of her 
sex-reassignment meant that she was unable to marry a man which, she claimed, amounted 
to a violation of Article 12 ECHR.  
 
In response the UK Government argued that the wide margin of appreciation ought to be 
maintained as “there was no generally accepted approach among the contracting states in 
respect of transsexuality”375 and therefore there was no violation of Article 8. It was argued 
that the applicant could obtain new versions of some official documents, such as her 
driving licence and passport, which reflected her sex re-assignment. The UK Government 
contended that “a fair balance had therefore been struck between the rights of the 
individual and the general interest of the community.”376 In arguing this the Government 
clearly set out that legal recognition of transsexuals is not just about the individual himself 
but also about how the individual interacts with wider society. The Government was of the 
opinion that where transsexuals had to disclose their previous identity, for example in 
obtaining insurance, this was appropriate because “medical history and gender affected the 
calculation of premiums.”377 Accordingly, the UK’s argument was that it was in the public 
interest that in some circumstances transsexual individuals ought to be forced to divulge 
their previous identity. In relation to the Article 12 claim the Government argued that 
states were not under any obligation to allow transsexuals “to marry a person of his or her 
original sex”378 and that the Court of Appeal in Bellinger had recently reviewed English 
matrimony law and upheld the law as it existed at that time.
379
 It was argued that should 
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UK law change in relation to this matter then this change “should come from the United 
Kingdom's own courts acting within the margin of appreciation which [the ECtHR] has 
always afforded.”380  
 
The Goodwin judgment 
The facts of Goodwin are unproblematic and reflect the earlier transsexual rights cases. 
However it is the reasoning of the ECtHR in this case which is fundamentally important as 
the judgment substantially departed from previous cases which involved UK domiciled 
transsexual applicants, as outlined in the previous chapter. It is the Court’s reasoning in 
Goodwin which is important because it indicated a move away from the test established by 
Ormrod J in Corbett which relied solely on physiological criteria over psychological 
identity. The ECtHR held unanimously that there had been a violation of both of 
Goodwin’s Articles 8 and Article 12 rights.  As the most important aspect of the Goodwin 
judgment, at least for the purpose of this thesis, is how the ECtHR determined that there 
was a violation of Article 8 the ECtHR’s determination of Goodwin’s Article 12 rights will 
not be discussed.  
 
The way in which the ECtHR considered Goodwin’s claims that her Article 8 rights had 
been violated is crucially important because the reasoning of the court indicates a shift in 
the balance between the rights of the individual and the rights and interests of others and 
the state. In addition the ECtHR departed from the complex issue of medical consensus 
regarding aetiology which had been a focus of earlier cases before it.
381
 The ECtHR did 
four particularly important things when reaching its conclusion that Goodwin’s Article 8 
rights had been violated. Firstly it gave “a greater weight to the interference with the 
applicants’ rights than it had in earlier decisions.”382 Secondly it “abandoned the view that 
medical knowledge about the causes of transsexualism was a determining factor”383; 
thirdly it “replaced the factor of a European standard with respect to the legal position of 
transsexuals with reference to an international trend”384 which favoured legal recognition 
of transsexuals and fourthly it provided a change in, what Rudolf calls, “the burden of 
persuasion”385 which meant that rather than consider the consequence of current law for 
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the applicants and the frequency of these consequences and then ask if those consequences 
were disproportionate to the rights of the applicants, as was the approach in earlier cases,  
the Court in Goodwin asked whether a “concrete or substantial hardship or detriment to the 
public interest has been […] demonstrated as likely to flow from any change to the status 
of transsexuals.”386 This change in questioning of the Court meant that “it became 
incumbent upon the state to show an overwhelming interest in preserving the conflict […] 
between law and social reality”387 for transsexuals. This reasoning therefore indicated a 
strong shift towards the rights of the individual and towards limited state interference in the 
private lives of transsexual citizens. According to Rudolf: 
 
[t]he underlying reason for these changes was the court’s consideration that the 
right to personal autonomy encompassed the right to establish the details of one’s 
own identity, including the harmonization of one’s sex and self-perceived 
gender.
388
 
 
So, the factor that truly impacted on the Goodwin decision was the developing 
understanding of ‘personal autonomy’ as an aspect of Article 8 ECHR,389  which, as the 
ECtHR stated in Goodwin, included “the right [of individuals] to establish details of their 
identity as human beings.”390 It was this which “conclusively tipped the balance in favor of 
the applicants.”391  
 
The idea of personal autonomy is not new in law; however it was fairly new to the Article 
8 jurisprudence at the time of Goodwin and it “derives its significance from its character as 
an emanation of human dignity.”392 The concept of human dignity as a foundation of the 
ECHR has been stated throughout Article 8 case law and is not a new idea and therefore its 
background and history will not be discussed in detail here.
393
 In order to appreciate how 
important the Goodwin judgment is it is necessary to examine it in more detail as doing so 
will show just how fundamental this case was in relation to the quest for legal recognition. 
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The fundamental issue in Goodwin was that once the ECtHR had established that the basis 
for the Court’s determination of the case was the concept of human dignity encompassing 
personal autonomy this shifted the Court’s focus of enquiry to the rights of the individual 
to develop her personal identity. The impact of Goodwin therefore was to severely limit the 
state’s margin of appreciation in relation to transsexual legal recognition: it was no longer 
possible for the state to refuse to recognise post-operative transsexuals; the only issue 
remaining within the state’s margin of appreciation was in determining how to provide this 
legal recognition.
394
  
 
In reaching its decision that the UK violated Goodwin’s Article 8 rights the ECtHR 
considered the following in this order: (i) the preliminary considerations, which amount to 
the factors which are used when interpreting any Article 8 claim; (ii) the applicant’s 
position in relation to domestic law; (iii) the state of medical and scientific knowledge on 
transsexualism; (iv) the European and international consensus, or lack thereof; (v) the 
impact on the UK administrative system of requiring change and (vi) the balance of the 
rights of the individual against the state and others. As a result of the Court adopting this 
particular stance in analysing the Goodwin arguments the same structure will be adopted 
here.  
 
The Preliminary Considerations 
The Court began its analysis by restating that: 
 
the notion of “respect” as understood in Article 8 is not clear cut, especially as far 
as the positive obligations inherent in that concept are concerned: having regard to 
the diversity of practices followed and the situation obtaining in the Contracting 
States, the notion’s requirements will vary considerably from case to case and the 
margin of appreciation to be accorded to the authorities may be wider than that 
applied in other areas under the Convention.
395
 
 
Although the Court’s reiteration of this position is not new it did prove to be crucial to the 
Court reaching the decision that the applicant’s rights had been violated. What became 
important in this case was the extent of the state’s margin of appreciation, the state’s 
positive obligations towards its citizens and the obligation on the Court to continue to 
evolve their interpretation of the Convention rights as these three issues resulted in the 
Court placing the individual’s interests in this case above all others. As can be seen from 
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the discussion of earlier cases in the previous chapter the early transsexual rights cases 
failed because the balance was not in favour of the individual but rather on the state. In 
these cases the Court noted that there was no positive obligation on the state to recognise 
transsexuals
396
 and that the state’s margin of appreciation in relation to this was wide397 as 
a result of a lack of medical and scientific consensus combined with a lack of European 
consensus which enabled the Court to determine that there had been no violation of Article 
8.
398
 
 
In further examining whether or not the UK was under a positive obligation in relation to 
transsexuals’ Article 8 rights the ECtHR in Goodwin began by stating:  
 
[i]n determining whether or not a positive obligation exists, regard must also be had 
to the fair balance that has to be struck between the general interest of the 
community and the interest of the individual, the search for which balance in 
inherent in the whole of the Convention.
399
 
 
It was acknowledged by the ECtHR in Goodwin that in the earlier cases originating in the 
UK: 
 
there was no positive obligation on the Government to alter their existing system 
for the registration of births by establishing a new system or type of documentation 
to provide proof of current civil status.
400
 
 
The situation for Goodwin therefore looked bleak however this was to prove not to be the 
case because the ECtHR noted that it was not bound by these previous decisions. The 
Court stated that: 
 
since the Convention is first and foremost a system for the protection of human 
rights, the Court must have regard to the changing conditions within the respondent 
State and within Contracting States generally and respond […] to any evolving 
convergence as to the standards to be achieved.
401
 
 
Therefore the ECtHR was laying the foundations for a departure from the previous case 
law concerning UK domiciled transsexuals.
402
 In justifying such a departure the ECtHR 
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stated that “[i]t is of crucial importance that the Convention is interpreted and applied in a 
manner which renders its rights practical and effective, not theoretical and illusory.”403 By 
reiterating the purpose of the Convention as protecting human rights and reinforcing the 
idea that the Convention is a ‘living instrument’ which ought to be interpreted in a manner 
compatible with evolving social conditions and standards the ECtHR thus paved the way 
for a ground-breaking decision in Goodwin. 
 
The applicant’s position 
Once the Court had considered the extent of the state’s positive obligation and the need to 
interpret the Convention in a manner consistent with changing social circumstances it 
progressed to considering the applicant’s position in terms of UK law. In doing so the 
Court stated that “serious interference with private life can arise where the state of 
domestic law conflicts with an important aspect of personal identity.”404 Thus the Court 
was firmly placing the interests of the individual in developing personal identity above the 
interests of the state in maintaining the status quo. The Court continued: 
 
[t]he stress and alienation arising from a discordance between  the position in 
society assumed by a post-operative transsexual and the status imposed by law 
which refuses to recognise the change of gender cannot, in the Court’s view, be 
regarded as a minor inconvenience arising from a formality.
405
  
 
In stating this, the interests of the individual were given primacy as the Court was swayed 
by the impact of interference with a fundamental aspect of oneself. In this regard the 
ECtHR noted that at the time of the Goodwin application “a conflict between social reality 
and law arises which places the transsexual in an anomalous position, in which he or she 
may experience feelings of vulnerability, humiliation and anxiety.”406 One issue which the 
ECtHR focused on particularly was the fact that Goodwin’s medical treatment had been 
provided by the state. This acceptance by the UK of her medical condition and their 
provision of treatment in an effort to effect “as close an assimilation as possible to the 
gender in which the transsexual perceived that he or she properly belongs”407 aided 
Goodwin’s application. The ECtHR noted that it was: 
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struck by the fact that nonetheless the gender re-assignment which is lawfully 
provided is not met with full recognition in law, which might be regarded as the 
final culminating step in the long and difficult process of transformation which the 
transsexual has undergone.
408
  
 
And it continued: 
 
[w]here a State has authorised the treatment and surgery alleviating the condition of 
a transsexual, financed or assisted in financing the operations […] it appears 
illogical to refuse to recognise the legal implications of the result to which 
treatment leads.
409
 
 
The Court then returned to the previous transsexual cases which had been decided in the 
1980s and 1990s. In returning to these cases the Court was attempting to consider the 
public interest argument which had been put forward in those cases and observed that in 
them one fact which counted against those applicants was the “medical and scientific 
considerations, the state of any European and international consensus and the impact of 
any changes to the current birth register system.”410 In emphasising the importance of these 
factors in earlier cases the Court was effectively inviting a reconsideration and re-
examination of them in light of 2002 knowledge and practices.  
 
The state of medical and scientific knowledge 
In revisiting these factors in Goodwin the ECtHR noted that “the ongoing scientific and 
medical debate as to the exact causes of the condition is of diminished relevance.”411 
Therefore it was no longer necessary to know what definitively ‘caused’ transsexualism 
before those who had undergone sex re-assignment could be recognised in law. The fact 
that medical science could not pinpoint the exact aetiology of the condition, as discussed in 
Chapter One, was not considered to be fundamentally important to the Court’s 
determination of Goodwin’s Article 8 rights. To some extent the Court distanced itself 
from the medical debates ongoing at the time and stated that it was not persuaded “that the 
state of medical science of scientific knowledge provides any determining argument as 
regards the legal recognition of transsexuals.”412 One crucial observation from the Court in 
Goodwin was that in revisiting the importance of biology in relation to attributing a legal 
sex to an individual it was noted that: 
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[w]hile it […] remains the case that a transsexual cannot acquire all the biological 
characteristics of the assigned sex, the Court notes that with increasingly 
sophisticated surgery and types of hormonal treatments, the principal unchanging 
biological aspect of gender identity is the chromosomal element. […] It is not 
apparent to the Court that the chromosomal element, amongst all the others, must 
inevitably take on decisive significance for the purposes of legal attribution of 
gender identity for transsexuals.
413
  
 
The Court was therefore distancing itself not only from its previous judgments which had 
relied on medical and scientific knowledge but also issued a strong challenge to the 
Corbett judgment which was based largely on the fact that one cannot change one’s 
chromosomes. In Goodwin the aetiology of transsexualism was no longer deemed legally 
important and what was to prove more important was the growing international trend that 
transsexuals should be given legal recognition. In largely dismissing the state of medical 
and scientific knowledge as not determinative of one’s legal rights the ECtHR effectively 
strengthened the possibility of a model of gender identity recognition emerging within the 
UK in the years following this decision which was not based on medical criteria. Although 
the Court did not directly challenge the Corbett decision the ECtHR did separate the issue 
of legal rights and medical knowledge so that one could no longer be thought of as reliant 
upon the other and removed any potential remaining doubt that post-operative 
transsexuals’ right to legal recognition of their sex re-assignment was to be considered an 
issue of personal identity as protected by human rights law.  
 
The European and International consensus, or lack thereof 
Regarding the state of European consensus it was noted that as early as Sheffield and 
Horsham v United Kingdom
414
 in 1999 there was growing consensus in the Council of 
Europe of providing legal recognition following sex re-assignment. However there was no 
clear consensus on how to provide recognition. The ECtHR in Goodwin noted that lack of 
a clear consensus in the contracting states was “hardly surprising” given the “widely 
diverse legal systems and traditions”415 and the wide margin of appreciation afforded to 
contracting states in deciding “on the measures necessary to secure Convention rights 
within their jurisdictions.”416 Therefore, the ECtHR, as with the factor of medical and 
scientific knowledge, attached: 
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less importance to the lack of evidence of a common European approach to the 
resolution of the legal and practical problems posed, than to the clear and 
uncontested evidence of a continuing international trend in favour not only of 
increased social acceptance of transsexuals but of legal recognition of the new 
sexual identity of post-operative transsexuals.
417
 
 
In largely dismissing the state of European consensus as a determinative factor the ECtHR 
was again in effect strengthening the rights of the individual against the state in an area of 
private life which could be deemed intimate to the individual. In so doing the ECtHR was 
giving primacy to the individual’s intimate identity over the state’s maintenance of the 
status quo. The means by which the ECtHR managed to achieve this in Goodwin will be 
discussed below when the Goodwin case is situated within the wider Article 8 
jurisprudence but suffice it to say at this point the ECtHR was strongly emphasising that in 
some areas of one’s private life the individual’s sense of identity will be protected 
notwithstanding a lack of European consensus on the matter in question. 
 
The impact on the state’s administrative systems 
So having dismissed the issue of European consensus and the state of medical and 
scientific knowledge on the aetiology of transsexualism, and focussing instead on the 
growing international trend towards providing legal recognition the ECtHR once again 
indicated a willingness to depart from the earlier transsexual recognition cases which had 
derived from the UK. The other determinative factor in the early transsexual rights case 
law was the impact that requiring legal recognition of post-operative transsexuals would 
have on the UK administrative system. This, combined with the lack of consensus which 
had been identified in the earlier cases, had proven to be detrimental to the early cases 
before the Court as discussed above. Returning to this issue in Goodwin the ECtHR noted 
that “on the basis of the material before it at this time [it did not find] that any real prospect 
of prejudice [to others] has been identified as likely to arise if changes were made to the 
current system.”418 The alleged problems identified in the Government’s response were 
merely hypothetical. 
 
The balance of rights 
So, the four factors which were so determinative in the earlier transsexual rights cases of 
the 1980s and 1990s, i.e. the lack of positive obligation, the state of medical and scientific 
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knowledge, the lack of European consensus and the impact that requiring recognition 
would have on the state’s administrative systems were dismissed by the ECtHR in 
Goodwin in 2002. The lack of positive obligation in relation to transsexual legal 
recognition which underpinned all of the previous case law brought by UK based 
transsexuals actually changed so that in 2002 in Goodwin it was acknowledged that there 
was a positive obligation on the state to enable the development of the applicant’s right to 
private and family life. However the state of medical and scientific knowledge was 
dismissed as no longer determinative as was the lack of European consensus, rather the 
ECtHR preferred to acknowledge the growing international trend towards recognition. The 
ECtHR had already discussed the issue of balancing the applicant’s rights and those of the 
wider community in relation to transsexuals in Cossey v United Kingdom
419
 and so taking 
this approach was not new to the Goodwin case but merely a restatement of one of the 
guiding principles of ECHR jurisprudence: that a fair balance must be struck between the 
rights and interests of all. However, it became clear as the judgment progressed that the 
balance began to tip in favour of the applicant in Goodwin. The factor which allowed this 
to happen was the way in which human dignity and human freedom were conceived of by 
the Court. The Court stated: 
 
[u]nder Article 8 of the Convention in particular, where the notion of personal 
autonomy is an important principle underlying the interpretation of its guarantees, 
protection is given to the personal sphere of  each individual, including the right to 
establish details of their identity as individual human beings.
420
 
 
The Court noted that there would be difficulties for the state in changing its systems of 
registration of births and in relation to other areas of domestic law.
421
 However the ECtHR 
continued that: 
 
[n]o concrete or substantial hardship or detriment to the public interest has indeed 
been demonstrated as likely to flow from any change to the status of transsexuals 
and, as regards other possible consequences, the court considers that society may 
reasonably be expected to tolerate a certain inconvenience to enable individuals to 
live in dignity and worth in accordance with the sexual identity chosen by them at 
great personal cost.
422
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Therefore there was thought to be no sufficiently strong competing public interest which 
would prevent transsexual applicants from receiving legal recognition of their sex re-
assignment. The Court stated that: 
 
the respondent Government can no longer claim that the matter falls within their 
margin of appreciation, save as regards the appropriate means of achieving 
recognition of the right protected under the Convention.
423
 
 
As noted earlier in this chapter, one of the factors which operated so decisively against UK 
based transsexuals was the margin of appreciation which, in relation to this strand of 
applications, had been accepted as being very wide in favour of the respondent states. The 
margin of appreciation which had been so important in the earlier cases before the 
ECtHR
424
 was effectively reduced to almost nothing in Goodwin.
425
  
 
The ECtHR’s analysis in Goodwin of the competing interests of individual versus public 
interest and the balance of rights inherent in Article 8 as discussed above can be explained 
by how the Court had developed Article 8 jurisprudence in the years preceding Goodwin, 
in particular the extent of a state’s margin of appreciation in areas of private life. The 
Court’s analysis of the role of the margin of appreciation by the time of Goodwin had 
shifted considerably from earlier case law in this area such that it had a significant impact 
on the Goodwin judgment and, as will be shown below, this was a result of the 
development of concepts such as human dignity and personal autonomy which are 
embodied within Article 8. 
 
This changing emphasis from the state to the individual is hugely important. Traditionally, 
as Kavanaugh highlights, the states’ margin of appreciation has been wide where “there is 
no consensus by the contracting state parties on the rights in question and where the 
decision of the Court falls to a balancing of moral issues.”426 This wide margin was fatal to 
the applications of UK domiciled transsexuals as shown in Chapter Two. The issue in the 
previous cases had been that the lack of consensus within the medical profession regarding 
the aetiology of transsexualism as a medical condition and the lack of consensus between 
contracting states in relation to how to provide for transsexuals in domestic law meant that 
states were afforded a very wide margin and therefore the UK Government was not in 
                                                 
423
 ibid. 
424
 Rees; Cossey; Sheffield and Horsham (n 15). 
425
 Goodwin (n 15) [94]. 
426
 K A Kavanaugh ‘Policing the Margins: Rights Protection and the European Court of Human Rights’ 
(2006) European Human Rights Law Review 4:422-444, 427. 
109 
 
violation of transsexuals’ Article 8 rights in the earlier cases by not providing a means of 
legal recognition. However, as Kavanaugh argues, the ECtHR’s determination in these 
earlier cases was “at best, questionable.”427 The issue that rendered the determinations 
questionable was that at the time of these earlier cases there was in fact growing European 
recognition of the legal rights of transsexuals partly as a result of the European Council’s 
Recommendation 1117 of 1989 that member states “enact provisions on transsexuals’ right 
to change sex […] and banning discrimination against them.”428 At the time of Rees and 
Cossey 14 member states provided for legal recognition of transsexuals, so although there 
was not 100% consensus in favour of transsexuals’ rights there was a growing consensus 
that legal recognition should be provided. However despite this, the ECtHR maintained 
that there was no European consensus in the case of X, Y and Z v United Kingdom
429
 as 
outlined above and it was only in 2002 in the Goodwin case that the ECtHR, for the first 
time, acknowledged the growing consensus, albeit international rather than European, in 
favour of transsexuals’ rights.430  
 
In addition to this shift in the applicability of the margin of appreciation the Goodwin 
judgment is important because the Court itself began to change how it approached the 
determination of these types of case. Kavanaugh argues that in Goodwin the ECtHR 
“shifted away from applying a technical approach, and embraced key aspects of the 
arguments raised by Judge Martens some 12 years earlier in Cossey.”431 The idea of the 
margin of appreciation was beginning to alter slightly as early as Cossey albeit in 
dissenting judgments. In Cossey Judge Martens made a crucial observation which was to 
prove true in Goodwin. In Cossey he stated that “[s]tates do not enjoy a margin of 
appreciation as a matter of right, but as a matter of judicial restraint.”432 This means that 
the ECtHR should respect states’ margins of appreciation but that this in itself does not 
mean that the state has a margin in relation to recognising the existence of a Convention 
right: the margin only applies in relation to how the state should effect that Convention 
right, not whether or not the right exists in the first place:
433
 the same argument was 
                                                 
427
 ibid 429. 
428
 ibid. In reference to Council of Europe Recommendation 1117 – on the condition of transsexuals. This 
was adopted by the Assembly on 29 September 1989. 
429
 X, Y & Z (n 15). 
430
 Kavanaugh (n 427) 432. 
431
 ibid. 
432
 Cossey (n 15) [74]. 
433
 Kavanaugh (n 427) 428-429. 
110 
 
initially raised by the applicant in Rees v United Kingdom.
434
 Returning to Judge Marten’s 
dissent in Cossey there it was stated that: 
 
[i]n this context there simply is not room for a margin of appreciation. That margin 
comes into play only when a State resolves to recognise the new sexual identity of 
post-operative transsexuals: then there should be room for a certain discretion as to 
the requirement for and the form of such recognition.
435
 
 
So as early as Cossey there was an indication of how the ECtHR might develop the Article 
8 jurisprudence and limit the scope of the margin of appreciation. It was not until 2002 
however that this limitation would actually be realised. Nevertheless, by the time the 
Goodwin case was heard in the ECtHR although some contracting states already provided 
for legal recognition of (usually post-operative) transsexuals; some did not. There was, 
therefore, a degree of inconsistency remaining between the contracting states in relation to 
legal recognition of sex re-assignment: however, more states provided some degree of 
recognition than did not.
436
 This meant that the previously wide margin of appreciation 
which had enabled a decision of no violation of Article 8 in Rees, Cossey, Sheffield and 
Horsham, and X, Y and Z had drastically narrowed as consensus was in favour of granting 
legal recognition to a change of sex.  
 
The structure of the Court’s decision was fundamentally important because, as was argued 
above, the Court altered its approach to analysing these cases and placed the emphasis on 
the rights of the individual. The earlier technical approach taken by the ECtHR in these 
cases sought to identify consensus regarding aetiology within the medical profession 
which, as Chapter One showed, is not possible to find. It also sought to find consensus 
within legal systems as to how to provide for legal recognition, if at all, and as mentioned 
above although there was a growing consensus in this area the fact that it was not 100% 
was fatal to the early applications. In addition the ECtHR had, in the earlier cases, sought 
to consider the impact on the UK administrative system of registration of births in relation 
to legal recognition of transsexuals.
437
 However, as Rudolf argues, the ECtHR in Goodwin 
“no longer found these factors decisive.”438 So Goodwin marked a shift away from the 
technical formulaic approach of the Court towards broader human rights principles such as 
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autonomy and human dignity which it is argued, was the real importance of the Goodwin 
case in relation to Article 8.
439
  
 
Situating Goodwin within Article 8 jurisprudence 
Marshall argued that it can now be said that Article 8 gives a justiciable right to personal 
identity relating to a number of areas of one’s life.440 Although the Goodwin judgment was 
a huge step forward in the emergence of transsexual rights in Europe it should not have 
been a surprising judgment as the ECtHR Article 8 jurisprudence was building towards 
such a decision through careful development of the concept of human dignity. One of the 
factors behind this development was articulated by Marshall who stated that: 
 
[a]ny interpretation of law needs to be seen in the light of the fundamental 
objectives of that area of law. For human rights law, the objective is to safeguard, 
and potentially develop, the human dignity and human freedom of everyone.
441
 
 
The way in which the ECtHR developed Article 8 jurisprudence and the understanding of 
personal autonomy within Article 8 is not limited to the conception of negative rights i.e. a 
right not to be interfered with by the state and to choose what happens to oneself (for 
example, the right of a competent person to determine his own medical treatment), but 
rather autonomy within Article 8 is much broader than this. Marshall argues that the 
contemporary version of autonomy in the ECtHR’s judgments: 
 
illustrates the importance of social conditions and relationships between human 
beings in creating and developing that autonomy or one’s human personality: it is 
something which needs a social context to thrive.
442
 
 
This then relates to the concept of positive obligations within Article 8 which was 
discussed above in relation to the ECtHR’s determination of the Goodwin case. There it 
was noted that Article 8 includes not only negative but also positive obligations which are 
intended to ensure that individuals have the conditions available to enable them to exercise 
personal freedom and to thrive. This does not mean that individuals have absolute rights to 
determine their own identity and to live the lives they choose since the Article 8 rights are 
qualified and therefore the rights of the individual have to be balanced with the rights and 
interests of others. In addition the development of human dignity as a key concept which 
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underpins the ECHR impacted on the development of this wider understanding of personal 
autonomy, as to embrace and uphold human dignity implies a move away from negative 
obligations of the state (from restricting the state’s interference with one’s private life), 
towards the positive obligations upon states to enable individuals to shape their own lives 
and their fates “in a way that [they] deem best fit [their] own personality.”443 As briefly 
noted above many facets of one’s identity are now protected under the broad protections 
given by Article 8: for example rights to one’s physical and social identity,444 one’s gender 
identity,
445
 one’s sexual orientation and sexual life,446 one’s name,447 one’s religious 
identity,
448
 one’s genetic heritage and early development449and one’s cultural identity450 
among other things.  However it took several decades before the ECtHR reached this 
position. In 1970 ‘privacy’ as it related to Article 8 was defined by the Council of Europe 
Resolution as consisting of: 
 
the right to live one's own life with a minimum of interference. It concerns private, 
family and home life, physical and moral integrity, honour and reputation, 
avoidance of being placed in a false light, non-revelation of irrelevant and 
embarrassing facts, unauthorised publication of private photographs, protection 
from disclosure of information given or received by the individual confidentially.
451
 
 
Slowly the ECtHR moved from this negative conception of rights towards a more enabling 
model of privacy.
452
 Marshall argues that: 
 
to freely exercise their right, people need enabling conditions – including the 
resources to make free choices in a fully informed way. For example they need to 
have control over their own body and health, their sexual identity and sex life, and 
some would say, full knowledge of their origins and access to information about 
their childhood development.
453
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The development towards this broad understanding of privacy which encompasses 
personal autonomy and identity began in the late 1970s. In Bruggemann and Scheuten v 
Germany
454
 which concerned availability of abortion, the ECtHR stated that respect for 
private life comprised: 
 
to a certain degree, the right to establish and to develop relationships with other 
human beings, especially in the emotional field, for the development and fulfilment 
of one’s own personality.455 
 
However the Court was not willing at the time, and nor have they been willing since, to 
give absolute precedence to the rights of the individual and reiterated the need to balance 
the individual’s right to private life with the wider public interest and the rights of others. 
At the same time in Dudgeon the ECtHR held that Northern Irish law which made 
consenting homosexual activity in private between adult males, over the age of twenty-one, 
a criminal offence amounted to a violation of the applicant’s Article 8 rights.456 The 
Dudgeon decision was followed in the case of Modinos v Cyprus.
457
 In relation to the right 
to one’s sexual orientation as an aspect of private life it is clear to see that the Court was 
developing protections very early on.  
 
However, the Court in Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v United Kingdom refused to grant 
absolute rights to one’s chosen form of sexual expression thereby, to some degree, limiting 
the rights to sexual privacy under Article 8.
458
 Despite this there is, to a limited extent, 
protection of one’s sexual expression which is based on equality of individuals. Therefore 
the issue was not which sexual activities were being engaged in, as in Laskey, Jaggard and 
Brown but rather the legitimacy of treating homosexual and heterosexual couples 
differently within the domestic criminal law.  
 
The transsexual rights case law which originated in the United Kingdom during this time 
was unsuccessful, as was shown in Chapter Two. The issue was that although the ECtHR 
had consistently reiterated that Article 8 protects against state interference and that in 
doing so this gave rise to positive obligations, the ECtHR had always held, until Goodwin, 
that there was no positive obligation upon the state to alter the system of birth registrations 
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and that the margin of appreciation was in favour of the state rather than the applicants. 
The Court was able to make these determinations in the early cases because the 
understanding of privacy comprising personal autonomy was not fully developed by this 
time. However by 1992 the concept of private life widened considerably in the case of 
Niemietz v Germany
459
 where the Court stated: 
 
it would be too restrictive to limit the notion [of private life] to an ‘inner circle’ in 
which the individual may live his own personal life as he chooses and to exclude 
therefrom entirely the outside world not encompassed within that circle. Respect 
for private life must also comprise to a certain degree, the right to establish and 
develop relationships with human beings.
460
 
 
So the Court was moving from a narrow interpretation of private life in the early 1970s to a 
much broader one by 1992. This meant though that the relationship between the state and 
the individual would require to be reconsidered as would the relationship between the 
individual and others. The right initially contained in Article 8 to be free from state 
interference has now morphed into a right to personal autonomy and it was this which truly 
impacted on the Goodwin decision. As shown above, the concept of human dignity as a 
foundation of the ECHR has been stated throughout Article 8 case law and is also not a 
new idea. However, the concept of personal autonomy as an issue of private life deriving 
from human dignity “was first recognized by the Court less than three months earlier”461 
than the Goodwin judgment in Pretty v United Kingdom.
462
 In this case the ECtHR was 
asked to consider whether the refusal of the Director of Public Prosecutions to grant 
immunity from prosecution to a husband of a woman who wished to be aided to die 
amounted to a violation of the applicant’s Convention rights. The Court held that it was not 
a violation of the applicant’s rights.   
 
So, as can be seen, the interpretation of Article 8 had steadily been developing and 
evolving to reflect basic human dignity and limited state interference in the private lives of 
individuals such that now, in interpreting Article 8, Moreham argues that the ECtHR 
judgments can be categorised into five distinct areas of “private life interest”.463 These five 
areas include three ‘freedoms from’ based rights and two ‘freedoms to’ type rights. 
According to Moreham the ‘freedom from’ rights include the right to freedom from 
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interference with psychological and physical integrity,
464
 the right to be free from 
“unwanted informational access”465 and covers the collection, storing, publishing and 
disclosure of information about oneself, and the final ‘freedom from’ right encompasses 
the right to protection of one’s living environment i.e. a right to be free from 
environmental pollution.
466
 The ‘freedom to’ rights comprise a right to one’s identity467 
including the right to have information about one’s parents and early development,468 a 
right to one’s gender,469 the right to retain one’s name470 and the right to one’s cultural 
identity.
471
  It is clear from the analysis of the case law that it was the development of these 
‘freedom to’ rights by the Court which rendered the Goodwin judgment inevitable. 
 
Article 8 beyond Goodwin  
This wider interpretation of Article 8 has developed beyond Goodwin indicating that the 
Court’s interpretation of Article 8 in 2002 was indeed the correct approach to take. The 
development of a broad right to identity and personal autonomy as aspects of Article 8 can 
be seen in the later Article 8 jurisprudence, for example in 2005 in Von Hannover v 
Germany
472
 the ECtHR phrased the right to respect for private life as including: 
 
a person’s physical and psychological integrity […] The guarantee afforded by 
Article 8 of the Convention is primarily intended to ensure the development, 
without [unwanted] outside interference, of the personality of each individual in his 
relations with other human beings. There is therefore a zone of interaction of a 
person with others, even in a public context, which may fall within the scope of 
‘private life’.473 
 
In 2007 in Tysiaç v Poland
474
 the Court again stated that the right under Article 8 to 
develop one’s personality encompassed a right to establish and develop relationships with 
others and with the outside world. It also encompasses a right to moral and physical 
integrity. So it is clear from contemporary judicial interpretation of Article 8 that its scope 
is continuing to widen and it now covers almost all aspects of one’s private life and 
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personal identity although a right to personal identity in terms of recognition of one’s 
gender identity remains a long way from being an absolute and indefeasible right. As a 
result of the development of Article 8 by the Court from Bruggemann and Scheuten v 
Germany
475
 and Dudgeon v United Kingdom
476
 until today: 
 
the right to respect for one’s private life, freedom from intrusion, now means the 
right to develop one’s personality in connection with others, the freedom to live the 
life of one’s own choosing.477 
 
In particular, it is clear that the ECtHR’s judgment of July 2002 in Goodwin truly marked a 
turning point, albeit a small one, for transsexuals domiciled in the UK and had some 
influence on domestic courts as the next section will show. 
 
A v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police 
Shortly after the Goodwin decision on 5 November 2002 the Court of Appeal reversed a 
decision of an Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) which had provided that the employee, 
a Chief Constable, had not unjustifiably discriminated against an MTF potential recruit by 
refusing to employ transsexuals who could not conduct intimate searches of suspects.
478
 
The case centred around s.54(9) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE 
1984) which provided that “[t]he constable carrying out a search shall be of the same sex 
as the person searched”. It was argued that the potential recruit could not satisfy the 
requirements of this piece of legislation as she would not be in a position to search female 
suspects and therefore to exempt her from carrying out these searches without disclosing 
her transsexualism to colleagues and the public would raise certain operational difficulties. 
Before the employment tribunal the police force conceded that there had been 
discrimination on the grounds of sex under the SDA 1975 but the police argued that the 
discrimination was justified on the grounds of the SDA 1975 s.7(2)(b)(i)  which enabled 
exceptions to be made on the basis of ‘a genuine occupational qualification’ i.e. the need to 
have someone who was not transsexual carry out intimate searches of suspects. It was 
initially argued by the police force that A had not wanted her transsexualism to be made 
known to colleagues and to the public and therefore excusing her from conducting searches 
without making her transsexualism apparent would prove difficult.  
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There was two crucial factors in the Court of Appeal’s determination to overturn the 
decision of the EAT. Firstly that for the first time in the case history Ms A indicated that 
she was not averse to her transsexualism being disclosed neither to her work colleagues nor 
to the public where necessary.
479
 The second crucial factor was that the Court of Appeal 
followed the ECtHR’s ruling in Goodwin rather than determine the case based on EU anti-
discrimination provisions.
480
 Kennedy LJ noted that: 
 
[i]n light of Goodwin it is no longer possible, in the context of employment, to 
regard the appellant as being anything other than female, except perhaps in 
circumstances where, as was said in Goodwin, there are “…significant factors of 
public interest to weigh against the interests of the individual applicant in obtaining 
legal recognition of her gender re-assignment.”481 
 
Kennedy LJ noted that had Goodwin been decided before the EAT delivered its judgment 
in the instant case the decision of the EAT could very well have been different.
482
 Kennedy 
LJ stated that: 
 
[i]f when dealing with the appellant’s application for employment the Chief 
Constable was bound to treat her as female, then it was not open to him to 
discriminate against her on the basis that she was transsexual, and no possibility of 
invoking s.7 [SDA 1975] could arise. 
 
Kennedy LJ stated that “in the light of Goodwin it is now clear that the respondent's 
attempt to invoke s.7 of the 1975 Act cannot succeed.”483 Buxton LJ’s decision further 
explains how the Court of Appeal reached this decision based on Goodwin. He stated that: 
 
[i]t is important to be clear that Goodwin decides that it will be a breach of Art. 8, 
in cases “where there are no significant factors of public interest to weigh against 
the interest of this individual applicant in obtaining legal recognition of her gender 
re-assignment”, to refuse to recognise that re-assigned gender.484 
 
He continued: 
 
[a]ccordingly, in any case to which the Human Rights Act 1998 [the HRA] applies, 
it will in future be necessary to consider whether a failure or refusal to treat a post-
operative transsexual as being of the reassigned gender involves a breach of Art.8. 
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Since the application of Art.8 is case specific, and does not confer absolute rights, 
the court will have to consider in every case whether the subject's interest in 
achieving respect and recognition for her gender re-assignment is outweighed by 
countervailing considerations of the public interest.
485
 
 
So once again the idea of the interests of the individual being weighed against the interests 
of the public at large was raised in interpreting the scope and protections of Article 8 and 
how Article 8 applies in specific cases. It is worth noting that Goodwin did not provide that 
transsexuals had to be given legal recognition in all areas of the law or for all purposes, 
only that it was no longer within the state’s margin of appreciation to continue to deny 
legal recognition to post-operative transsexuals; the manner in which this recognition was 
to be given and for what legal purposes, remained within the state’s margin of 
appreciation. What the Court of Appeal did in this appeal was to take the issue of sex 
discrimination in employment into the realm of human rights law rather than consider it 
under EU law. Buxton, LJ noted that it would have been possible for the Court to have 
considered this case under EU law but that it was not necessary to do so.
486
 The Court of 
Appeal’s decision was subsequently upheld by the House of Lords.487 However, although 
the Lords upheld the Court of Appeal decision the Lords reached their determination based 
on different factors than the Court of Appeal. The Lords based their determination of EC 
law and held that the Equal Treatment Directive applied such that domestic law and the 
impact of Goodwin was not important. The Lords therefore placed EC anti-discrimination 
law above the impact that Goodwin could have and held that the respondent had been 
discriminated against. This is an important case, but perhaps not as important as it could 
have been. The Lords’ decision in this appeal was handed down just over a month after the 
Gender Recognition Act 2004 (GRA 2004) came into force
488
 and, although the Lords 
could not use the GRA 2004 to make their determination as it had no retrospective effect, 
the Lords’ decision reinforced that there are multiple ways of obtaining legal recognition 
of one’s gender identity in UK law; either via the GRA 2004 or by means of EC anti-
discrimination law and other provisions which provide recognition in certain situations. 
The Lords’ decision extended the anti-discrimination provisions contained in EC law. It 
should be remembered from the previous chapter that in White
489
 the employee was not 
able to be given protection under EC law as being male was considered a genuine 
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occupational qualification. What the decision in this case does is challenge the idea of 
when one is male or female for the purpose of such provisions.
490
  
 
Croft v Royal Mail Group Plc. 
The impact of Goodwin, which applied ECHR jurisprudence, and other EU law based 
cases can be seen in the progress of Croft v Royal Mail Group Plc. (formerly Consignia 
Plc.) through the UK court system, although the Goodwin case was not, in Croft, helpful 
because a significant weakness of Goodwin as it applied to transsexuals was highlighted by 
the Croft case as will be discussed below. In September 2002 the EAT in Croft v Royal 
Mail Group Plc. (formerly Consignia Plc.)
491
 held that a male employee who had been 
diagnosed with gender dysphoria and who began treatment which included starting the 
feminisation process and dressing as a woman at work, in accordance with the medically 
necessitated Real Life Experience, a process by which the patient’s eligibility and 
readiness for sex re-assignment procedures is assessed by his or her supposed success or 
failure at living as a member of the opposite sex in all areas of life for a two year period,
492
 
had not been discriminated against by her employer refusing to allow her to use the female 
facilities during this time. As part of living as a woman Croft requested to use the female 
toilets but was informed that she would have to use the disabled toilets instead thereby 
leading her to become absent from work and later resign as a result of stress and 
depression. The EAT held on 30 September 2002 that she had not been discriminated 
against. It was held that as the employee was legally male and alternative facilities had 
been made available then to prevent her from using female facilities was not 
discriminatory because other male employees were not permitted to use the female 
facilities.
493
 The EAT relied upon the Court of Appeal’s decision in Bellinger494 to 
reinforce that under English law Croft remained legally male. In considering the Goodwin 
judgment the EAT noted that the case would not impede Croft or assist her as Goodwin 
concerned post-operative transsexuals and Ms Croft was pre-operative. The decision of the 
EAT in Croft therefore established a significant limitation of the Goodwin judgment: that it 
only applied to post-operative transsexuals. 
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Croft was appealed to the Court of Appeal which, in July 2003, held that Ms Croft had not 
been discriminated against by her employers because the moment at which she should 
cease to be treated as male and begin to be treated as female had not arrived therefore she 
was not treated any differently from any other male employee.
495
 Pill LJ observed in Croft 
that although the SDA 1975, as amended, protected transsexuals at all stages of sex re-
assignment where they were under medical supervision it:  
 
does not follow that all such persons are entitled immediately to be treated as 
members of the sex to which they aspire. Nor does it follow that, until the final 
stage is reached, they can necessarily be required, in relation to lavatories, to 
behave as if they were not undergoing [sex re-assignment].
496
 
 
During the transition from one sex to the other there had to be a period of time available to 
employers to make separate arrangements for such employees until it could be said that the 
employee had reached the stage at which he or she was to be treated as a member of the 
opposite sex; in this case, as the applicant was merely beginning the real life experience 
which precedes the provision of medical treatment it could not be said that she had reached 
the stage at which she should be treated as female for all purposes. So Croft is clear in that 
UK law provided that transsexual individuals could not be discriminated against on the 
basis of their transsexualism but also that this did not mean that the law obliged that they 
be treated as members of the opposite sex until they reached a point on their transition 
whereby it became appropriate to treat them as such. This meant that actually the law was 
no more clear than it was before Goodwin: some transsexuals (post-operative) would get 
protection in some areas of law but others (pre-operative) likely would not. 
 
Goodwin was therefore being used to ensure that only post-operative transsexuals were 
protected from discrimination; this is a serious limitation of the Goodwin case for 
transsexuals in general. So, although the Goodwin judgment was a huge step forward in 
relation to transsexual rights it was not without its limitations and the question then for UK 
law was at which stage in the transition process should an individual be recognised as a 
member of the opposite sex and be protected as such. Croft was clear that only those who 
had reached a certain stage in the transition process would be protected.  In a sense post-
operative in this context, as highlighted by Croft, had to be taken to mean post-operative as 
far as possible. This raises issues for individuals who cannot undergo, or who choose not to 
undergo, medical procedures. This is a particular issue in relation to genital surgery for 
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female-to-male (FTM) transsexuals which is not always desired by the individuals because 
of the relatively less developed nature of the genital surgery available for FTMs than MTFs 
and the potential for a negative outcome. In addition not all individuals are medically 
suited to surgery and/or hormones. The Court of Appeal in Croft noted that s.82 of the 
SDA 1975 ensured that those undergoing sex re-assignment could not be discriminated 
against but it did not ensure that all transsexuals were entitled to be treated as members of 
the sex to which they aspired; legal protection increased as the individual progressed along 
the sex re-assignment process and as Ms Croft was merely beginning the process her legal 
protection was limited. So the Court of Appeal decision in Croft, relying on the ECtHR 
decision in Goodwin, placed strong limitations on when transsexual individuals would be 
protected by domestic law; the bar was set very high. So, the force of the Goodwin 
judgment was clear but it was not without limitation and Goodwin, although transformative 
for post-operative transsexuals, was merely a stepping stone in the overall quest for 
transsexual legal recognition.  
 
Bellinger v Bellinger in the House of Lords 
As was noted above, no progress was made in the UK following the Goodwin judgment. It 
is arguable that no reform would have been forthcoming in this area of law had it not been 
for the House of Lords decision in Bellinger v Bellinger.
497
 The facts of Bellinger were 
outlined in Chapter Two when the Court of Appeal judgment was discussed so will not be 
repeated here. Suffice it to say the decision of the Court of Appeal
498
 that the marriage 
between Elizabeth Bellinger, an MTF transsexual, and her husband was not a valid 
marriage under s.11(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (MCA 1973) as the parties 
were not male and female was appealed to the House of Lords. On appeal to the House of 
Lords Elizabeth Bellinger once again sought that the terms ‘male’ and ‘female’ in the 
s.11(c) be interpreted in such a manner as to include post-operative transsexuals. Should 
the interpretation sought not be forthcoming the applicant also sought that a declaration of 
incompatibility under s.4 of the HRA 1998 be issued.  
 
The judgment of the House of Lords was unanimous in denying the first point of the appeal 
by restating that ‘male’ and ‘female’ in the legislation could not be interpreted as including 
post-operative transsexuals. However it was also unanimous in accepting the need to issue 
a declaration of incompatibility between MCA 1973 s.11(c) and the ECHR. The 
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importance of the Goodwin judgment, although changing nothing in itself, comes in the 
impact that it had on the House of Lords’ decision in the Bellinger appeal to issue the 
declaration of incompatibility. For the purpose of completeness the reasons why s.11(c) 
could not be interpreted to include post-operative transsexuals will be discussed in addition 
to the decision to declare the section incompatible with ECHR jurisprudence. 
 
The House of Lords was faced with the decision whether to apply the Corbett judgment 
regarding sex determination for the purposes of marriage law or to depart from it. As noted 
in Corbett and indeed in subsequent cases marriage is one of the legal relationships in 
which the sex of the parties is an essential element of that legal relationship. Goodwin had 
held only the year before however that not allowing post-operative transsexuals to marry in 
their post-operative sex violated their Article 12 rights. So the question before the Lords 
was whether to recognise the Goodwin judgment and depart from previous case law by 
forcing an interpretation of s.11(c) to include post-operative transsexuals or to uphold 
previous UK court judgments which denied marriage to this group of individuals. If the 
Lords applied Corbett, which by this point had a long legacy in relation to sex for the 
purpose of marriage as shown in the previous chapter, then the Bellinger’s marriage would 
be void ab initio: if they reinterpreted s.11(c) in the manner sought post-operative 
transsexuals would be able to have existing marriages recognised by the law and be able to 
enter into marriage as members of their post-operative sex but would still be without legal 
recognition overall which would place them in an anomalous position in relation to UK 
law: being recognised for some but not all legal purposes. In addition the problem would 
be in determining at what stage the law should provide legal recognition to the individual’s 
re-assigned sex, as was the discussion in Croft as outlined in the previous chapter.  
 
In relation to the reinterpretation of s.11(c) the petitioner argued that the purely biological 
criteria used by Ormrod J in Corbett should no longer be applicable as it ignored the 
psychological aspects of gender identity: a factor which, it was observed by Thorpe LJ in 
his dissenting Court of Appeal judgment
499
 and by the ECtHR in Goodwin,
500
 as being 
relevant to the development of one’s gender identity and ought to be relevant to the legal 
test determining one’s sex. The petitioner argued that as ‘male’ and ‘female’ were not 
defined in statute, and because societal attitudes had changed, the Court ought to take a 
broad interpretation  of the terms rather than the narrow interpretation taken by previous 
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courts tasked with determining whether post-operative transsexuals are encompassed by 
the terms of the legislation. The petitioner argued that in determining the meaning of 
‘male’ and ‘female’ “[t]he court should not be bound by the classification of gender at the 
time of birth but should look at the reality of the situation at the time of the marriage.”501 
She sought to base her argument on the fact that society had changed since Corbett and 
there was now a much greater understanding of the factors which determine one’s sex. The 
petitioner contended that it was: 
 
clear from the Hansard records of the parliamentary debates that it was 
Parliament’s intention […] that “male” and “female” should be left undefined and 
would be capable of bearing meanings other than those ascribed to them in the 
Corbett case, and that a person’s sex would be a question of fact to be determined 
in light of evolving medical evidence and opinion.
502
 
 
There was a possibility that the House of Lords in Bellinger might take an approach to 
s.11(c) which would allow for the marriage between Elizabeth and Jeffrey Bellinger to be 
declared valid. All the House of Lords had to do was to recognise that Elizabeth was 
female. The petitioner argued: 
 
[i]f, in addition to self-identity, the petitioner has female physical characteristics it 
must be said that she is female. Post-operative [sex re-assignment] patients are 
indistinguishable from members of the sex to which they have changed.
503
 
 
Elizabeth Bellinger identified as female, she had altered her body to appear female, and all 
that she could not alter was her genetic make-up. Counsel for the petitioner argued that for 
the law to treat Elizabeth Bellinger as not female because of her chromosomes and her 
genetics and gonads at birth and to ignore her psychological gender identity and post-
operative presentation was unfair and unjust.  
 
Lord Nicholls’ judgment is the most comprehensive of the five judgments and in it he 
begins by considering how one determines the sex of an individual, reiterating the Corbett 
test he stated: 
 
[t]he indicia of human sex or gender (for present purposes the two terms are 
interchangeable) can be listed, in no particular order, as follows: (1) Chromosomes: 
XY patterns in males, XX in females. (2) Gonads: testes in males, ovaries in 
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females. (3) Internal sex organs other than gonads: for instance sperm ducts in 
males, uterus in females. (4) External genitalia. (5) Hormonal patterns and 
secondary sex characteristics, such as facial hair and body shape.
504
 
 
He also added to the list non-biological indicia such as “[s]tyle of upbringing and living”505 
and “[s]elf-perception”.506 In relation to the self-perception criterion he noted, following 
some medical and scientific opinion, as outlined in Chapter One, that “[s]ome medical 
research has suggested that this factor is not exclusively psychological. Rather it is 
associated with biological differentiation within the brain.”507 As such he was claiming that 
self-perception is not an arbitrary choice of the individual, a ‘whim’, but rather is it 
something which is driven largely by physiological factors even if this sexed 
differentiation in the brain is not manifest in terms of other biological and physiological 
characteristics of the individual. Lord Nicholls’ judgment is mindful of the state of medical 
and scientific knowledge on sexed differentiation in humans. He reiterates that largely 
there is no problem when determining the sex of individuals: for the most part individuals’ 
self-perception and physical appearance are congruent. However he noted that “nature does 
not draw straight lines.”508 This leads him on to considering those whose sex is more 
difficult to determine: intersex individuals and transsexuals. After outlining the treatment 
available for transsexuals, he began his discussion of the state of the law as it was then in 
England and restated the Corbett test.
509
 Although he acknowledged that Corbett reflected 
the law in England at that time he was mindful of the fact that the Corbett judgment had 
“attracted much criticism, from the medical profession and elsewhere.”510 Some of the 
medical criticism was mentioned in Chapter Two when discussing the Bellinger case in the 
Court of Appeal where, it will be remembered, that Professor Green stated that 
determining the sex of an individual using only the biological chromosomal, genital and 
gonadal test was too reductionist.
511
 Lord Nicholl then considered the decision of the trial 
judge, Johnston J and the Court of Appeal judgment noting that the law was clear and that 
Corbett had to apply in determining Elizabeth Bellinger’s sex for the purpose of MCA 
1973 s.11(c).
512
 One important question which was asked by Lord Nicholls, a question 
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which ran through the judgment of the House of Lords in Bellinger was the issue of when 
to determine that a change of sex had occurred. He asked: 
 
[a]t what point would it be consistent with public policy to recognise that a person 
should be treated for all purposes, including marriage, as a person of the opposite 
sex to that which he or she was correctly assigned at birth? This is a question for 
Parliament, not the courts.
513
 
 
It would appear that Lord Nicholls was sympathetic to the plight of Elizabeth Bellinger and 
her husband. He noted that the ECtHR “has taken the view that the sands of time have run 
out”514 and that “[t]he United Kingdom’s margin of appreciation no longer extends to 
declining to give legal recognition to all cases of [sex re-assignment].”515 It was further 
noted that the impact of the Goodwin judgment was that “[a] test of congruent biological 
factors can no longer be decisive in denying legal recognition to the change of gender of a 
post-operative transsexual.”516 However, despite these indications of sympathy the issue of 
exactly how the law should be reformed and whose responsibility it was to reform the law 
remained. The issue of how to provide legal recognition to transsexual individuals’ gender 
identity was considered complex and not one with which the courts should engage. In 
addition to the issue of complexity of this legal task the UK Government had, between the 
judgment being issued in Goodwin and the House of Lords hearing the Bellinger appeal, 
indicated that they intended to reform the law in this area by means of introducing 
legislation which may have had a strong bearing on the decision of the House of Lords to 
decline to reinterpret s.11(c) in the manner sought by the petitioner.  
 
In justifying the refusal to reinterpret the legislation to include post-operative transsexuals 
Lord Nicholls is careful to highlight the very complex legal issues involved. He stated: 
 
[i]n this country, as elsewhere, classification of a person as male or female has long 
conferred a legal status. It confers a legal status, in that legal as well as practical 
consequences follow from the recognition of a person as male or female. The legal 
consequences affect many area of life, from marriage and family law to gender-
specific crimes and competitive sport. It is not surprising, therefore, that society 
through its laws decides what objective biological criteria should be applied when 
categorising a person as male or female. Individuals cannot choose for themselves 
whether they wish to be known or treated as male or female. Self-definition is not 
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acceptable. That would make nonsense of the underlying biological basis of the 
distinction.
517
 
 
In relation to the issue of self-perception of gender identity for legal purposes Lord 
Nicholls stated: 
 
society is now facing the question of how far it is prepared to go to alleviate the 
plight of the small minority of people who suffer from this medical condition. 
Should self-perceived gender be recognised?
518
 
 
The issue for Lord Nicholls was that it would not be easy to recognise one’s self-perceived 
gender for legal purposes because sex is a crucial aspect of a number of legal interactions. 
On exploring how self-perceived gender could be recognised for legal purposes he stated: 
 
the circumstances in which, and the purpose for which, [sex re-assignment] is 
recognised are matters of much importance. These are not easy questions. The 
circumstances of transsexual people vary widely. The distinction between male and 
female is material in widely differing contexts. The criteria appropriate for 
recognising self-perceived gender in one context, such as marriage, may not be 
appropriate in another, such as competitive sport.
519
 
 
So Lord Nicholls was highlighting the complexity of this area of law and indicating that it 
was not for the courts to reform this area but rather it ought to be left to Parliament. While 
Lord Nicholls acknowledged the very real difficulties faced by post-operative transsexuals 
who were denied legal recognition, he was reluctant to afford Elizabeth Bellinger the status 
of female. In relation to Bellinger’s first point of appeal: that the terms ‘male’ and ‘female’ 
in the primary legislation be interpreted to include post-operative transsexuals Lord 
Nicholls noted that: 
 
[r]ecognition of Mrs Bellinger as female for the purposes of section 11(c) of the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 would necessitate giving the expressions “male” and 
“female” in that Act a novel, extended meaning: that a person may be born with 
one sex but later become, or become regarded as, a person of the opposite sex.
520
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To recognise Mrs Bellinger as female for the purpose of marriage law “would represent a 
major change in the law, having far reaching ramifications.”521 As such the issue of legal 
recognition of transsexuals: 
 
raises issues whose solution calls for extensive enquiry and the widest public 
consultation and discussion. Questions of social policy and administrative 
feasibility arise at several points, and their interaction has to be evaluated and 
balanced. The issues are altogether ill-suited for determination by courts and court 
procedures. They are pre-eminently a matter for Parliament, the more especially 
when the government in unequivocal terms, has already announced its intention to 
introduce comprehensive primary legislation on this difficult and sensitive 
subject.
522
 
 
The fact that the Government had already announced intention to introduce legislation on 
this matter and the complex ramifications of providing legal recognition to transsexual 
individuals both clearly influenced Lord Nicholls’ reluctance that the courts should 
become involved in determining legal recognition of gender identity. Although comment 
had been made by Nicholls that it was not an easy task for the law to determine when one 
had changed sex
523
 it was argued by counsel for the petitioner that these considerations did 
not apply in the instant case because regardless of where the line between being male or 
female was drawn “Mrs Bellinger is on the reassigned gender side of the line.”524 However 
Lord Nicholls, mindful of the implications of this decision for other transsexual individuals 
and in other areas of law, was not convinced that changing the law in such a fundamental 
manner on the basis of one person’s situation was “a proper, or indeed, responsible basis 
on which to change the law.”525 The issue for Lord Nicholls was that in effect the Court 
was being asked to determine when individuals could be said to have transitioned from one 
sex to the other for legal purposes and although Mrs Bellinger clearly had achieved this the 
same could not be said for all transsexuals. Had the Court determined that Mrs Bellinger 
was female for the purpose of marriage law then would this have meant that only post-
operative transsexuals could fulfil the requirements in s.11(c) of the Matrimonial Causes 
Act 1973? The related question to that would be how to determine which form of body 
modification was required to evidence transition from one sex to the other and how should 
the law deal with individuals who could not medically transition or who chose not to? Lord 
Nicholls stated: 
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[t]oday the case before the House concerns Mrs Bellinger. Tomorrow’s case in the 
High Court will relate to a transsexual person who had been able to undergo a less 
extensive course of surgery. The following week it will be the case of a transsexual 
person who has undergone hormonal treatment but who, for medical reasons, has 
not been able to undergo any surgery. Then there will be a transsexual person who 
is medically able to undergo all or part of the surgery but who does not wish to do 
so. By what criteria are cases such as these to be decided?
526
 
 
Lord Nicholls also was not willing to separate recognition of sex re-assignment for the 
purpose of marriage from other areas of law in which individuals are treated differently 
because they are either male or female.
527
 
 
Therefore in relation to the first point of Mrs Bellinger’s appeal Lord Nicholls refused to 
recognise her as female for the purpose of the MCA 1973 s.11(c) for the reasons outlined 
above. In determining how legal recognition should be given he stated that “[a] change in 
the law as sought by Mrs Bellinger must be a matter for deliberation and decision by 
Parliament when the forthcoming Bill is introduced.”528 
 
In considering whether or not to issue the declaration of incompatibility Lord Nicholls 
identified that the appropriate question was whether UK law prevented post-operative 
transsexuals marrying thereby breaching Articles 8 and 12 ECHR. The question of whether 
or not the impending introduction of legislation in this area impacted on the compatibility 
of English law with the ECHR was considered and the Government had argued that the 
Goodwin decision had given them time to reform the law therefore there was no current 
incompatibility however the Lords determined that the question to be asked was whether 
the law as it currently stood was incompatible with the ECHR.
529
 In answering this 
fundamental question Lord Nicholls stated that “[i]n the present case section 11(c) of the 
Matrimonial Causes At 1973 remains a continuing obstacle to Mr and Mrs Bellinger 
marrying each other.”530 So, Lord Nicolls was very clear that English law on this matter 
was not compatible with the rights given to citizens under the ECHR. The fact that the 
Government had signalled intent to reform this area of law, in the opinion of Lord 
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Nicholls, did not preclude the Lords from issuing a declaration of incompatibility and as 
such the declaration was issued.
531
  
 
Shortly after the Lords’ judgment was handed down in Bellinger the UK Government 
published the draft Gender Recognition Bill, in July 2003, which was intended to ensure 
compliance between UK law and ECHR jurisprudence regarding the legal recognition of 
transsexuals. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to show how case law developed in the short period from 2002 
through to 2005 as a result of the decision of the ECtHR in Goodwin. Although Goodwin 
only applied to post-operative transsexuals before the law and therefore it was not a wholly 
transformative judgment per se the reliance of the ECtHR on human rights principles 
established in the wider Article 8 jurisprudence and the effective dismissal of medical 
knowledge as a determinative factor in law meant that how the law conceived of 
transsexuals’ rights had changed. No longer was it possible for states to deny that 
transsexuals had a right to legal recognition and marry but rather the margin of 
appreciation of states was reduced in Goodwin to determining how to provide for the rights 
of transsexuals. The particular strength of the Goodwin judgment lies in the way that the 
ECtHR was willing to extend the scope of Article 8 in relation to gender identity by 
subsuming it within the wider legal issue of human dignity and personal autonomy and by 
the willingness of the ECtHR to depart from medical and scientific knowledge as 
determinative of the rights of transsexuals before the law. As Chapter One showed the 
medical model of transsexualism and the state of medical and scientific knowledge is in 
constant flux and, even in 2015, some 13 years after the Goodwin judgment it remains 
impossible to state that there is consensus from the medical profession in relation to the 
aetiology of transsexualism. Had the ECtHR continued to rely on this lack of consensus in 
Goodwin the rights of transsexuals in the UK to legal recognition would not have been 
achieved. So, although Goodwin was a limited judgment in that it only referred to post-
operative transsexuals it was transformative in that it enabled the possibility of the 
emergence of a model of gender identity recognition in law which is based on strong 
human rights principles and not reliant on the medical model of transsexualism. 
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The approach taken by the ECtHR in Goodwin indicated a fundamental shift in the 
thinking and approach of the ECtHR and, as this chapter has shown, this had a huge 
influence on the UK domestic courts which used Goodwin in the following years to 
determine cases based on domestic legal provisions. Although Goodwin did not directly 
change the law it led to the House of Lords in Bellinger issuing a declaration of 
incompatibility between domestic marriage law and the ECHR. This was all that the House 
of Lords could do in this case because it was felt by the Court in Bellinger that reforming 
the law in relation to this issue was not for the courts to determine but rather it ought to be 
left to Parliament to determine because reform impact on so many different areas of life 
and law and also it was not appropriate for courts to determine at which point a person 
could be considered to have changed sex Later other UK courts used Goodwin in the 
context of employment protections. The issue for UK law following Goodwin was that it 
was unclear at which point on the transition process the law had to treat a transsexual 
individual as a member of the opposite sex. Goodwin was a particularly easy case to decide 
as the applicant had undergone full medical transition from male to female so it was easy 
for the Court to acknowledge that she was female. The same is true of all of the other 
transsexual applicants before the ECtHR as outlined in Chapter Two, they were all post-
operative transsexuals therefore they posed no problem for the law in determining whether 
or not they had reached this elusive point at which they could be deemed to have changed 
sex and therefore there was a continuing challenge for UK law.  
The following chapter will examine how the law was reformed following the Goodwin 
decision and it will be noted that the UK legislature opted to take an approach which firmly 
reinforced the idea that transsexual identity is a result of a medical condition and in so 
doing gave particularly strong gatekeeper roles to medical professionals and the Gender 
Recognition Panel.  
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4. The Gender Recognition Act 2004 
 
Introduction 
The previous two chapters outlined how transsexualism emerged as a medical condition 
and how, when transsexual individuals underwent medical procedures to alleviate the 
impact that the condition had on them and then sought legal recognition of their transition, 
law consistently refused to acknowledge the physical changes they had undergone. As a 
result of the European Court of Human Rights judgment in Goodwin v United Kingdom
532
 
and the House of Lords judgment in Bellinger v Bellinger
533
  the Gender Recognition Act 
2004 (GRA 2004) was enacted; this was an attempt to provide legal recognition and 
protection to transsexuals across the UK. This chapter explores the GRA 2004 and outlines 
the main provisions in the legislation. The purpose of this chapter is to show how the UK 
Government chose to protect and recognise transsexuals in UK law. The chapter begins by 
considering how the GRA 2004 was ground-breaking when it was enacted because of the 
quite radical approach taken by the legislature in not requiring individuals to undergo any 
form of body modification prior to being able to access the protections in the legislation; in 
effect then legislating to ensure that it was one’s gender identity which would be 
recognised and protected rather than one’s physical body. The chapter then considers 
exactly how the legislation provides for legal protection and recognition through outlining 
the mechanism by which such is provided: the Gender Recognition Certificate (GRC). 
Once the GRC has been examined the chapter then explores the exceptions which are 
contained in the legislation to show in which situations the UK Government intended that 
the GRC should have no legal consequence. In doing this the chapter will, until this point, 
have shown how the UK Government intended to meet their human rights obligations to 
transsexual applicants. The chapter then explores how the GRA 2004 works particularly 
the process by which one obtains a GRC firstly by examining the requirement that 
applicants apply to a panel, the Gender Recognition Panel (GRP). As the GRP determine 
whether or not to grant GRCs it is important that the composition and function of this panel 
is examined in detail. The GRP has, as will be shown below, the ability to progress or halt 
an applicant’s quest for legal recognition of their gender identity therefore they are crucial 
to the determination of whether one will obtain recognition of their gender identity. The 
chapter then explores the specific grounds upon which one can apply for a GRC and the 
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criteria which have to be established before a GRC can be issued by the GRP as well as the 
appeals process for those who have been unsuccessful in their application.  
 
Background to the GRA 2004 
As was shown towards the end of the previous chapter, the UK Government was 
effectively forced into introducing legislation to recognise a person’s change of sex by the 
European ECtHR in Goodwin
534
 and by the House of Lords in Bellinger.
535
 Therefore, it 
may be tempting to argue that the legislation was a rushed response to the decisions of 
these courts. However this would be inaccurate. As noted in Chapter Two the UK had been 
tasked by the ECtHR, since the 1980s, with keeping the legal position of transsexuals 
under review. So, in 1999, before the decisions in Goodwin and Bellinger, an 
Interdepartmental Working Group was established to consider how the law ought to 
respond to transsexual individuals. The group reported in early 2000. In considering the 
options available to UK Government ministers the group identified three possibilities: (i) to 
do nothing, (ii) to issue new birth certificates which would show the individual’s “new 
name and possibly sex”,536 and (iii) to allow full legal recognition of one’s gender.537 The 
group did not consider maintaining the status quo to be a real option but rather focussed on 
the other two options which could provide some means of achieving legal recognition to 
transsexuals. On the option of issuing new birth certificates the Working Group noted that 
it was often possible to obtain new driving licences and passports but not birth 
certificates.
538
 Which meant that the individual may be seen by others as a member of the 
opposite sex by means of hormonal and/or surgical intervention but this physical transition 
was not reflected in all official documents. The most important legal document, because it 
determined legal sex and therefore how the law interacts with the individual – the birth 
certificate, did not reflect the physical changes that the individuals had undergone. 
Therefore, as noted by the Working Group, this disparity between physical appearance and 
legal sex could “lead to embarrassment when [post-operative transsexuals] are required to 
produce a birth certificate, for example before taking up employment.”539 So, the options 
were to offer a short birth certificate which reflected change of name but with no mention 
of sex or to show both name and new sex. The problem with taking this approach was that 
it would enable the individual to have a form of their birth certificate which recognised 
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their new name but it would not constitute a change of legal sex as “they would still for all 
legal purposes be of their birth sex as recorded on the full certificate.”540 
  
The issue of providing transsexuals with a new birth certificate was thought to not be 
particularly easy in that it would require primary legislation to effect.
541
 Issuing a short 
birth certificate:  
 
might, in some circumstances, save transsexual people some embarrassment. But 
unless this carried with it recognition for some or all legal purposes it would not do 
much to relieve their underlying concerns.
542
  
 
It was thought that issuing an amended short birth certificate would amount to a ‘half-way 
house’ which would provide recognition in some circumstances but not in others thereby 
leading to confusion and uncertainty for transsexuals and those interacting with them.
543
 
Therefore the Working Group explored the third option – granting full legal recognition to 
transsexuals. Full recognition would mean that “after fulfilling certain conditions, a 
transsexual person would be entitled to be treated as belonging to their acquired gender for 
all purposes.”544 In terms of providing legal recognition of a change of sex the Working 
Group was of the opinion that there would need to be a formal stage when recognition 
would be given and noted that this could be achieved by means of an appropriate Court 
order “which defined the date and process from which the applicant acquired the new 
gender.”545 
 
As noted in Chapter Two one of the arguments against altering birth certificates was that 
they amounted to a record of historical fact.
546
 The Working Group referred to this by 
stating that after the Court order which would enable re-registration of the individual by 
the Registrar General “the transsexual person would be treated as of their acquired gender 
for all purposes, but there would be no rewriting of history”.547 It was also noted that to be 
granted such a Court order legislation would be required which outlined the criteria for the 
making of such an order.
548
 
                                                 
540
 ibid. 
541
 ibid. 
542
 ibid. 
543
 ibid. 
544
 ibid. 
545
 ibid 20. 
546
 See page 81.  
547
 Home Office (n 398) 20 (emphasis added). 
548
 ibid. 
134 
 
 
Regarding the criteria needed before a Court order would be granted, the Working Group 
considered that there were three potential stages: firstly where the person was living in the 
new gender role; secondly where the individual had undergone hormone treatment and 
thirdly where the individual had undergone surgery.
549
 The concern with the first option 
was although it accorded with the then practice of HM Passport Office and of the DVLA in 
issuing new documents when a transsexual individual had been living in the new gender 
role, it meant that there was a “significant chance that some people will revert to their birth 
gender”550 and also that “the person concerned will [at that point] still bear most of the 
characteristics of their birth sex.”551 If the Court order was granted at the point of hormonal 
intervention then the individual’s body would, by this point, “have at least some physical 
characteristics of the opposite gender”.552 One of the factors which seemed to be important 
to the Working Group was that at this stage, although the individual would retain some 
characteristics of birth sex, they would be “unlikely to be able to have children.”553 The 
likelihood of the individual reverting to birth gender at this point was also reduced.
554
 In 
relation to waiting until after surgery before granting legal recognition it was noted that not 
all individuals can undergo the surgical interventions necessary. However the clear benefit 
of adopting this stage as the prerequisite for legal recognition was that the individual “will 
have clear physical attributes of the opposite gender.”555 This indicated that how a person 
looks was important to those making the law as was the idea that the change should be a 
permanent change from one sex to the other as at this stage “[t]here is a reasonable 
expectation that the change of gender will be permanent, although the possibility of a 
reversion to the birth sex cannot be ruled out.”556 What was clearly coming though in the 
Working Group’s considerations was not only the interests of transsexual individuals but 
also how they interact with others: the ability to become a parent, the issue of looking like 
the sex which the law deems one to be and the question of reversion to birth sex. These 
issues will be returned to in the remaining chapters of this thesis as inherently this is a 
debate about how the law balances the rights of individuals with the rights of third parties. 
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The interests of third parties argument can be seen in relation to the pre-conditions of 
recognition. Firstly the Working Group considered whether or not individuals ought to be 
sterile prior to achieving legal recognition. At the time the Working Group was considering 
this the requirement for sterility was a pre-condition in 29 Council of Europe member 
states.
557
 To ensure sterility the various laws in these states required that individuals 
undergo medical procedures which may not be medically necessary and which the 
individual may not wish to undergo. In considering whether or not to require sterility the 
Working Group noted the argument put forward by the transsexual community that such a 
requirement would be discriminatory to those who, for whatever reason, could not undergo 
the medical procedures required.
558
 Interestingly, though, the Working Group states that: 
 
[t]he transsexual community’s concern about discrimination has, however, to be set 
against the great concern which would be felt by the general public if someone who 
was legally a man gave birth to a child or someone who was legally a woman 
became the father of one.
559
 
 
By making this statement the Working Group was once again raising the interests of third 
parties and the importance of public perception in relation to transsexual legal recognition. 
The Working Group also considered amending the laws relating to surrogacy and assisted 
reproduction, for example by suggesting that any stored gametes would also have to be 
destroyed prior to the individual obtaining legal recognition so as to avoid the situation of 
having a legal mother who was also that same child’s biological father.560 In order to avoid 
same-sex marriage the Working Group suggested ensuring that prior subsisting marriages 
be ended before one of the parties obtained legal recognition. To not require the ending of 
a marriage before legal recognition is given would, in effect, legalise same-sex marriages 
for a small number of people while excluding the great majority.
 561
  
 
Although the Working Group considered the various issues surrounding affording legal 
recognition of a change of sex and identified three possible options for the Government, it 
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did not recommend one option over any other and no progress was actually made to reform 
the law based on the work of this group until after the decision in Goodwin was handed 
down. The Working Group was reconvened in June 2002 as it was thought that this was 
the “best way to achieve comprehensive consideration of the wide range of such issues, 
which affect the policy responsibilities of a number of other Government departments and 
of the devolved administrations.”562 This reflects the opinion of Nicol, who argues that had 
this area of law been reformed by means of judicial decisions then it would have been 
piecemeal and unsatisfactory,
563
 and of Lord Nicholls in Bellinger.
564
 Reforming this area 
of law by means of legislation would allow for comprehensive consideration of all of the 
issues which would be impacted by such reform and on 13 December 2002 the UK 
Government announced its intention to publish such legislation to enable legal recognition 
of transsexuals. The legislation would give transsexual individuals the right to be legally 
considered a member of the sex opposite to his or her birth sex from the date at which legal 
recognition occurred;
565
 the legislation would not have retrospective effect and therefore 
would not affect rights and obligations which occurred prior to legal recognition e.g. in 
relation to parentage.  
 
In highlighting the process for obtaining a legal change of sex Rosie Winterton MP 
introduced the idea of a model of recognition which relied upon third party input, namely 
the medical profession, when she stated: 
 
[c]hanging legal identity is a serious step, with significant consequences. It is 
important that no-one should embark upon formal recognition in the acquired 
gender without convincing evidence. We will therefore propose that applications 
should be scrutinised by an authorising body, given legal powers to assess medical 
evidence before the transsexual person is allowed to register in the new gender. In 
some cases, where the person undertook [sex re-assignment] years earlier, and has 
lived successfully in the acquired gender, that assessment may be straightforward. 
In other cases, the authorising body will need to be assured that, in addition to 
meeting medical criteria, the transsexual person has lived successfully in the 
acquired gender for at least two years. The medical criteria may include medical 
treatments to modify the person's sexual characteristics, but the Government will 
not require surgery as a condition of registration in the acquired gender.
566
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One of the issues before the UK courts in the early cases: X, Petitioner
567
 and Corbett v 
Corbett,
568
 was that birth certificates could not be altered because they were records of 
historical fact, a position with which the ECtHR agreed in Rees v United Kingdom,
569
 
Cossey v United Kingdom
570
 and Sheffield and Horsham v United Kingdom
571
 all of which 
were discussed in Chapter Two. To acknowledge this but also provide a means of 
recognition in law Winterton noted that the new law did:  
 
not intend history to be re-written. Original birth records will remain in existence, 
unamended, and will continue to be made available when needed. But the 
authorising body will empower the Registrar General to create a new record in 
relation to the transsexual person, from which a new certificate stating acquired 
name and gender may be drawn. This certificate will be indistinguishable from a 
birth certificate, in order to remedy the breaches of Article 8 identified by the 
European Court of Human Rights. The link between the original and the revised 
record will remain confidential within the Registrar General's office.
572
 
 
In her final statement justifying the new legislation Winterton noted that the proposed 
legislation: 
 
will enable transsexual people confidently to take up those rights which have been 
denied to them in society - including the right to marry in their acquired gender - 
while preserving other obligations entered into in the original gender.
573
 
 
The legislation was introduced in the House of Lords in 2003 and was given Royal Assent 
on 1 July 2004. 
 
Ground-breaking legislation 
Cowan has claimed, that the GRA 2004 “embodies what could be termed groundbreaking 
reform”574 and Jeffreys described the Act as a piece of radical legislation.575 The GRA 
2004 was indeed in some senses at least ground-breaking and radical because, according to 
Sharpe, when it was passed it located “the UK at the forefront of global transgender law 
reform.”576 Whereas the UK was traditionally one of the most resistant of all EU states to 
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legislate to recognise transsexuals’ change of birth sex, the GRA 2004, at the time, placed 
the UK in “pole position among progressive states willing to legally recognise the sex 
claims of transgender people.”577 The reason it was ground-breaking was that it required no 
body modification prior to obtaining a legal change of sex.  
 
The GRA 2004 separates gender identity from one’s physical sex by not requiring any 
body modifications prior to applying for legal recognition of gender identity. This places 
the UK as one of merely a handful
578
 of European states which takes this approach. For 
example, of the 38
579
 European states which provides legal mechanisms for individuals to 
change their gender on official documents 23 require that the individual first undergo 
compulsory sterilisation
580
 and 20 require that the individual undergo surgical 
procedures.
581
 The approach taken in the GRA 2004 recognises that not everyone is 
medically able to undergo such procedures nor is everyone willing to do so should they be 
a possibility. In addition to this though, one of the most important aspects of the GRA 2004 
is that it recognises, in theory at least, that one’s gender identity is not necessarily linked to 
how one appears to others, or indeed to how one presents oneself. What the GRA 2004 
does is acknowledge that what is being recognised in law is not one’s body but one’s sense 
of self as male or female; however as will be shown in this chapter and in subsequent 
chapters the GRA 2004 is confused in its approach to recognising gender identity because 
of the specific provisions in the legislation which essentially require third party 
intervention which is designed to ‘test’ the applicant’s sense of themselves as male or 
female and to prove that the individual seeking legal recognition is really transsexual. 
 
The Gender Recognition Panel  
The GRA 2004 works by establishing a panel, the Gender Recognition Panel (GRP), which 
determines applications to change the applicants’ legal sex to correspond with their gender 
identity. According to the Joint Human Rights Committee (JHRC) the GRP is one of the 
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essential elements in the scheme of legal gender recognition in the UK.
582
 Membership of 
the GRP is outlined in the GRA 2004 sch.1 paragraph 1(2) and (3) which provides that 
members are appointed by the Lord Chancellor and have to be either legally or medically 
qualified. There must be at least one medically qualified member and one legally qualified 
member on each panel determining applications. In relation to medical qualifications, sch.1 
para 1(2)(b) provides that the medical member must be a registered medical practitioner or 
a registered psychologist. In relation to legal members, sch.1 para 1(3) outlines the 
qualifications required: “a person who has a 7 year general qualification within the 
meaning of section 71 of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990,”583 “an advocate or 
solicitor in Scotland of at least seven years’ standing,”584 and “a member of the Bar of 
Northern Ireland or solicitor of the Supreme Court of Northern Ireland of at least seven 
years’ standing.”585 As such the GRP is in reality a medico-legal tribunal586 which is tasked 
with examining the evidence to determine whether or not the applicant is entitled to a 
change of legal sex. The GRP does not base its decision on an evaluation of the applicant’s 
physical sex but rather whether or not the individual meets the requirements in the 
legislation to change their legal sex. 
 
The Gender Recognition Certificate  
The GRC is the document which changes an applicant’s legal sex. Section 4 provides that 
if the application is successful and the GRP is satisfied that the applicant meets the 
requirements for a GRC then the GRP must grant a GRC.
587
 In general the panel will issue 
a full GRC,
588
 although the possibility exists to issue an interim GRC.
589
 Whether or not 
the applicant is granted a full or interim GRC depends on his or her marital/civil 
partnership status and it is important to determine the difference between full and interim 
GRCs because s.9(1) provides that: 
 
[w]here a full gender recognition certificate is issued to a person, the person’s 
gender becomes for all purposes the acquired gender (so that if the acquired gender 
is the male gender, the person’s sex becomes that of a man and, if it is the female 
gender, the person’s sex becomes that of a woman. 
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It is the possession of a full GRC which allows individuals to have their gender identity 
recognised and for their legal status as male or female to flow from this gender identity. 
The difference between a full and an interim certificate is important for the individuals 
involved because it is only the full GRC which changes the person’s legal sex. The interim 
certificate is of no real legal value in terms of the person’s right to have his or her gender 
identity recognised
590
 as he or she remains the sex they were registered as after birth. An 
applicant will be issued with a full GRC if he or she is nether married or in a civil 
partnership.
591
 In addition the GRC will be a full certificate if the applicant is in a protected 
marriage and his or her spouse consents to the marriage continuing
592
 or the applicant is in 
a protected civil partnership and the GRP has decided to issue a full gender recognition 
certificate to the other party to the civil partnership.
593
 An interim GRC will be issued in all 
other circumstances. 
 
Exceptions 
Although s.9 provides that once an individual has a full GRC his legal sex is the sex 
opposite to the one registered on birth there are some exceptions to this rule contained in 
the legislation itself. Section 12 provides that a GRC does not affect parenthood status of 
the applicant. For example if a male-to-female (MTF) transsexual fathers children prior to 
obtaining a GRC she
594
 will remain the child’s father notwithstanding that she is now 
legally female and if a Female-to-Male (FTM) transsexual is the mother of a child prior to 
obtaining a GRC then he will remain the child’s mother notwithstanding that he is now 
legally male. Section 15 makes provision in relation to succession and states that “[t]he 
fact that a person’s gender has become the acquired gender under this Act does not affect 
the disposal or devolution of property under a will or other instrument made before the 
appointed day.”595 Therefore if a parent of an older female child and a younger male child 
made provision in his or her will to leave everything to their firstborn son and the female 
child then obtained a GRC he would not be entitled to claim the estate as firstborn son. 
Section 16 provides exceptions in relation to peerages etc. The impact of s.16 is that the 
GRC “does not affect the descent of any peerage or dignity or title of honour.”596 In the 
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Act as enacted s.19 provided for exemptions in relation to sport. Section 19 enabled 
sporting bodies regulating gender-affected sports
597
 to prohibit or restrict the participation 
of those in receipt of a GRC
598
  where such prohibition on restriction was “necessary to 
secure (a) fair competition,
599
 or (b) the safety of competitors.”600 Section 19 was repealed 
by the Equality Act 2010 Sch. 27(1) para. 1. The sport exception in the GRA 2004 s.19 
was replaced by a similar exception in s.195 of the Equality Act 2010.
601
 Section 20 of the 
GRA 2004 provides exceptions for gender-specific offences. 
 
So the premise behind the legislation is quite straight-forward: an individual who identifies 
as a member of the sex opposite to his or her birth sex can apply for a certificate which, 
subject to certain very specific exceptions, will legally change his or her legal sex for all 
purposes. However, the process of obtaining a GRC is complex and technical and not all 
individuals who identify as transsexual will obtain the certificate and consequent legal 
recognition as the remainder of this chapter will explore. The GRA 2004 places very strict 
boundaries around who is able to obtain a GRC and consequently who is able to benefit 
from the rights and protections contained in the legislation therefore it is important that the 
process of applying for a GRC is examined. 
 
Making an application for a GRC 
Those seeking legal recognition must satisfy a number of conditions contained in the 
legislation.
602
 The GRA 2004 s.1 provides that a person aged 18 or over may apply to the 
GRP for a GRC. This provision is potentially problematic in itself as it means that there is 
an age based restriction on applying for a GRC. However, notwithstanding the minimum 
age requirement, the Act has been utilised successfully by a considerable number of 
individuals. Data on applications has been kept since financial year 2004/05 and so it is 
possible to provide a detailed picture of how many applications have been considered, how 
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many were successful and how many have been refused.
603
 This data is presented in table 1 
below: 
 
Table 1: applications dealt with by the Gender Recognition Panel, since inception 
Time 
Period 
Applications 
Received 
Outcome of Application Dealt with 
Total 
applications 
dealt with 
Full GRC 
granted 
Interim 
GRC 
granted 
Refused Application 
withdrawn 
2004/05 395 0 0 0 0 0 
2005/06 991 1253 1181 33 21 18 
2006/07 690 588 532 22 23 11 
2007/08 293 448 392 24 27 5 
2008/09 278 274 241 25 8 0 
2009/10 286 273 239 16 15 3 
2010/11 303 317 260 17 28 12 
2011/12 320 308 264 11 23 10 
2012/13 301 278 237 9 15 17 
2013/14 311 371 318 16 20 17 
 
There is no information available for the outcomes of applications in financial year 
2004/05 in the table above because the Act was not yet in force and therefore no 
applications were determined in that financial year, although they were able to be 
commenced. Other than a rise in applications in financial years 2005/06 and 2006/07 the 
number of applications received each year has remained relatively steady. The rise in 
applications in 2005/06 and 2006/07 can be explained by the fact that these were the first 
few years that the Act was in force and therefore there would have been a spike in 
applications in these years as individuals took advantage of the new opportunity to apply 
for legal recognition. So, as can be seen from table 1 above, the Act has enabled a 
substantial amount of people to seek legal recognition of their gender identity.  
 
Applications for a GRC are based on one of two criteria: either “living in the other 
gender”604 or “having changed gender under the law of a country or territory outside the 
                                                 
603
 Please note that the most recent data available is until the end of financial year 2013/14. 
604
 GRA 2004 s.1(1)(a). 
143 
 
United Kingdom”605 The two types of application are called the standard track application 
which corresponds to s.1(1)(a) and the overseas track application which corresponds to 
s.1(1)(b). The list of approved countries or territories can be found in the Gender 
Recognition (Approved Countries and Territories) Order 2011. 
 
In relation to the type of application being made the majority, as would be expected, are of 
the standard track type.
606
 These two types of application were in addition to the temporary 
fast-track procedure for individuals who had transitioned several years before the 
legislation came into force. The purpose of the fast-track procedure was to enable those 
post-operative transsexuals such as those outlined in the previous chapter to bypass the 
normal legal requirements in the legislation and obtain legal recognition on the basis that 
they had physically transitioned from one sex to the other. Such individuals would 
presumably be able to meet the other criteria in the legislation which is outlined below 
without the need to provide the level of evidence required by the legislation. 
 
It should be remembered that each of these applications relates to an individual seeking 
legal recognition of his or her gender identity. Therefore it is important to know how many 
of the applications are successful and how many fail. If the information in Table 1 above is 
analysed it can be shown that of the 4,110 applications which were dealt with by the GRP 
between the first quarter of financial year 2005/06 (Q1 2005/06) and the end of Q4 
2013/14), 3,664 applications resulted in a full GRC being granted (89.15%), 173 resulted 
in an interim GRC being granted (4.21%), 180 applications were refused (4.38%) and 93 
applications (2.26%) were withdrawn by the applicants. If this is broken down further it 
can be seen that the numbers of full GRCs being granted has dropped since the Act first 
came into force. In addition the percentage of applications resulting in interim GRCs being 
issued has remained relatively low. The data outlined above is interesting and highlights 
that a significant percentage of those who apply for GRCs obtain them and therefore are 
given the opportunity to have their gender identity recognised and protected by UK law. 
However some are not successful. Despite the fact that 93.37% of applications resulted in 
either a full or interim GRC being issued and therefore arguably the legislation is a success 
it is the 4.38% of applications which were rejected that is most important for this thesis: for 
each rejected application there is a corresponding individual who has not been able to 
achieve legal recognition of his or her gender identity.  
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Arguably then the legislation has mostly been a success in that it has enabled a 
considerable number of people to obtain legal recognition of their gender identity, however 
this thesis seeks not to argue that the legislation has not been a success for many 
individuals but rather that it could be better. Although the number of applications which 
are successful, i.e. result in either a full or interim GRC being issued, is high there remains 
the possibility within the legislation that applications will not succeed. There is also the 
possibility that the provisions within the legislation itself may prevent individuals from 
even being able to make an application thereby impacting on the ability of those 
individuals to have their gender identity recognised and protected in UK law. Further, 
these provisions may play a part in individuals withdrawing applications or being deterred 
from making an application in the first place, although such concerns are difficult to 
establish. An examination of the statistics in relation to applications alongside the relevant 
statutory provisions will highlight problems with the success of applications under the 
legislation as it currently exists. As was noted above of the 4110 applications 4.38% of 
applications were refused. Although this percentage is small it represents 180 real 
individuals who have, for whatever reason, been unable to access the protections and rights 
in the GRA 2004. One can surmise that those whose applications were refused failed to 
meet the evidentiary requirements outlined in the legislation, however it is not possible to 
say for certain because reasons for refusal of GRCs is not publically available. Therefore it 
is important to examine the specific criteria required beginning with those in s.2 of the 
GRA 2004. 
 
Criteria to be satisfied before GRC can be issued 
Looking at the criteria in detail, determination of the application depends on which type of 
application the individual is making.
607
 If the applicant has applied for legal recognition of 
his gender identity under s.1(1)(a)
608
 then s.2(1) provides that the GRP must grant the 
application if they are satisfied that the applicant: 
 
(a) has or  has had gender dysphoria; 
(b) has lived in the acquired gender throughout the period of two years ending with 
the date on which the application is made; 
(c) intends to continue to live in the acquired gender until death; and 
(d) complies with the requirements imposed by and under section 3. 
                                                 
607
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If the applicant is making his or her application under s.1(1)(b)
609
 then under s.2(2) the 
panel must grant either a full or interim certificate if satisfied: 
 
(a) that the country or territory under the law of which the applicant has changed 
gender is an approved country or territory, and
610
 
(b) that the applicant complies with the requirements imposed under section 3.611 
 
If, under s.1(1) the panel is not required to grant a certificate then it must reject the 
application.
612
 Each of these criteria need to be examined in turn to highlight how the GRA 
2004 operates and to show the burden placed on the individual making the application. As 
noted above the majority of applications are based on s.1(1)(a) – the standard-track 
application, and as such it is the criteria in s.2(1)(a)-(d) that will be considered as it is in 
s.2(1)(a)-(d) that one of the main problems of the legislation exists; the potential for a third 
party to derail an individual’s quest for legal recognition of their gender identity. 
 
Has or has had Gender Dysphoria (GD) 
This is contained in s.2(1)(a) which provides that an application will be determined on the 
basis that the applicant has or has had GD and sections 3(1) and 3(2) which provide that in 
support of the application the applicant must include medical reports
613
 which include 
details of the applicant’s diagnosis with GD.614  
 
The issue of having or having had GD appears, at first glance, to be quite straightforward 
as it would seem that all the applicant is required to do is provide the reports mentioned in 
s.3(1)(a) and (b). However, this provision was subject to considerable debate during pre-
legislative scrutiny. During debate on the Bill, in an attempt to understand the phrase ‘has 
had GD’, a probing amendment was proposed. In response to which  Dr Evan Harris stated 
that: 
 
[t]he treatment for gender dysphoria is [sex re-assignment]. It is perfectly possible 
for people to have had gender dysphoria that has been treated and dealt with by 
reassignment. Legal recognition is a separate issue and follows on from that 
process.
615
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Mr David Lammy replied also: 
 
the Government included the words ''or has had'' to cover the situation of a person 
who was diagnosed with gender dysphoria and has since continued through the 
process, as we expect people to do to live fully in their acquired gender. As the 
person is now living fully in the acquired gender, it may not be accurate to say that 
the person has gender dysphoria. The gender dysphoria has been dealt with. In 
order to ensure that such a person could apply for recognition, the words ''or has 
had'' were included.
616
 
 
Those individuals, according to David Lammy “will have moved beyond the GD that they 
had to a new life in an acquired gender, which they have had for many years.”617 As a 
result of this discussion it was clear that the phrase ‘or has had’ was intended to apply to 
those who have been treated for GD and who, consequently, may no longer ‘have’ GD and 
the amendment was withdrawn. It was this section which enabled the fast-track 
applications to be made as it relates to historical sex reassignment undergone by the 
applicant. 
 
To have GD, as required by the legislation, also appears straight-forward: those who have 
gender dysphoria have been provided with a mechanism to change their legal status. 
However this very provision, alongside the provision outlined above, highlights that 
perhaps the legislation is not as straight-forward as it could be. If those who have 
undergone medical procedures to change their bodies can be said to no longer have gender 
dysphoria but rather have had it then to whom does the provision have GD apply? 
Presumably this would be those individuals who cannot yet be said to no longer have GD 
because they have taken steps to change their bodies to align with their gender identity 
therefore it must be those who have not yet achieved congruence of body and gender 
identity for whatever reason. This then begs the question of whether or not the legislation 
provides for not only those who seek to align mind and body through medical procedures 
but also those who do not? In addition to this, as outlined in Chapter One, GD is a 
diagnosable medical condition. The issues raised by this provision will be explored in 
detail in Chapter Five. Therefore it is clear from the parliamentary debates and the final 
legislation that one cannot seek legal recognition of one’s gender identity in the UK 
without first having gone through the process of obtaining a diagnosis of GD at some point 
at least two years before making the application for recognition, see the second criteria 
discussed below. What this provision does is take control from the individual as he or she 
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is unable to progress with their quest to have their gender identity recognised in law which 
has serious consequences for how the law and other people interact with him or her. 
However, obtaining a diagnosis is merely the first hurdle to be overcome. Should the 
individual be given such a diagnosis the GRP then has to be satisfied that the individual 
meets the other requirements in the legislation outlined below. 
 
Has lived in the acquired gender for two years 
Section 2(1)(b) places an obligation on individuals to have lived in the acquired gender for 
the two years immediately preceding the application. This in itself is intended to ensure 
that those making applications are fully committed to living as members of the opposite 
sex and ensures that applications are not made on a whim. However, the question of what it 
means to live as a member of the acquired gender is thus raised. As this is a decision which 
the GRP have to reach it therefore opens up space for discretion in deciding whether or not 
the applicant has met this requirement as it is a judgement to be made based on what the 
GRP believes it means to live as either male or female. This is another point in the 
legislation which seems straight-forward until it is examined. How does a panel, who do 
not personally know the applicant, determine whether or not the applicant has lived as a 
member of the opposite sex and to what extent will the panel members’ notions of 
maleness and femaleness influence their decision making? This provision will be examined 
in depth in the following chapter as, as with the provision on having or having had GD, 
this is a point at which the individual’s gender identity may not be given recognition in 
law. 
 
Intends to live in acquired gender until death 
Section 2(1)(c) requires that the individual must intend to live in the acquired gender until 
death. This amounts to a permanence requirement which will be discussed in depth in the 
following chapter because this provision is fairly easy to satisfy but arguably is impossible 
to enforce and does not accord with contemporary medical approaches to gender 
dysphoria. 
 
 
Meets the evidentiary requirements in s.3 
The evidence required to support an application for a GRC is contained in s.3. The 
evidence required to support standard track applications and overseas track applications is 
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slightly different. Section 3(1) – (3) stipulate the medical evidence which has to be 
provided to support an application under s.1(1)(1)(a). Such an application must be 
supported by: 
  
(a) a report made by a registered medical practitioner practising in the field of 
gender dysphoria and a report made by another registered medical practitioner 
(who may, but need not, practise in that field),
 618
 or  
(b) a report made by a registered psychologist practising in that field and a report 
made by a registered medical practitioner (who may, but need not, practise in 
that field).
 619
 
Section 3(2) provides that the reports outlined above must include “details of the diagnosis 
of the applicant's gender dysphoria.”620 Where the applicant is planning to undergo, has 
undergone or is undergoing medical procedures to modify their body at the time of making 
the application then the medical reports have to contain details of that treatment.
621
 This 
may seem relatively unproblematic however as the recent case of Carpenter v Secretary of 
State for Justice
622
 shows it is yet another potential stumbling block for those seeking legal 
recognition. Section 3(4) provides that applicants must provide a statutory declaration that 
they meet the requirements in s.2(1)(b) and (c) i.e. that they have lived in the acquired 
gender for two years immediately prior to the application and that they intend to live in the 
acquired gender until death. In addition applicants have to provide evidence in relation to 
their marital status under s.3(6)(a) which will vary depending on whether or not the 
applicant is domiciled in England and Wales or Scotland,
623
 any other information or 
evidence required by the Secretary of State
624
 and any other information or evidence 
required by the GRP.
625
  
 
For overseas track applications the applicant need only provide evidence that they have 
changed gender under the law of an approved country or territory
626
 and meet the 
requirements contained in s.3(6)(a)-(c) mentioned above.  
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When the Bill was being debated the issue of evidence was raised and given considerable 
coverage. The main issue was that the evidence required by s.3 had a particular function; it 
is intended to “establish whether a person has taken decisive steps to live fully and 
permanently in their acquired gender” ”627 which, because there is no requirement for body 
modification in the legislation, requires to be proven in a different way. Had the legislation 
required some form of body modification, as some other European jurisdictions do, the 
issue of establishing their decision to live fully and permanently in their acquired gender 
would have been more straightforward in some respects.
628
 The issue then becomes one of 
how to prove someone’s intention without body modification and how to legislate for 
this.
629
 The evidentiary requirements in s.3 then are intended to ensure that only 
transsexuals are provided with legal recognition of gender identity i.e. only those who have 
been diagnosed with GD and who seek to live fully and permanently as members of the sex 
opposite to their birth sex and this will be discussed in depth in the following chapter.  
 
Appeals 
The GRA 2004 provides a limited mechanism for appealing against a decision of the GRP 
to reject the application for a GRC. Section 8 provides that an applicant may appeal to the 
Family Division of the High Court or to the Court of Session on a point of law only.
630
 The 
appeal must be held in private if the applicant so requests.
631
 If the appeal is successful the 
court must either allow the appeal and issue the certificate which was applied for
632
 or 
allow the appeal and refer the matter back to the same or a different panel for 
reconsideration
633
 or dismiss the appeal.
634
 If the appeal is dismissed then the applicant can 
reapply to the panel for a GRC under s.1(1) but only after a period of six months has 
passed since the date of rejection.
635
 In addition to the limited right of appeal of the 
applicant there are mechanisms within s.8 to enable the Secretary of State, an applicant’s 
spouse or civil partner to challenge the granting of a GRC, by means of an application to 
the High Court or Court of Session, if they consider that the GRC was obtained by means 
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of fraud.
636
 If the case has been so referred based on any of the above provisions, then the 
court to which it was referred must either “quash or confirm the decision to grant the 
application”637 and if the decision to grant the application for GRC is quashed then it “must 
revoke the gender recognition certificate issued.”638 
  
The acceptance of medical knowledge in the Gender 
Recognition Bill debates 
Lord Filkin, in introducing the Gender Recognition Bill during the second reading in the 
Lords stated that in order to be able to apply for legal recognition of one’s gender identity 
the “person must have or have had gender dysphoria, the recognised medical condition that 
drives a transsexual person to live in the opposite gender.”639 The emergence of 
transsexualism as a medical condition as outlined in Chapter One appears to have been 
wholly accepted by the majority of those debating the Gender Recognition Bill in both the 
House of Lords and the House of Commons where, it is clear from the Hansard records, 
that viewing transsexualism as a medical condition was not questioned other than by a few 
dissenting voices.
640
 Therefore the position underpinning the GRA 2004 is that 
transsexualism, the desire to live as a member of the opposite sex to one’s birth sex, is a 
result of a diagnosable and treatable medical condition: gender dysphoria. During the 
various debates and reports there were some minor doubts raised concerning the state of 
medical knowledge on transsexualism: those comments opposed were mainly by Lord 
Tebbit and Baroness O’Cathain. Lord Tebbit noted: 
 
there is a controversy in the world of medicine as to whether it is a medical or 
psychological condition. We also know that the world of medicine changes its mind 
quite frequently, sometimes in a spectacular fashion as we have seen recently in the 
press in relation to cases of infant cot deaths, and matters of that kind.
641
 
 
This corresponds to the discussion contained in Chapter One regarding the emergence of 
transsexualism as a medical condition where it was noted that at various points in history 
there were sometimes, and still remain, competing opinions regarding the cause of 
transsexualism. The Government acknowledged the debate within medicine itself 
regarding the aetiology of transsexualism when it was said that: 
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[c]learly, there are elements of the medical profession that maintain that there is no 
convincing evidence of a physiological cause for transsexualism and that to 
recognise the new gender is to pander to psychological delusion, as has been argued 
in this debate.
642
 
 
This accords with the debate outlined in Chapter One. Lord Tebbit’s comment above is 
useful, however, because it highlights that although there is an accepted medical 
understanding of transsexualism, this position is subject to developing medical knowledge 
and opinion, as is all medical knowledge which may be revisited following subsequent 
development in that field. Lord Chan also addressed this when he considered the state of 
medical knowledge and legal rights. In referring to a discussion regarding the aetiology of 
transsexualism Lord Chan outlined that there was no agreed aetiology, in line with the 
presentation of medical knowledge presented in Chapter One. As will be shown in Chapter 
Three the issue of aetiology was discussed by the ECtHR in Goodwin where it was 
determined that the lack of consensus surrounding aetiology was not a material factor in 
deciding the case. Therefore it is clear that there does not need to be a known aetiology or 
indeed consensus surrounding aetiology for a condition to be accepted as a medical 
condition and treatment protocols developed. Lord Chan observed that it was an accepted 
medical condition albeit that: 
[m]ore medical research is needed into transsexual people in order to provide them 
with appropriate support. The Gender Recognition Bill assumes that the condition 
is already a discrete and clearly agreed medical condition, which is not the case.
643
 
In addition it was noted that although the aetiology of transsexualism could not be 
conclusively determined by the medical profession this did not preclude the possibility of 
providing legal recognition to such individuals. As noted above the decision in Goodwin v 
United Kingdom
644
 was referred to as enabling legal developments notwithstanding the that 
there was some  uncertainty within medicine because in Goodwin the:  
European Court of Human Rights took the view that the continuing debate over the 
nature and aetiology of transsexualism should no longer stand in the way of 
transsexual people enjoying their human rights as others do.”645 
 
In the debates, Lord Carlile of Berriew largely dismissed the lack of certainty about 
aetiology as irrelevant. He stated: 
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I say to those who feel uncomfortable about this proposed legislation that we are 
talking about a rights issue and a medical issue. When I started my involvement in 
these matters people used to ask me whether it was a psychological matter, a 
somatic matter, a psychosomatic matter or something else, as if one could pigeon-
hole gender dysphoria as akin to measles (a physical illness) on the one hand or 
schizophrenia (a mental illness) on the other hand. After 20 years of research into 
this matter and a huge amount of reading, one cannot pigeon-hole this condition in 
any particular way. It is a whole person, whole body condition.”646 
However the dissenting voices, although very important, were in the minority and it was 
reinforced throughout the debates that this was a Bill which was intended to protect the 
rights of those who had been diagnosed with gender dysphoria: a treatable medical 
condition regardless of its aetiology, focusing instead on the fact that it was a medical 
condition for which there was an accepted diagnosis and treatment process which enabled 
those with the medical condition to alleviate their dysphoria. In fact the words ‘medical 
condition’ appear regularly in the Hansard records. Baroness Hollis of Heigham stated that 
transsexualism “is a medical condition whereby a person feels driven to live in the opposite 
gender,”647 Lord Marlesford stated that he “like other noble Lords, have great sympathy for 
those who suffer from the medical condition known as gender dysphoria.”648 Lynne Jones 
stated that “In this country, transsexual people have suffered from discrimination and fear 
of being exposed to ridicule because they suffer from a medical condition.”649 There was 
almost no challenge to the idea that transsexualism was a medical condition within these 
debates. David Lammy reinforced that the Bill was based on the belief that transsexualism 
was a result of a medical condition when he stated: 
 
[t[he Bill deals specifically with people with gender dysphoria who present 
themselves as having acquired a new gender because they are driven to that by the 
medical condition surrounding gender dysphoria. Gender dysphoria is, after all, a 
medical condition whereby a person feels driven to live in the opposite gender. To 
be reminded of the original gender, to be regularly confronted by it, and to have 
others knowing that one suffers from that medical condition and to know that they 
might be talking about it is not conducive to feeling secure and it makes it very 
difficult to live in the acquired gender in dignity.
650
 
 
The question of aetiology was raised in the debates and Lord Carlile of Berriew largely 
dismissed this as irrelevant. He stated: 
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I say to those who feel uncomfortable about this proposed legislation that we are 
talking about a rights issue and a medical issue. When I started my involvement in 
these matters people used to ask me whether it was a psychological matter, a 
somatic matter, a psychosomatic matter or something else, as if one could pigeon-
hole gender dysphoria as akin to measles (a physical illness) on the one hand or 
schizophrenia (a mental illness) on the other hand. After 20 years of research into 
this matter and a huge amount of reading, one cannot pigeon-hole this condition in 
any particular way. It is a whole person, whole body condition.”651 
 
Clearly then the accepted position was that this Bill would address the difficulties faced by 
a small minority of individuals who could be said to suffer as a result of gender dysphoria. 
Lord Goodhart stated that: 
 
Gender dysphoria is a condition that causes enormous distress. We believe that the 
Bill will go some way—by no means the whole way—towards reducing that 
distress and will cause no foreseeable harm.
652
 
 
The opinion of medical experts was referred to regularly throughout the debates as a means 
of defeating dissenting opinion. For example it was noted several times that the Chief 
Medical Officer recognises transsexualism as a medical condition therefore its acceptance 
at such a high level of office implies that it is wholly accepted by the medical profession 
and that treatment is provided by the state by means of the National Health Service.
653
 In 
addition several times it was stated that esteemed medical organisations such as the BMA, 
the GMC, the Royal College of General Practitioners, the Royal College of Psychiatrists 
and the British Psychological Society had been involved in discussion of the Bill.
654
 It 
would appear that the mention of these organisations was an attempt to give authority to 
the position underpinning the Bill that the Bill was only intended to provide legal 
recognition to those who could be deemed to have a diagnosable medical condition and not 
those who merely sought to live as members of the opposite sex through some form of 
lifestyle choice. David Lammy noted that the desire to live as a member of the opposite 
sex, “is not a choice according to the way in which we understand the word; it is a driven 
conviction because of a medical state”655 and that the way in which the UK would seek to 
legislate to protect the rights of those in this position was by means of adopting the 
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accepted medical knowledge on transsexualism. David Lammy reinforced the fact that a 
medicalised approach to gender variance underpinned the legislation when he stated: 
 
the standards in the Bill to some extent mirror the Harry Benjamin standards, which 
are the standards of acquired practice among the medical professionals who 
practise in this area. Those standards require three planks: the person has begun the 
process of social change, of acquiring a new gender, and of dressing accordingly; 
they have hormone treatment and other treatments; ultimately, they have surgical 
treatment if it is viable.
656
 
 
The discussion in the Hansard records, mirrors, to some extent, the focus of law in the 
cases concerning transsexual individuals where there has often been a tension between 
medical knowledge and practice, and legal rights. Although medicine has developed to 
such an extent the condition, GD, is well established and treatment has been developed to 
ease the dysphoria experienced by such individuals the law has taken a slightly different 
approach and determined that all that is required is a diagnosis of GD and that there is no 
requirement on the individual to progress with any medical treatment.  
 
Is the GRA 2004 still ground-breaking? 
Although, as noted at the beginning of this chapter the GRA 2004 was considered ground-
breaking legislation when it was enacted the UK is no longer at the global forefront of 
transsexual legal recognition. Since the 2004 Act was enacted Argentina, Colombia, 
Denmark, Ireland and Malta have all passed more progressive legislation which, it will be 
argued in Chapter Six, are not based on the medical model of transsexualism. Each of these 
approaches will be discussed in detail in Chapter Six. Arguably, then, the UK means of 
providing legal recognition of gender identity is now already outdated and in need of 
reform. It is argued in this thesis that a primary reason it is in need for reform is because 
UK law is dependent on the medical model of transsexualism which was in existence in 
2004. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter provided an overview of the GRA 2004, the subject of examination of this 
thesis, and in doing so showed how one obtains legal recognition of one’s gender identity 
in UK law. What is clear from the provisions contained in the Act is that the legislation is 
heavily based on a medical model of transsexualism: evidenced by the requirement for a 
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diagnosis of GD, the medico-legal nature of the GRP, and the requirement for medical 
evidence. It is clear from this Act that the legislature sought to devise a means of testing 
individuals’ claim to be transsexual; the very nature of the GRA 2004 is to ensure that only 
those who are truly transsexual can obtain a change of legal sex and that there should be no 
possibility of individuals choosing to change sex otherwise. The following chapter 
explores how the gatekeeper role given to both the medical profession, via the requirement 
of a diagnosis, and the GRP, via the obligation to scrutinise applications and evidence, 
works in practice and outlines the consequences for those who are unable to achieve legal 
recognition of their gender identity under the GRA 2004. 
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5. Problems which arise as a result of the legislation 
adopting a medical model of transsexualism as its 
basis for legal recognition of gender 
 
Introduction 
In the quest to show that the Gender Recognition Act 2004 (GRA 2004) is flawed because 
it adopts a medical model of transsexualism as its foundation and therefore could be 
reformed to ensure a better way of providing legal recognition of one’s gender identity the 
thesis, thus far, has examined a variety of different factors such as the emergence of 
transsexualism as a medical condition, the law’s response to those who sought legal 
recognition of sex reassignment procedures and the GRA 2004 itself which showed how 
the medical model of transsexualism underpins the GRA 2004. This chapter examines the 
specific problems which arise as a result of the UK Government adopting this approach as 
the basis for the provision of legal rights and protections in the GRA 2004. There are three 
main problems with the legislation adopting this model; two of which relate to gatekeeper 
roles inherent within the legislative provisions and one relates to the currency of the 
legislation as medical knowledge surrounding transsexualism, gender identity and indeed 
Gender Dysphoria (GD) develops. This chapter will begin by providing an overview of 
why the Government took the approach it did in enacting the GRA 2004 and then it will 
examine all three problems caused by this approach: the gatekeeper function of the medical 
professionals which exists in the provision that one obtains a diagnosis of GD before being 
eligible to make an application to the Gender Recognition Panel (GRP); the gatekeeper 
role of the GRP itself which has the possibility to deny applications which, in its opinion, 
fail to meet the legislative requirements and thirdly the changing medical knowledge 
surrounding gender variance. It is argued in this chapter that each of these approaches and 
developments undermines the GRA 2004 as the most appropriate means of providing legal 
recognition of one’s gender. 
 
Why did the Government take this approach? 
There was considerable debate surrounding the Gender Recognition Bill when it passed 
though the Lords and Commons.
657
 Central to these debates were a number of themes such 
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as the need to ensure certainty regarding an individual’s status in law,658 the need to avoid 
same sex marriage,
659
 the need to ensure the protection of rights and interests of third 
parties
660
 etc. Each of these concerns is important in its own right, however for the specific 
purpose of this thesis it is the requirement to ensure certainty of legal sex which is the most 
important as it is primarily this concern which gave rise to the gatekeeper function of 
medical professionals and the GRP. On the requirement for certainty of sex in law the Joint 
Human Rights Committee (JHRC) noted that: 
 
[i]t is reasonable for the Government to take the view that there needs to be a 
degree of certainty about people’s genders. Gender will affect the legal status and a 
variety of other rights and obligations. Certainty is also needed to protect the 
interests and rights of people who have dealings, either administratively or in the 
course of personal relationships, with the person whose acquired gender is to be 
recognised.
661
  
 
Therefore certainty underpins the other concerns mentioned above i.e. avoiding same sex 
marriage, rights and interests of others etc. According to the JHRC the legislation achieves 
certainty in two main ways: firstly by means of having a panel determine applications and 
secondly by the strict statutory criteria to be taken into consideration by the panel.
662
 One 
of the primary concerns regarding recognition of gender without the requirement to alter 
one’s body was that it might lead to a process of legal recognition of lifestyle choice or 
frivolous applications.
663
 However, the idea that an individual would ‘flit back and forth’ 
between male and female as a result of the non-requirement for body modification was 
considered to be unlikely if there was a panel because they would not issue certificates to 
such individuals seeking to make lifestyle changes.
664
  
 
So the panel, and the legislative criteria of which the panel require to be satisfied, are 
central to the operation of the GRA 2004 and also to ensuring that individuals who apply 
for GRCs are truly transsexual because this allows the law to be certain as to their sex as 
sex within the UK remains a legally important category, although to some extent the 
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importance of legal sex is diminishing.
665
 However in attempting to ensure that the need 
for certainty, particularly in relation to ensuring only true transsexuals were able to change 
their legal sex, was met by means of a panel and strict legislative criteria the legislature has 
enacted a piece of legislation which has the result of placing the legal identity of 
transsexual individuals in the hands of third parties by creating particularly strong 
gatekeepers which will now be explored in depth. 
 
Gatekeeping in the GRA 2004 
Gatekeeping in the GRA 2004 occurs at two specific points in the individual’s quest to 
have his or her gender recognised in law: at the point where the individual approaches the 
medical profession seeking to be diagnosed as transsexual and when he or she then applies 
for a GRC. This two-pronged gatekeeper approach in the GRA 2004 occurs as a result of 
the way in which the legislature approached the issue and ensures that only ‘true’ 
transsexuals are given legal recognition. This approach is problematic because, as 
discussed in the Introductory chapter to this thesis, gender identity is one’s deeply held 
sense of being male or female and, as will be discussed below, there is no way of 
conclusively determining, medically, whether or not the person’s self-declared gender 
identity is accurate other than by asking him or her and measuring their response against 
various criteria. So if the only way of actually determining someone else’s gender identity 
is to ask them then why should there be a means built into to the legislation to then deny 
that person’s self-declaration? 
 
Gatekeeping by medical professionals: the requirement for diagnosis 
The gatekeeping function of the medical professional is strong in the GRA 2004 because, 
as Cowan argues, “the Act firmly and statutorily anchors the transsexual person within the 
realm of medical expertise”.666 The medical role is reinforced in the legislation by means 
of sections 2 and 3 of the Act. Therefore without the support of medical professionals 
initially providing a diagnosis of GD and then later providing medical reports, an 
individual cannot obtain legal recognition of his or her gender identity.  
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This approach, primarily the requirement for a diagnosis, places the applicant in the 
position of being dependent upon the medical professional accepting his or her narrative 
and measuring it against the expected narrative of what it means to be transsexual; part of 
which includes ensuring that the individual’s narrative matches the diagnostic criteria. 
Therefore the medical professionals working with transsexual patients are the first judges 
of one’s gender identity and the patient is measured against what is deemed ‘normal’ – 
normal gender identity and normal transsexual identity thus establishing the medical 
professionals as the initial gatekeepers of legal identity and this role, which is not part of 
their professional remit, is problematic: Whittle et al argue that the requirement that 
transsexual individuals engage with the medical profession as a means of realising their 
identities: 
 
places trans people in a position with healthcare providers which has all the 
hallmarks of a difficult relationship: power and control; desire and need coupled 
with vulnerability; pathologisation and protocol.
667
 
 
This therefore highlights concerns over the power dynamics inherent within the 
doctor/patient relationship in which the individual seeking legal recognition of his or her 
gender identity is at the mercy of the medical professional making the required diagnosis. 
In addition to this concern, there is extensive literature which questions the attitudes and 
knowledge of medical professionals who work with transsexual patients and healthcare 
providers’ training in relation to this medical condition.668 All of these factors influence 
how the medical gatekeeper role works in practice. This in turn influences an individual’s 
ability to fulfil the diagnostic stage and therefore, by implication, impact on his or her 
ability to progress to the application for legal recognition because without a diagnosis of 
GD the individual cannot, unless he or she changes sex in a country or territory approved 
by the Gender Recognition (Approved Countries and Territories) Order 2011 and 
subsequently makes an application for a GRC under s.1(1)(b) of the GRA 2004, even 
initiate an application for a GRC as he or she would not be able to provide the evidence 
required by s.3 to support such an application. So how does one obtain a diagnosis of GD 
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in the UK? To answer this the different processes in the NHS in each of the UK 
jurisdictions must be considered because even before one can obtain a diagnosis of GD one 
required to have access to those who provide the diagnosis and as the following section 
will highlight this is not always easy. 
 
NHS Treatment Protocols and Guidelines 
The NHS in Scotland, England, and Wales has devised various treatment protocols and 
guidelines which apply to transsexual patients. The creation of these protocols and 
guidelines can be seen as a positive commitment of the NHS to providing specialist 
services to transsexual individuals. This is a positive step because in 2007 the issue of 
transsexuals’ interaction with the NHS formed part of a report compiled by Whittle et al 
which found that there was “strong evidence that access to good healthcare for trans people 
[was] sporadic in the UK.”669 Whittle et al also highlighted the fact that 25% of their 
respondents felt that they had been refused treatment because the medical practitioner 
treating them did not approve of sex re-assignment.
670
 Since the publication of the Whittle 
et al report it can be argued that the care of transsexuals based in the UK has been 
developing for the better. Over the past few years the Department of Health (DoH) has 
produced a number of publications on this topic, from the detail and number of such 
publications, it can be seen that this is an area that the DoH takes seriously.
671
 Wylie notes 
one of the important developments in relation to treatment of transsexuals in the UK is that 
“[i]n recent years there has been a move away from one national centralised specialist 
service for gender dysphoria in the UK to the gradual introduction and development of 
regional services.”672 This is important as regional care and support services can offer 
“greater convenience for patients and also allows for an increase in the overall number of 
patients being referred and seeking help for gender dysphoria.”673 There are regional 
centres in Leicester, Leeds, Nottingham, Sheffield, Plymouth, Northampton, 
Newcastle/Sunderland, Glasgow, Edinburgh and Belfast.
674
 The provision of treatment in 
Scotland is specifically governed by the NHS Scotland Gender Reassignment Protocol, in 
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England by the Interim Gender Dysphoria Protocol & Service Guideline 2013/14 and in 
Wales by the Specialised Adult Gender Identity Services policy which will now be 
explored in detail because how the NHS in the UK deals with transsexual patients has an 
impact on the ability of those individuals to access the rights and protections in the 
legislation because of the way that the legislation was framed by requiring a diagnosis of 
GD as one of the main criteria to be established before an applicant can make an 
application for a GRC. 
 
NHS Scotland Gender Reassignment Protocol 
Under the NHS Scotland Gender Reassignment Protocol (GR Protocol) a patient may 
present to his or her General Practitioner (GP) who is then required to refer the patient to a 
Gender Identity Clinic (GIC). Alternatively, within the Scottish GR Protocol, a patient may 
self-refer to a GIC. The GIC then assesses the patient. The purpose of this first assessment 
(Assessment 1) is to determine whether or not the patient has GD. The result of 
Assessment 1 can be threefold: (i) that GD is diagnosed; (ii) is not diagnosed; or (iii) that a 
diagnosis is uncertain. If GD is not diagnosed then the patient is discharged from the care 
of the GIC or referred onwards for further support. If the diagnosis is uncertain then the 
patient is given additional support at the GIC and a later diagnosis may be obtained. If, 
after further support from the GIC, the patient is not diagnosed then the patient is 
discharged or referred onwards for further support. If during Assessment 1 a diagnosis of 
GD is made, or a subsequent diagnosis made following initial uncertainty, then treatment 
possibilities are to be discussed with the patient and an agreement is sought from the 
patient regarding participation in a 12 month preoperative real life experience (RLE).
675
  
 
The NHS England Interim Gender Dysphoria Protocol & Service 
Guideline 2013/14 
Following the publication of the NHS Scotland GR Protocol in July 2012 the NHS in 
England began work on an equivalent protocol specific for patients in England. The NHS 
England Interim Gender Dysphoria Protocol & Service Guideline was accepted by the 
Clinical Priorities Advisory Group on 12 July 2013 and is largely based on the Scottish GR 
Protocol and is intended to be read alongside the UK Intercollegiate Good Practice 
                                                 
675
 As this stage considers treatment options it will not be discussed as it is outwith the scope of this thesis 
which is concerned with the pre-treatment stage i.e. access to services and obtaining a diagnosis. 
162 
 
Guidelines for the Assessment and Treatment of Adults with Gender Dysphoria
676
 (the 
Good Practice Guidelines) The initial stages of presenting for diagnosis within the English 
Protocol are largely the same as in the Scottish one however one difference exists between 
the Protocols in relation to the referral process: in England the patient must be referred 
either by a GP, psychologist, psychiatrist or sexual health service via a GP.
677
 There is no 
mechanism for self-referral to a GIC. This makes the process of accessing GICs in England 
more problematic than in Scotland and is a huge potential stumbling block for English 
domiciled patients because as the Good Practice Guidelines state “[t]he support of a GP 
who is prepared to be proactive in supporting referrals for treatment and to enter into 
collaborative care arrangements is essential.”678 Without the support of the GP the patient 
in England cannot progress through the process. Once the patient in England has been 
referred to a GIC, by whatever means, to the specialist gender service for diagnosis the 
process is the same as outlined above in relation to the Scottish Protocol.  
 
NHS Northern Ireland 
Diagnosis and treatment of transsexuals in Northern Ireland is dealt with at the 
Brackenburn Clinic in Belfast and individuals cannot self-refer to this clinic but must 
rather seek a referral from their GP or mental health professional. The Brackenburn Clinic 
does not have their own protocol as such but rather follow the Good Practice Guidelines
679
 
and, as such, the support of the patient’s GP is crucial to the individual being able to access 
the specialist services provided by the clinic. 
 
NHS Wales Specialised Adult Gender Identity Services 
Following a report in 2011 the NHS in Wales developed a policy which would outline how 
transsexual patients were to be diagnosed and treated; the Specialised Adult Gender 
Identity Services policy.
680
 This policy outlines that diagnosis and treatment will be 
provided by the NHS in England, specifically the West London Mental Health NHS Trust 
GIC. However the most important aspect of the policy for the purpose of this thesis is that 
an individual cannot self-refer to the GIC but rather a referral has to be made by the 
individual’s GP to a local NHS Consultant Psychiatrist who will “consider whether the 
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patient has a diagnosis of GD and/or whether the patient also has any other form of mental 
disorder.”681 However the NHS Wales policy is very open about the gatekeeper role of the 
medical professional in this process. Once the Consultant Psychiatrist determines that the 
patient is ready for further assessment and treatment he or she refers the patient to the 
“designated gatekeeper within their Local Health Board”682 whose role it is “to ensure that 
the referring consultant psychiatrist has made a diagnosis of gender dysphoria and that the 
referral meets the agreed criteria.”683  There are seven Local Health Boards in Wales and 
each have one named clinical gatekeeper.
684
 Therefore it is the gatekeeper’s role to check 
the diagnosis and also check that the referral meets the required criteria.
685
 The NHS Wales 
system of referral is the most complex system in the UK and the one which has the most 
potential to derail an individual’s quest for legal recognition of his or her gender identity 
because it is the one with the most approval stages before the patient actually meets anyone 
from the GIC. Once the gatekeeper is satisfied that the Consultant Psychiatrist’s diagnosis 
and referral are ok he or she approves the referral and then forwards it on for authorisation 
by the Welsh Health Specialised Services Committee (WHSSC) who will, if they authorise 
the referral, notify the Consultant Psychiatrist that it has been so approved and that he or 
she can proceed with the referral to the GIC in London. 
 
The Protocols and guidelines discussed above are entirely focussed on providing access to 
medical services, access to specialist medical practitioners and ensuring best practice in 
terms of the diagnosis and treatment of GD patients, they are not intended to fit within the 
current legislation on recognition of gender identity in any way. This conflation of legal 
and medical has introduced the first hurdle for those seeking legal recognition of their 
gender identity: being referred for a diagnosis, although in Scotland as a result of the 
mechanism for self-referral this is not a large issue. However the requirements in the 
English Protocol, the Welsh policy and the approach taken in Northern Ireland for referral 
to a specialist may well be a significant problem for such individuals should they not be 
supported by their GP or other medical professional who can make such a referral. 
Therefore what the GRA 2004 does is establish that the medical profession are gatekeepers 
of recognition of gender identity and this, I argue, is a result of the way that gender identity 
has been conceptualised as a medical issue, as outlined in Chapter One, as the test 
                                                 
681
<http://www.wales.nhs.uk/sites3/Documents/898/Specialies%20Services%20Policy%20Gender%20Servic
es%20CP21%20Approved%20120925.pdf>  (CP 21) accessed 27 October 2015, 14. 
682
 ibid. 
683
 ibid. 
684
 ibid 26. 
685
 ibid 15. 
164 
 
established in the legislation is to ensure that only ‘true’ transsexuals obtain legal 
recognition of their gender identity while excluding all others…and indeed excluding some 
who would seek to live permanently as a member of the opposite sex but, for whatever 
reason, cannot satisfy the requirements in the GRA 2004. 
 
As has been already outlined in this thesis elsewhere, and will be shown further below, 
gender identity is something which cannot be objectively measured or determined but 
rather it is the individual’s deeply held belief about himself or herself. Often the individual 
will seek to have his or her gender identity recognised by others by means of altering his or 
her body to conform to how they experience their gender as male or female or they will 
seek to have it recognised in terms of their legal identity and status or both. Therefore how 
one is seen by others and classified by the law has a huge impact on that person’s sense of 
self and mental wellbeing. The purpose of the medical approach to transsexuals is to 
ensure that the individual is able to take the steps necessary to achieve a sense of 
congruence between mind and body in whatever way is best for the patient i.e. through no 
physical treatment, through hormone treatment alone, or through a combination of 
hormone and surgical treatment; the aim is to achieve the best means of treating the 
patient, assuming that the patient’s medical condition requires, and indeed is also suitable 
for, such treatment. However the medical approach to treating the patient has to be separate 
from the process of providing legal recognition of one’s gender identity because the 
medical approach is about ensuring that no harm is done to the patient and so the NHS 
protocols and policies were never intended to form part of the process of obtaining legal 
recognition of gender identity. Whereas it may be appropriate to have gatekeepers in 
medicine to ensure that an appropriate diagnosis has been provided or funding is in place 
to pay for treatment such gatekeepers are not required in law and merely operate as a 
barrier to be overcome by the individual in their quest for recognition of their internally 
experienced sense of self as male or female. However, the legislature opted to enact a 
system which provides that medical professionals have a legal gatekeeping role by means 
of requiring that the individual obtain a diagnosis of GD at least two years prior to making 
their application for a GRC and so, although I argue that this role is unnecessary, as 
Chapter Six will show when alternative models of providing legal recognition of gender 
identity are explored, it is now necessary to show how the legal gatekeeper role of medical 
professionals operates in practice and the impact that this could have on applications for 
GRCs because in the current system there is no mechanism for an individual to assert his 
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or her own gender identity free from medical input and to seek to have this recognised by 
law and this need not be the approach taken by UK law.  
 
Why require a diagnosis of Gender Dysphoria (GD)? 
The starting point in critiquing the diagnostic requirement in the legislation is to try to 
understand why it is there. In justifying requiring a diagnosis Mr David Lammy stated that: 
 
[t]he diagnosis of a specialist is essential because a specialist will know the 
diagnosis criteria well, apply recognised standards of care and have experience of 
dealing with a range of patients—those who are certainly gender dysphoric, those 
who are borderline and those who are not gender dysphoric.
686
 
 
It is clear from the statement above that the role of the medical professional is to determine 
whether or not the patient is suffering from GD and if so whether or not he or she can be 
considered transsexual i.e. to distinguish between those who have a medical condition 
which results in their gender identity being different from that which corresponds with 
their physical sex and those who merely seek to make a lifestyle decision to change their 
legal sex. The requirement for a diagnosis is problematic because the law provides legal 
rights and protections to those who can satisfy medical professionals and not to those who 
cannot. Due to the lack of a physiological diagnostic test for GD and transsexualism, 
mental health professionals have had to devise alternative means of identifying the 
condition which are largely derived from psychiatry. As a result of the importance placed 
on the diagnosis in the legislation it is crucial to explore how the diagnostic process works. 
The psychiatrist or psychologist must diagnose the patient during the process of what is 
known as the ‘clinical interview’. 
 
Obtaining a diagnosis: the Clinical Interview 
In the clinical interview, the diagnosis is a differential one which is made by examining the 
patient’s narrative against the requirements of the diagnostic criteria in the DSM 5 and 
ICD-10 and excluding possible alternative diagnoses. In DSM 5 the diagnostic criteria for 
GD in adolescents and adults is contained in code 302.85 which provides that in order to 
diagnose there must be “[a] marked incongruence between one’s experienced/expressed 
gender and assigned gender, of at least 6 months’ duration.”687 In addition there must be 
two of the following present: 
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1. A marked incongruence between one’s experienced/expressed gender and 
primary and/or secondary sex characteristics […].688 
2. A strong desire to be rid of one’s primary and/or secondary sex characteristics 
because of a marked incongruence with one’s experienced/expressed gender 
[…].689 
3. A strong desire for the primary and/or secondary sex characteristics of the other 
gender.
690
 
4. A strong desire to be of the other gender (or some alternative gender different 
from one’s assigned gender).691 
5. A strong desire to be treated as the other gender (or some alternative gender 
different from one’s assigned gender).692 
6. A strong conviction that one has the typical feelings and reactions of the other 
gender (or some alternative gender different from one’s assigned gender).693 
 
In addition to the above it is noted that “[t]he condition is associated with clinically 
significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of 
functioning.”694 If the individual has a comorbid disorder of sexual development e.g. 
congenital adrenal hyperplasia or the like then this must be coded alongside the diagnosis 
for GD: therefore a diagnosis of a comorbid physical condition may not necessarily, 
according to the DSM 5, negate a diagnosis of GD. However, it might and for that reason 
comorbidity and paraphilias will be examined below. The thing that distinguishes GD 
patients from other gender non-conforming patients is the level of distress and impairment 
experienced by GD patients.
695
  
 
Within the ICD-10 “disorders of gender identity are classified as disorders of adult 
personality and behaviour.”696 Gender Identity Disorders are contained in diagnostic code 
F64 with F64.0 specifically addressing transsexualism. Within code F64.0 transsexualism 
is characterised by a:  
 
[d]esire to live and be accepted as a member of the opposite sex, usually 
accompanied by the wish to make one's body as congruent as possible with one's 
preferred sex through surgery and hormonal treatment.  
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This desire must be one which is persistently present for at least two years
697
 and which is 
“[n]ot a symptom of another mental disorder, such as schizophrenia, or associated with 
chromosome abnormality.”698 In addition code F.64.1 provides for a disorder labelled as 
‘Dual-role Transvestism’ which is distinct from transsexualism and is marked by 
“[w]earing clothes of the opposite sex in order to experience temporarily membership of 
the opposite sex.”699 For a diagnosis of dual-role transvestism there must be the absence of 
any sexual motivation for the cross-dressing
700
 and an absence of any desire to change 
permanently into the opposite sex.
701
 This is substantially the same as the criteria contained 
in the in DSM 5 as outlined below.  
 
As part of the diagnostic process physiological tests are carried out prior to, or indeed, 
alongside the psychological testing to determine that there is no underlying physiological 
cause for the dysphoria experienced by the patient.
702
 These physiological and 
psychological tests form part of the important diagnostic process of separating the true 
transsexual from those who cannot be so labelled but the consequence of s.2 and s.3 of the 
GRA 2004 is that this diagnostic process has the potential to impact on the individual’s 
legal rights. The medical profession is, here, concerned with differentiating between ‘true’ 
transsexuals and pseudotranssexuals – as though such a differentiation can be made. The 
true transsexual is someone whose gender identity occurs not as a result of any other 
underlying physiological or psychological medical condition or abnormality whereas the 
pseudotranssexual’s gender identity can be attributed to an underlying factor and therefore 
be said to not truly be the individual’s identity; the true transsexual is diagnosed and 
treated and can access the provisions in the GRA 2004 whereas the pseudotranssexual is 
refused a diagnosis, cannot obtain any form of treatment for GD and cannot access the 
GRA 2004 but rather he or she may be offered alternative treatment or psychological 
support the aim of which would be to treat their underlying ‘condition’. The problem is 
that there is a clear possibility of mis/non-diagnosis which will then impact on the 
individual’s ability to achieve legal rights and protections because of how the legislation 
was drafted. 
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The physiological tests which are carried out alongside the clinical interview are based on 
the premise that gender variance occurs only as a result of an abnormality of either 
physiology or psychology. This medical approach is a result of the research which was 
carried out during the twentieth century, as was outlined in Chapter One. During the 
clinical interview, the psychiatrist or psychologist may work with a “standardized patient 
interview protocol”,703 however this is not obligatory. James Barrett, Consultant 
Psychiatrist at Charing Cross Gender Identity Clinic, London provides an overview of the 
initial diagnostic interview process.
704
 He notes that generally it is useful to work through a 
set of predetermined questions which explore all facets of the patient’s life. Generally 
speaking, the goal of the clinical interview is to: 
 
document the history of the patient’s gender identity struggles from their ‘first 
awareness’, to examine their motivations for hormones and sex change, and to 
explore whether they have realistic expectations for the future.
705
  
 
It is within the patient/doctor interview where the patient’s narrative is interpreted and 
“filtered through [the doctor’s] accumulated experience and matched against [the doctor’s] 
stored memory of the transsexual phenomenon, and the diagnosis is then formulated.”706 
During this stage Barrett notes that it is important to determine whether any family 
members are “gay, cross-dress or have a gender identity disorder”707 because, he claims, 
GD/transsexualism can run in families. In addition to this, according to Barrett, if there are 
family members who are homosexual, transvestite or have GD/transsexualism then this 
may be indicative of chromosomal or hormonal abnormalities such as partial androgen 
insensitivity syndrome which need to be explored and ruled out before the patient is 
diagnosed with GD/transsexualism.  
 
As noted above there is no definitive test; rather the decision to treat the patient is often 
taken based on the ‘balance of probabilities’ principle”708 i.e. on the balance of all of the 
medical evidence from the tests carried out to identify alternative causes of the patient’s 
gender identity, the patient’s narrative and the identification of any comorbid psychiatric or 
paraphilic conditions the patient is probably suffering from GD rather than some other 
medical condition; this may be a hard test to satisfy. These comorbid and paraphilic 
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conditions need to be explored in depth as, I would argue, it is the potential for one of these 
conditions to be present which is most likely to derail the quest for a diagnosis of GD and 
disrupt the individual’s quest for legal recognition under the GRA 2004. 
 
Comorbidity 
As noted above, comorbid conditions have the potential to derail the quest for a diagnosis 
of GD/transsexualism. In 2003 á Campo et al noted that in relation to comorbidity “[t]he 
question arises as to what extent gender identity can be reliably distinguished from a cross-
gender identification that is secondary to other psychiatric disorders.”709 It is not unheard 
of for a patient to claim that he or she has GD or is transsexual when in fact he or she has a 
comorbid psychiatric disorder or physical condition which gives rise to the transsexual 
gender identity. In their study á Campo et al examined 584 reported cases of patients 
exhibiting symptoms of GD/transsexualism. They reported that: 
 
[i]n 225 (39%) of the 584 reported cases, [GD] was regarded as the primary 
diagnosis. For the remaining 359 patients (61%), cross-gender confusion occurred 
along with other psychiatric disorders, and in 270 (75%) of these 359 cases it was 
interpreted as secondary to other psychiatric illnesses.
710
 
 
In addition to the above study Hepp et al conducted a study in 2003 seeking to assess the 
correlation between GID and comorbid psychiatric conditions and found that “[l]ifetime 
psychiatric co-morbidity in GID patients is high, and this should be taken into account in 
the assessment and treatment of GID patients.”711 Although the name of the condition has 
changed this statement by Hepp et al remains true. Therefore it is crucial that those making 
the diagnosis make the correct diagnosis so as not to misdiagnose and then mistreat those 
who are not transsexual. However conversely it is crucial that those who are transsexual 
but who also might have a comorbid condition are diagnosed and treated. Before further 
exploring the issue of comorbidity it is important to determine how this term will be used 
in this chapter. In psychiatry there is debate about the usefulness of the term.
712
 The term 
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comorbidity was reportedly used for the first time by Feinstein in 1970
713
 in relation to 
general medicine whereby the patient was diagnosed as having two or more medical 
conditions existing at the same time but which may or may not be independent of each 
other.
714
 However despite the term originating in general medicine Maj argues that it: 
  
has recently become very fashionable in psychiatry to indicate not only those cases 
in which a patient receives both a psychiatric and a general medical  diagnosis […], 
but also those cases in which a patient receives two or more psychiatric 
diagnoses.
715
 
 
Maj argues that the: 
 
use of the term ‘comorbidity’ to indicate the concomitance of two or more 
psychiatric diagnoses appears incorrect because in most cases it is unclear whether 
the concomitant diagnoses actually reflect the presence of distinct clinical entities 
or refer to multiple manifestations of a single clinical entity.
716
 
 
However despite this debate on the suitability of the term, it is used in the context of 
diagnosing GD and therefore it will continue to be used in this chapter. Comorbidity in the 
context of this chapter means merely the existence of two or more psychiatric or medical 
conditions. It must be noted that in some instances the comorbidity will prohibit a 
diagnosis of GD and in some it will not. It depends largely on the condition which has been 
diagnosed alongside the GD and whether or not it can be said that the GD has been caused 
by the comorbid condition or merely exists alongside it. This is a judgement which is made 
by the medical professionals and which is based on their clinical expertise. In the 2003 
study by á Campo et al it was noted that “[o]ne hundred twenty-nine psychiatrists specified 
psychiatric comorbidity for their patients with [GD].”717 Of those psychiatric comorbidities 
identified, “[c]omorbid personality disorders were reported by 102 (79%) of the 129 
psychiatrists, major mood disorders by 34 (26%), dissociative disorders by 34 (26%), and 
psychotic disorders by 31 (24%).”718 In addition to the á Campo et al and Hepp et al 
studies, in 1960 Edgerton et al found that 71% of patients presenting for sex re-assignment 
surgery were considered to have a psychological disorder including neurosis, personality 
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disorder or psychosis.
719
 Meyer et al found that 50% of patients presenting for surgery had 
a psychological disorder and a further 46.66% expressed some tendency towards 
psychological disorder.
720
 Hoening et al reported that 70% of transsexuals have a 
coexisting psychiatric disorder.
721
 
  
One example of GD/transsexualism presenting alongside other psychiatric conditions is 
delusional pseudotranssexualism which occasionally accompanies schizophrenia. Although 
co-existence of true transsexualism and schizophrenia is unusual, it is not entirely 
unknown to the medical profession.
722
 Patient delusions regarding the need for sex re-
assignment are, according to Borras, present in 20-25% of the schizophrenic population.
723
 
The problem is that the medical professionals have to ensure that the schizophrenic patient 
is in fact truly transsexual as well as schizophrenic rather than presenting as transsexual as 
a result of delusional pseudotranssexualism derived from schizophrenia: the primary 
condition in this case. It would be inappropriate to diagnose such a patient with GD 
because the condition is merely a manifestation of a delusion caused by another psychiatric 
condition. The true transsexual who is diagnosed with schizophrenia may be denied 
recognition of their gender identity because of the belief that the desire to change one’s 
body is a common facet of schizophrenia which occasionally results in male patients 
attempting self-castration.
724
 Bower argues that in schizophrenic patients: 
 
delusions of belonging to the other sex are mistakenly thought to occur rarely. In 
my experience, schizophrenic patients presenting behind a mask of gender 
dysphoria not uncommonly apply for surgery.
725
 
 
Psychiatrists have to rely on their expertise and experience to diagnose such patients 
accurately. The issue is that á Campo et al determined that “[i]n about half of the cases that 
were reported, cross-gender confusion was regarded as an epiphenomenon of other 
illnesses.”726 Therefore in about half of the reported cases the transsexual identity 
professed by the patient was considered to be caused by a comorbid condition. This in 
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itself presents difficulties for those diagnosing the patient. Although the law is concerned 
with providing access to rights and recognition of one’s gender identity the medical 
profession is concerned with providing treatment and care to these individuals. Once the 
issue of comorbid conditions has been considered and ruled out by the diagnosing clinician 
then it becomes necessary to explore whether the transsexual identity is a manifestation of 
a paraphilia. 
 
Paraphilias 
The DSM-IV distinguished between what could be termed ‘classic transsexualism’ and 
non-classic transsexualism’, the difference being the presence or absence of paraphilias 
and this stance is maintained in the DSM 5. Although GD/transsexualism is not per se a 
paraphilia, certain paraphilias may present as GD/transsexualism and, as with comorbid 
psychiatric conditions or comorbid physiological conditions it is important that the 
diagnosing clinician correctly assesses the patient’s narrative because, as with comorbidity 
the presence of a paraphilia may or may not preclude a diagnosis of GD/transsexualism: if 
the transsexual identity can be said to be an epiphenomenon of the paraphilia then no 
diagnosis of GD/transsexualism should be given, if however the transsexual identity 
merely co-exists with the paraphilia then this ought not preclude a diagnosis. 
 
The ICD-10 is silent as to paraphilias and their impact on a diagnosis of transsexualism in 
code F64. However subsequent diagnostic codes indicate that paraphilias may need to be 
considered by the diagnosing clinicians. Code F65 deals with, what are termed, disorders 
of sexual preference which can be identified by “[r]ecurrent intense sexual urges and 
fantasies involving unusual objects or activities”727 whereby the individual acts on these 
urges and fantasies or is “markedly distressed by them”728 and which have been present for 
at least six months.
729
 Disorders of sexual preference in the ICD-10 include fetishism 
(including fetishistic transvestism), exhibitionism, voyeurism, paedophilia and 
sadomasochism. However for the purpose of this chapter it is the disorder of sexual 
preference labelled fetishistic transvestism which will be focussed on because it is this 
sexual preference which might prevent an individual being diagnosed with transsexualism. 
According to Arcelus and Bouman: 
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[t]he fetishistic transvestite is a man (probably never a woman) who wears female 
clothes as fetish objects. The clothes are sexually arousing and wearing them 
usually leads to masturbation.
730
 
 
This is reflected in the ICD-10 where,  in addition to the general requirements of code F65, 
outlined above, being present the individual will be diagnosed with fetishistic transvestism 
if:   
[t]he wearing of articles or clothing of the opposite sex in order to create the 
appearance and feeling of being a member of the opposite sex and the cross-
dressing is closely associated with sexual arousal.
731
  
 
For fetishistic transsexuals the desire to cross-dress is purely sexual and is characterised by 
the fact that “[o]nce orgasm occurs and sexual arousal declines, there is a strong desire to 
remove the clothing.”732 Therefore, if a patient describes feelings of being aroused in the 
clothing of the sex opposite to his birth sex then he is likely to be considered to be 
describing transvestic fetishism rather than GD and such a declaration is likely to lead to a 
denial of GD. 
 
In addition to transvestic fetishism in the ICD-10, the diagnostic criteria in the DSM 5 
provide for a condition called transvestic disorder which is very similar to fetishistic 
transvestism contained in ICD-10. The DSM 5 criteria defines transvestic disorder as 
behaviour which: 
  
occurs in heterosexual (or bisexual) adolescent males (rarely in females) for whom 
cross-dressing behaviour generates sexual excitement and causes distress and/or 
impairment without drawing their primary gender into question.
733
 
 
This is considered to be, therefore, a paraphilic disorder and one of the conditions of 
diagnosing transvestic disorder is that it must be specified whether it is accompanied with 
fetishism
734
 or with autogynephilia.
735
 So the DSM 5 makes it clear that the patient cannot 
obtain a diagnosis of GD if he is exhibiting evidence of autogynaephilia, which is defined 
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as “love of oneself as a woman”736 and occurs when the individual imagines himself as 
female, resulting in sexual arousal. This paraphilia may not be as rare as first appears, 
Bower argues that: 
 
[a]dults with gender identity disorder are at times sexually aroused by their cross-
dressing activity and engage in masturbation. Decades ago this occurrence almost 
disqualified him or her from a diagnosis of transsexualism.
737
 
 
A number of transsexual individuals may fall within this category and as such may not 
receive medical intervention. Individuals who exhibit any form of paraphilic behaviour 
which could be deemed to have ‘caused’ the transsexual identity are deemed unsuitable for 
diagnosis, notwithstanding that the transsexual’s only means of arousal may be by 
imagining himself as a woman and by dressing as a woman, so it is arguable that it may 
not be appropriate always to deny a diagnosis of GD to individuals who exhibit this form 
of behaviour. Blanchard and Clemmensen are highly critical of the diagnostic criteria 
which treat transsexualism and paraphilia as mutually exclusive, suggesting that human 
sexuality is more complex than conceptualised in the DSM. Blanchard and Clemmensen’s 
study suggests that the presence of paraphilia ought not to preclude treatment for GD
738
 
nevertheless the diagnostic manuals make it clear that paraphilic behaviour which could be 
deemed to ‘cause’ the transsexual identity preclude a diagnosis of GD/transsexualism and 
therefore have the ability to deny these individuals legal recognition of their gender 
identity under the GRA 2004. 
 
The interpretation of the criteria established for diagnosing a patient in the DSM-5 and the 
ICD-10, and therefore whether or not the patient’s narrative matches the diagnostic criteria, 
are largely open to the discretion of the diagnosing medical professional. If, in the opinion 
of the psychiatrist or psychologist, the patient matches the diagnostic criteria then he or she 
can be diagnosed as transsexual.  Therefore the diagnosing clinician has a powerful 
gatekeeper role to play in the process of diagnosis. This then means that the first step in the 
process of legal recognition, obtaining a diagnosis, is crucial but uncertain as it is based on 
how the individual presents himself to the diagnosing physician and how that physician 
interprets the individual’s story in line with an expected narrative which meets the DSM 5 
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or ICD-10 diagnostic criteria: there is little room for individuality within the diagnostic 
process and therefore this is an area of concern in the resultant GRA 2004. If the medical 
aspect of transsexualism and the legal aspect of providing legal recognition of one’s gender 
identity were not so connected as they are in the GRA 2004 then the issue of comorbidity 
and paraphilias would be less important. A model of gender identity recognition which 
does not rely on the medical model of transsexualism as its basis will be proposed in the 
following chapter. This alternative model will be called the self-declaration model and will 
be outlined in detail in Chapter Six. The strength of this alternative model is that it does not 
rely on the individual obtaining a diagnosis of GD prior to seeking legal recognition of 
their gender identity and therefore does not require individuals to navigate the medical 
diagnostic process which comes with the detailed examination of the patient’s life because 
the assumption underlying the self-declaration model would be that the individual himself 
or herself is best placed to know whether they identify as male or female. The question of 
how the law then ensures that only true transsexuals are able to align their gender identity 
with their legal sex is rendered unimportant because there is no need in the self-declaration 
model to distinguish between those who suffer as a result of a medical condition and those 
who seek to make a lifestyle choice based on how they perceive themselves; this will be 
returned to in the following chapter where it can be explored in more detail. However, at 
this point because the legal approach in the UK is very much dependent upon the medical 
professionals ‘getting it right’ at this stage in the process, the issue of comorbidity and 
paraphilia cannot be ignored.  
 
Problems with basing legal rights and protections on clinical decision 
making 
Medically the requirement for diagnosis is crucial but legally it is not. Within the 
legislation there is no need to undergo body modifications and there is no ban on making 
subsequent applications should the individual’s sense of self as male or female change. It 
would therefore appear that the legislation is confused; it has taken aspects of the medical 
model of transsexualism and incorporated them into the process of providing legal 
recognition of one’s gender identity but in so doing it has created a much more difficult 
process than was required. The desire to ensure that subsequent applications could be made 
to the GRP and the fact that there is no need to undergo any form of body modification 
show that on the one hand the legislation was seeking to ensure that lifestyle choices 
regarding gender identity could not impact on legal status and this was achieved by means 
of adding in the role of the medical profession but on the other the legislation appears to 
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take a very progressive approach to gender identity by acknowledging that how one 
identifies and how one presents oneself to others need not correspond and may change over 
time.  
 
One of the main problems with the legislation, as has been argued, is the requirement for a 
diagnosis which, as is clear from the discussion above, is not an easy process and there are 
a number of instances at which the individual may be prevented from achieving the 
required diagnosis: by not being referred to specialist services if living in England, Wales 
or Northern Ireland; by not being able to access specialist services once referred or if self-
referring due to the lack of specialist services in the UK. Even assuming the patient has 
been able to access GICs and get an appointment with a specialist, he or she may still be 
prevented from obtaining the diagnosis required by the GRA 2004 because his or her 
narrative may not meet that which the medical professional expects to hear or he or she 
may be diagnosed with alternative medical conditions, psychiatric conditions or 
paraphilias. Each of these stages represent the point at which a third party has the legal 
ability to prevent an individual from being able to assert his or her identity in law because 
without the diagnosis an application for a GRC cannot succeed. What is interesting in this 
is that the way that clinical decision making of the medical professionals would be 
exercised was never examined by the legislature during the debate stage of the GRB; it was 
merely accepted throughout the debates that the medical profession was best placed to 
make these decisions in relation to whether or not an individual has a diagnosable medical 
condition. That seems like a sensible approach to take until one begins to examine the 
medical profession’s degree of acceptance of and interaction with patients who claim to be 
transsexual, the knowledge and understanding of medical professionals in relation to 
gender identity and transsexualism, and also how medical professionals make their 
decisions in clinical matters. The Whittle et al report mentioned above covered the issue of 
medical professionals’ interaction with transsexual patients so it is not unknown that 
patients feel that they are not supported or believed by their GPs when initially presenting 
to them as transsexual. This has an impact, particularly in England, Wales and Northern 
Ireland, in relation to being referred to a specialist service. In addition, although patients in 
Scotland are protected from this stage by being able to self-refer to a GIC the patient must 
first know that he or she does not need to be referred by his or her GP and also the patient 
must be in a position to self-refer. Given that there are only two specialist centres in 
Scotland, both in the central belt, which provide services for gender variant patients then 
this in itself presents a barrier to many individuals. The issue of non-specialist medical 
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professionals not understanding transsexualism is also a problem if it relates to whether or 
not an individual is referred on for specialist diagnosis and treatment. One of the major 
difficulties with the law giving such a strong gatekeeper role to the medical profession 
relates to the issue of clinical decision making by those medical professionals particularly 
where transsexualism and gender variance are not routinely covered in medical school 
curricula and nor is clinical decision making itself. Literature suggests that there is little 
time spent on teaching clinical decision making in the medical school curricula but rather 
these skills are learned ‘on the job’.739 This has an impact for the rights and protections of 
individuals seeking to have the law recognise their gender identity because there is little 
ability to challenge the clinical decision making of a medical professional if it relates to a 
clinical matter i.e. a diagnosis of a viable alternative comorbid condition which leaves the 
individual in a position of not being able to assert their identity in law;
740
 this, I argue, is 
far too uncertain a foundation upon which to base legal recognition of gender identity. 
 
Gatekeeping by the Gender Recognition Panel (GRP) 
In addition to the legislation creating a strong gatekeeper role for medical professionals 
prior to the individual even accessing the GRA 2004, the Act also adds another 
gatekeeping layer by ensuring that the GRP itself has a gatekeeper role to play by giving 
the GRP a screening function
741
 which is not clearly articulated in the legislation itself but 
which is evidenced by Lord Chan’s statement that:  
 
[w]e need to be absolutely clear that the right people, who are absolutely convinced 
of the way forward, would be those who applied and were screened carefully by the 
panel in order that they may be given the certificate.
742
 
 
It is evident then at the outset of the debates on the GRB that the role of the GRP was to 
act as the gatekeepers of ‘true’ transsexual applicants versus those seeking to change legal 
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sex on a whim. The careful screening role of the GRP was also backed by Lord Filkin who 
stated that the change of sex is dependent not solely upon the wishes of the applicant but 
on “the tests set out in the Bill being met and tested by the panel.”743 Therefore it is clear 
that the first hurdle to be overcome by the applicant seeking legal recognition of their 
gender identity is to ensure that he or she provides suitable evidence to the panel which 
will scrutinise the application. A fundamental misunderstanding of the reasons for seeking 
a GRC, and indeed mistrust, of gender dysphoria and transsexuals was evident in the 
Grand Committee’s debate on the role of the GRP. Lord Cobbold seemed quite concerned 
that this Bill would enable individuals to obtain same sex marriages. He asked whether 
Lord Filkin was “confident that the Bill, as it stands, does not open the door to same sex 
marriage?”744 After some discussion he then stated that “it seems to me that there is a 
possibility of fraudulent application to go through the process in order to achieve a same-
sex marriage.”745  
 
Lord Filkin responded that, essentially, the role of the panel is to determine, by means of 
the tests set out in the legislation, the true transsexual from the fraudulent individual who 
sought to use the legislation for his or her own ends to circumvent marriage laws and other 
laws. Lord Filkin noted that:  
 
there is a possibility of fraud in most areas of public life. However, one would 
expect the process that the panel was going through would be designed to reduce 
the likelihood of that, because there has to be a diagnosis and evidence.
746
 
 
This discussion of the role of the panel in the debates may be seen as mirroring that of the 
development of the role of the medical professional in medical practice in determining 
whether or not the patient is truly transsexual or has another reason for their behaviour and 
desire, as discussed in detail above. An interesting point was made by Dr Harris during the 
second sitting of the Standing Committee where the Committee was debating the type of 
membership required for the panel. He noted that it was wise that the panel not be over-
medicalised but that lay members may not be the best way of achieving this.  Instead he 
continued that:  
it would be better to say that medical members must not be too old-fashioned and 
consider the issue narrowly. Although I am sure that there is still some way to go, I 
hope that medics will not do that.
747
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Therefore there was acknowledgment during the debates on the GRB that there is not 
always particularly great understanding of transsexualism even from within members of 
the medical profession. As medical members are required to sit on the GRP, there exists 
the possibility that panel members, through their lack of understanding of transsexualism, 
could deem that an individual does not meet the requirements set out in the legislation to 
be able to obtain a GRC.  These comments would seem to be reflected in the available 
literature which examines medical professionals’ knowledge and understanding of gender 
dysphoria mentioned above. As there is such strong potential for the GRP to deny an 
individual’s application and, as concerns have been raised in this thesis about the 
gatekeeping role of the GRP, it is now important to explore the legislative requirements of 
which the GRP must be satisfied before a GRC can be issued. 
 
The requirement to have lived for two years in acquired gender 
In addition to the requirement for a diagnosis outlined above the law also requires that an 
individual has lived in the acquired gender for a period of two years.
748
  Whether or not the 
person has successfully achieved this will be determined, again, by the medical 
professionals involved in patient care but the panel must also be satisfied by the evidence 
provided that the individual has achieved this. One small problem with this is that 
immediately upon diagnosis the individual cannot apply for legal recognition of their 
gender identity. However a much larger problem is how one evidences that one has lived in 
the acquired gender for two years; what it actually means to live in the acquired gender 
(where one does not have to change one’s body or appear physically to be a member of the 
opposite sex) and the discretion available to the panel when scrutinising the individual’s 
life over the previous two years. 
 
During the debates on this provision Baroness Buscombe stated that she: 
 
should be grateful if the Minister would explain precisely what that will entail. 
How strictly will an individual have to abide by that requirement before they are 
issued with a full gender recognition certificate? For example, where there are 
small children involved who may not be old enough to understand the process 
which their father or mother is going through, would the applicant be allowed 
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flexibility in the extent to which they live in their acquired gender for the sake of 
the child?
749
 
 
The debate was interesting because it focussed on the practicalities of living in the acquired 
gender for a period of two years. Baroness Buscombe asked: 
 
[w]ould a pre-certificate applicant be expected to change in the changing rooms of 
their birth or acquired gender? What evidence would be sufficient to prove that an 
applicant had not fulfilled the criteria of living in the acquired gender for two 
years?
750
 
 
This raised the issue of the burden that the legislation was placing on the individuals and 
indeed the difficult task of the panel in determining whether or not the applicant could be 
said to have lived in the acquired gender or not. If the panel is not satisfied that the 
applicant has so lived then it is justified in rejecting the application. This would leave the 
applicant with a minimum wait of six months until he or she can reapply for a GRC,
751
 
although in reality the wait is likely to be longer because if the applicant cannot satisfy the 
panel that he or she is living in the acquired gender by the date of the initial application 
then he or she would be unlikely to satisfy the panel of the same requirement a mere six 
months later. This provision, and concomitant gatekeeper role of the GRP, highlights 
another aspect of how difficult it is for those seeking legal recognition in the UK. Baroness 
Buscombe drew attention to the practical difficulties faced by applicants during the debates 
when she stated: 
 
we need to understand to what extent these individuals are able to carry out their 
daily lives in a discreet way but at the same time meet the criteria required in order 
to satisfy the panel that they have lived according to those criteria. Much impinges 
upon the word "lived" in the Bill.
752
 
 
On addressing the issues raised by Baroness Buscombe Lord Filkin reassured parliament 
that “[t]he criteria for recognition of gender change […] are not in a sense set by the 
government as a set of hurdles to be leapt over.”753 However, it would be very difficult to 
agree with him based on an analysis of the legislation and the complete debates as the 
provisions in the GRA 2004 make the criteria for recognition seem very much like hurdles 
to be overcome by applicants. Lord Filkin stated that one of the purposes of the criteria is 
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that it provides “evidence of the commitment to want to live in the relevant gender in the 
future.”754 By making this comment Lord Filkin was underlining the fact that the 
legislation is based on permanence and commitment to a binary model of gender whereby 
the individual identifies as either male or female and seeks to have that reinforced and 
recognised by law. He continued: 
 
I believe that it seems right to many—it certainly seems so to the Government—
that one would certainly expect a person who was genuinely committed to wanting 
to live in that new gender for the rest of their life to demonstrate the reality of that 
by living that gender in the here and now. It is not like opting for a change of 
clothes; it is a matter of believing at heart that there is something incongruous in 
one's birth gender and wanting to bring into alignment as far as one can the totality 
of one's life. The matter should not be interpreted as the Government saying, "You 
must live this life". Transsexuals who believe passionately that they want to be 
fully recognised will already be in this position. They will be living their lives in 
the way that I have described. They will have acted in that way in the totality of 
their lives. All the panel is doing is checking to see that there is evidence of that. I 
cannot fully second-guess how exactly it will inspect that process. However, I 
would expect it to undertake that process seriously to check that the relevant 
criteria had been complied with. The test in the legislation exists for a purpose; it is 
not a minor issue.
755
 
 
The two year period contained in s.2(1)(b) may seem to be arbitrary but it has such a 
potential impact on the applicant’s ability to have his or her gender identity recognised in 
law that it requires to be examined in depth. The Lord Bishop of Winchester attempted to 
link the two year period in the GRA 2004 with the then two year period in the World 
Professional Association for Transgender Health’s Standards of Care. He stated: 
 
[m]y understanding is that this is something to do with the Benjamin protocols or 
the Benjamin rules or whatever and that consultants working in this field are 
responsible and follow that kind of code and will themselves supervise the matter 
in a thoroughly responsible way.
756
 
 
It should be noted that although at the time of the GRB debates the SOC provided that 
patients must live as members of the opposite sex for two years before any irreversible 
medical interventions could be provided. This has subsequently changed to one year in 
version 7 of the SOC, issued in 2011.
757
 The attempt by the Lord Bishop of Winchester to 
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link the legal requirement with medical practice was backed by Lord Carlile of Berriew 
who stated that: 
 
the criteria that are set out in Clause 2(1)(b) are applied in gender reassignment 
clinics as a prerequisite to surgical treatment. Therefore, for a change, the test in 
law will be similar to the medical test that is applied. Would that we had so many 
consistencies between the law and medicine, for example, in the law of provocation 
for diminished responsibility in relation to homicide. However, we do not have that 
consistency and the law and medicine frequently have to apply quite different 
criteria. In this case they will be the same and that is useful.
758
 
 
However, not only is this a fundamentally flawed argument as law and medicine are 
attempting to do two completely different things in relation to transsexual individuals, it 
has also been undermined by the developments from within medicine, which will be 
outlined in depth towards the end of this chapter, which now call into question the validity 
of the medical model of transsexualism within the GRA 2004. The two year period in 
medicine was there to ensure that no irreversible medical procedures had been carried out 
until the patient was ready to undertake them.
759
 The two year period in law does not need 
to be there as there are no irreversible consequences of obtaining a GRC, given that further 
applications may be made to change one’s legal sex. The comment by the Lord Bishop of 
Winchester evidences a fundamental confusion regarding the separation of legal and 
medical approaches in relation to transsexual individuals. The provision in the GRA 2004 
regarding the two years will not be examined by consultants but rather by the GRP. It may 
well be that the applicant will be able to provide medical evidence to support that they 
have lived in the acquired gender for two years but this is not something that medical 
professionals are obliged to provide because the RLE is now limited to one year as per the 
SOC but also because it only relates to those seeking to modify their bodies by means of 
surgery. The provisions in the SOC, regarding the RLE as noted above, are to ensure that 
the patient is ready for irreversible medical procedures and in no way amounts to a 
decision about the individual’s identity as this has already been determined by means of 
the diagnostic process, whereas the two year provision in the GRA 2004 has the power to 
very much make judgment on the individual’s identity. In addition to the SOC requiring a 
period of time before irreversible medical interventions are provided to the patient, thereby 
attempting to safeguard against harming the patient the SOC also exist to protect the 
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medical profession from claims of negligence which may arise from providing treatment 
when the patient is not ready for it. So, the attempt to collate the two year waiting period, 
as it existed in medicine, with a similar provision in the GRA 2004 is flawed; it was flawed 
in 2004 because of a misunderstanding of why the two year period existed in the SOC and 
it is further flawed now in 2015 because developments within medical practice, which will 
be discussed below, highlight problems with basing the legislation on the medical model of 
transsexualism. 
 
Albeit that the two year period is flawed it remains a part of the law and therefore how the 
panel will determine whether or not the applicant meets the requirements of this provision 
needs to be examined. Sandland makes some interesting points on this requirement in 
s.2(1)(b). He notes that the fact that the GRA 2004 does not require body modification 
prior to obtaining legal recognition raises a particular problem. Sandland considers the 
example of an FTM transsexual who undergoes no endocrine or surgical intervention but 
who applies for and obtains a GRC and therefore becomes legally male. Should this person 
then marry a woman, as he would be legally entitled to do, this would have the outward 
appearance, to third parties, of a same-sex marriage as both individuals would be 
physically, but not legally, female which, during the debates on the Bill, the Lords and 
Commons were at pains to avoid.
760
 However Sandland furthers this analysis by noting that 
the FTM transsexual who has not undergone any form of body modification retains the 
ability to become pregnant and to give birth to a child which as Lord Tebbit noted during 
the debates he could “see no better test of whether a person is female than that.”761 Lord 
Tebbit’s statement is rendered invalid by the GRA 2004 because within the legislation 
there exists the possibility that a legal male could give birth to a child. The possibility, as a 
result of the legislation, is that the UK could see male mothers and female fathers due to 
the fact that legal males can carry and give birth to children and legal females can 
biologically father children because of there is no requirement that applicants for GRCs 
undergo sterilisation. The fact that the legislation allows a legal male to become pregnant 
and give birth to a child becomes complex but is worth exploring as it shows the absurdity 
of what it actually means to ‘live in the acquired gender for two years’. Sandland argues 
that “[i]t might be objected that an FTM transsexual who continued to engage in sexual 
activity as a female would not satisfy the criteria for recognition.”762 Now the link between 
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the examples given by Sandland is not obvious: becoming pregnant and giving birth is not 
necessarily linked to engaging “in sexual activity as a female”763 because the child may be 
conceived by means other than sexual activity. However, where the child is conceived by 
means of sexual activity then this would give rise to the scenario which Sandland identified 
and raises the following question: is someone who is physically female, but who identifies 
as male, and who engages in heterosexual sexual intercourse with a biological male 
engaging in sexual intercourse as a female or as a male identified female bodied 
person…and indeed how would the GPR interpret this as per the requirement to live in the 
acquired gender for two years? Sandland continues that where this should occur:  
 
[i]n particular it might be thought that such a person, even if suffering from gender 
dysphoria, could not be said to have “lived in the acquired gender throughout the 
period of two years ending with the date on which the application is made.
764
 
 
Sandland’s argument is correct because he continues that if the only evidence that one has 
not lived in the acquired gender for a period of two years ending with the date on which the 
application is made is the individual’s sexual practices “then that is poor evidence”.765 He 
notes that gender identity and sexual orientation are not linked so if the applicant opts not 
to modify his or her body and uses their non-modified body to engage in sexual practices 
and derive sexual pleasure then this is not evidence that the individual has not lived in the 
acquired gender for two years. Although the transsexual individuals in all of the case law 
before the UK courts and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) identified as 
heterosexual it remains the case that not all transsexual individuals so identify: transsexual 
sexual orientation is just as diverse as within the non-transsexual community.
766
 As 
Sandland argues of his FTM example “[i]t is perfectly possible that an individual might 
self-identify as male but possess female genitalia and have sexual intercourse with a 
man.”767 This should not amount to evidence that the individual has not lived in the 
acquired gender for the appropriate amount of time prior to making the application. So, on 
a basic level how this requirement is evidenced when the applicant has opted not to alter 
his or her body remains uncertain.  
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The requirement to intend to live in acquired gender until death 
This requirement exists in s.2(1)(c) of the GRA 2004 and highlights the concerns some 
members of the Lords and Commons had with the permanence and certainty of recognising 
gender identity in UK law. The requirement was heavily debated during pre-legislative 
scrutiny of the Bill. How the GRP were to assess the intention to live permanently in the 
acquired gender caused an issue particularly where the individual does not change his or 
her body in any way. The Hansard records, however, can be useful here because although 
the legislation does not require any body modification it is clear from the Hansard records 
that Parliament intended that where body modification could be undertaken there ought to 
be a good reason for the individual not undertaking such procedures. Lord Filkin stated 
that:  
 
in cases where the person has not had surgery we would expect the panel not to 
treat that as prima facie evidence that there was doubt, but at least to question why 
surgery had not taken place. It might, just possibly might, have a bearing on the 
seriousness of the intent.
768
 
 
It would seem clear then that where the individual has had the opportunity to undergo body 
modification and has not done so then he or she will find it particularly difficult to 
convince the panel that he or she intends to live permanently in the acquired gender. 
 
A related issue, that of being able to ‘change one’s mind’ following obtaining a GRC, was 
considered in the House of Lords where amendment 42 was proposed. This amendment 
would have inserted a clause into the Bill regarding those who initially received a full GRC 
but who then wished to revert to the gender assigned at birth. Although ultimately 
withdrawn this proposed amendment intended to insert a new clause which would have 
stated that: 
 
(1) [w]here a successful applicant subsequently changes his or her mind, or decides 
a mistake has been made, and wishes to resume his or her original birth gender, 
a further application must be made to the Gender Recognition Panel for the 
issue of a further gender recognition certificate in the resumed gender 
(2) […] 
(3) Only one reversal of an original decision made by the Panel may be 
permitted.
769
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During the debate surrounding this proposed amendment Baroness O’Cathain implied that 
the issue of transsexual individuals ‘changing their minds’ was a regular occurrence. She 
stated:  
 
[t]he problem is well documented of the many people who have gone through the 
process of gender recognition and who have come to the decision that they want to 
reverse the situation. They may do that for all sorts of reasons—because they have 
been badly advised; because they have come to their senses, as they would say 
themselves; or because they recognise that a very big mistake has been made. After 
all our discussions today, I suspect that the full import of what they had decided to 
do hit them afterwards, when they realised the implications for their extended 
family and all their social circle. The net result is that there are people who have 
wished to reverse the procedure.
770
 
 
As noted above amendment 42 proposed that there should be a limit on the number of 
times a person can apply to have his or her gender identity recognised. Baroness O’Cathain 
stated that: 
 
if a gender recognition certificate has been issued and the person is no longer of the 
gender into which he or she was born, there must be some block on their being able 
to change their minds again and again, so they do not go chopping and changing at 
whim. I suggest that, under the amendment, we should agree that they can change, 
but change only once.
771
 
 
The fear that transsexual individuals might ‘chop and change at whim’ relates back to the 
fact that there needs to be no body modification prior to obtaining a GRC and therefore 
people might choose to change legal sex based on a lifestyle decision and not a medical 
condition. Despite Baroness O’Cathain’s assertions, her fears do not appear to be reflected 
in the literature. The majority of the literature related to this idea of ‘changing one’s mind’ 
examines the feelings of post-operative individuals in relation to their sex re-assignment 
surgery and so therefore is not on point. However, in 1993 Pfäfflin reported that no FTM 
transsexuals and only 1-1.5% of MTF transsexuals reported regret following sex re-
assignment.
772
 In 1997 Cohen-Kettenis and van Goozen reported that no participants in 
their study regretted their sex re-assignment surgery either.
773
 The same result was reported 
by Lawrence in 2003 when she found that none of the 232 participants in her study 
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reported overall regret and only a few patients reported occasional regret.
774
 Although 
therefore regret following sex re-assignment surgery may exist the majority of individuals 
who undertake these medical procedures appear to be satisfied with the outcome and 
therefore clearly do not want to revert to their birth sex. These are small scale studies and 
only those who had modified their bodies were interviewed and therefore may not be 
indicative of those who had changed legal sex without changing their bodies. However, the 
limitations of these studies aside, they show that the majority of transsexuals are satisfied 
with body modification and do not seek to revert back indicating that the fear expressed 
during the debates about individuals choosing to chop and change gender on a whim are 
largely misplaced and show a misunderstanding of those who would seek to use this 
legislation. These proposals by Baroness O’Cathain indicate poor understanding of 
transsexual individuals’ needs and experiences. Transsexual individuals, those covered by 
the legislation, desire to be seen as and accepted as members of the opposite sex and 
almost never ‘change their minds’.  
 
Therefore there must be a reason for the legislation adopting this requirement and, as 
mentioned above, the Hansard records would indicate that the intention of permanence 
requirement is about ensuring certainty of legal sex. However, Sandland argues that this 
requirement is intended to separate “the ‘lifers’ from the rest”775 and he has a valid point. 
In 2010 Grabham
776
 argued that the intention of permanence requirement in the GRA 
2004: 
 
fits with an administrative or bureaucratic logic that prioritizes permanence and 
stability. Within this logic, if citizens are to ‘change gender’, then this transition 
should be final, irreversible, and sanctioned by the state through applicants meeting 
a number of pre-agreed criteria.
777
 
 
For Grabham this requirement is at odds with the work of queer theorists and some 
feminist theorists who argue that gender is fluid
778
 and so the legislation imposes on 
transsexual individuals requirements which are not imposed upon non-transsexual citizens 
which is accurate and indeed is the purpose of the legislation. However a problem with 
Grabham’s analysis in this context is that the GRA 2004 seeks to only provide legal 
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recognition of gender identity which is based on a binary model of gender i.e. one is either 
male or female. The binary model of gender is the one inherent in UK law, and indeed I 
cannot identify any jurisdiction which does not base laws on a binary model of gender. It 
could therefore be argued that this ‘bureaucratic logic, as Grabham calls it, achieves what 
is required by such a legal system: one can identify as they choose but if they require legal 
recognition of this identification then there must be a means of regulating the conditions by 
which this recognition will be given. Grabham continues: 
 
[t]he moment of recognition is a gender ‘arrival’, intelligible within citizenship 
discourse as a point of inclusion and accession, but it could also be viewed as a 
gender fixing. It requires trans citizens to perform (and produce) gender 
permanence in a way that non-trans citizens are not required to do.
779
 
 
Grabham’s concerns are valid but also difficult to reconcile with how the law operates in 
the UK: the GRA 2004 has a particular model of gender hidden within its supposedly 
emancipatory and inclusive provisions as evidenced by the permanence requirement. This 
permanence requirement excludes those individuals whose gender identity is not fixed and 
stable and seeks to ensure that only those who obtain legal recognition are those who are 
willing to accept gender as binary and to ascribe to that model for their lives, as Sandland 
states the GRA 2004 “can be read as a case study demonstrating the truism that any act of 
inclusion also excludes.”780 Sandland argues this point also: he states that within the 
legislation “it is certainly the case that an individual defined as gender dysphoric who does 
not intend to cross and live in an acquired gender for life falls outside the legal regime of 
recognition”781 and this is becoming more problematic as the medical model develops 
beyond the state of understanding which existed in 2003/04. As will be shown below the 
medical model of transsexualism continues to develop and now the diagnosis of GD which 
is contained in DSM 5 allows for a much wider understanding of gender. Currently within 
DSM 5 it is possible to obtain a diagnosis of GD if one’s experience of gender is also non-
binary or fluid thereby moving considerably beyond the binary understanding of gender 
which underpinned DSM IV and consequently the GRA 2004.  
 
Despite this concern the GRA 2004 actually does not prohibit individuals from making 
subsequent applications to the gender recognition panel to revert to their original gender. It 
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is therefore possible for an individual to make an application to the GRP for a GRC which 
will be granted if he or she satisfies the requirements in the legislation. The individual can 
then make another application at a later date which would, if granted, effectively return the 
individual to the legal sex registered on birth. However this is not a right of reversal in any 
sense: the individual once again applies to the GRP on the basis that his or her gender 
identity is not congruent with his or her legal sex and must once again meet the 
requirements in the legislation regarding diagnosis and the provision of evidence i.e. they 
must be re-diagnosed as suffering from GD and as having lived in the other gender for two 
years. The GRP must also be satisfied that the applicant intends to remain in the new 
acquired (or in this case original) gender until death, albeit that there is no means of legally 
ensuring that the individual does so. It may be suggested that it would be more difficult to 
satisfy the GRP of the latter requirement given a change of mind after obtaining a GRC.  
 
The requirement to provide any other evidence as required by the 
GRP 
The GRA 2004 s.3(6) provides that the panel can request further information and evidence 
prior to making its determination. Cowan briefly anticipated this issue in 2009 when 
considering how the GRP would determine applications by those who had not undergone 
any body modification.
 782
 The idea being presented by Cowan was that those who could 
not, or who chose not to, undergo body modification might be thought of as less committed 
to living permanently as a member of the acquired gender as discussed above, and 
therefore would be required to provide additional evidence to the GRP. Cowan developed 
this argument and noted that it might well be that those who could not undergo such 
procedures on medical grounds may be treated more favourably by the GRP than those 
who chose not to change their bodies because the choice to not alter one’s body “renders 
their transsexual status suspect.”783 She observed that those who chose not to change their 
body: 
 
could well be regarded with scepticism by the GRP because it might be thought that 
any ‘real’ and committed transsexual person, who shows that they have for two 
years lived in the gender opposite to that associated with their birth sex – and who 
signs a legal declaration that they intend to continue to do so for life – would be 
willing to undergo ‘necessary’ physical surgical changes in order to have their body 
properly ‘match’ their mind.784  
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Cowan argued that in order to guarantee being granted a GRC the applicant needs to show 
that he or she fits with the model of gender identity and transsexualism which has been 
wholly medicalised as outlined in Chapter One i.e. that the desire to live as a member of 
the opposite sex is not a mere lifestyle choice but rather driven by “a psychological need, a 
medical condition, that can only be remedied by medical intervention – therapy and 
(usually) surgery.”785 Therefore those who depart from the accepted medicalisation of 
gender identity and transsexualism are likely to find it more difficult to obtain legal 
recognition of their gender identity: to a certain extent there is an onus placed on the 
applicant who has not undergone or is not planning on undergoing body modification to 
prove that he or she is truly transsexual and this may create a hierarchy of applicants with 
those who have undergone treatment placed higher than those who have not. However 
those who have not undergone treatment can, according to Cowan, be further categorised 
into those who cannot undergo treatment and those who choose not to. She noted “[i]f 
surgery is not involved, it is likely that only those who cannot rather than those who 
choose not to have surgery will be given legal recognition.”786  
 
Cowan’s observations in 2009 that those who had not undergone nor were they planning 
on undergoing body modification would find it difficult to satisfy the GRP have proven 
accurate. The recent case of Carpenter v Secretary of State for Justice
787
 has raised specific 
questions about the role of the GRP and s.3(6) of the GRA 2004. In Carpenter the 
applicant was an MTF transsexual who, on 12 May 2011, applied to the GRP for a GRC. 
She submitted the required medical evidence but the panel requested further information, 
as is their right, under s.3(6)(c). The panel sought information in relation to surgical 
procedures which the applicant had undergone and this information was duly provided by 
the surgeon who had treated the applicant. The applicant appealed against what she 
claimed was a refusal to grant a GRC. The Family Division of the High Court held that at 
no point had the GRP refused her application for a GRC.
788
 The GRC was issued in 
November 2011. The instant case concerned an alleged violation of Articles 8 and 14 
ECHR on the bases that s.3(3) of the GRA 2004 which allowed the panel to request further 
information was incompatible with the said rights. Section 3(3) of the GRA 2004 provides 
that subsection (1) is not complied with where “the applicant has undergone or is 
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undergoing treatment for the purpose of modifying sexual characteristics”789 or “treatment 
for that purpose has been prescribed or planned for the applicant”790 unless one of the 
medical report provides details of the treatment. It was argued that this requirement was 
incompatible with the applicant’s Article 8 right which provides that her right to private 
life has to be respected. It was also argued that the requirement to provide details of 
treatment: 
 
discriminates unlawfully against the applicant and other transgender people who 
have undergone surgery and is incompatible with Article 14 of the European 
Convention [on Human Rights], in the context of Article 8.
791
 
 
Thirdly it was argued that the requirement “discriminates unlawfully against the applicant 
and is thus incompatible with Article 14 in the context of Article 8.”792 This case is 
interesting because the applicant did not argue against any of the other aspects of the 
legislation such the need for a diagnosis, the requirement to have lived as a member of the 
acquired gender for two years or the permanence requirement. Nor was it argued that the 
provision of medical reports per se is incompatible with Article 8 ECHR but rather, as 
observed by Mrs  Justice Thirlwall, the “attack is directed to the requirement that where 
medical treatment to modify sexual characteristics has been planned or undergone one of 
the reports must set out the details of that treatment.”793 However, rather than challenge 
some of the problematic aspects of the legislation such as those outlined above, the 
applicant argued that: 
 
details of treatment (in this case surgery) are irrelevant and so unnecessary because 
a Panel must grant a certificate where it is satisfied that the applicant has or has had 
gender dysphoria; has lived in the acquired gender throughout the period of two 
years ending with the date on which the application is made; and intends to 
continue to live in the acquired gender until death.
794
 
 
Therefore the argument was that if an individual had not undergone, nor was he or she 
planning to undergo, medical procedures he or she would be able to obtain a GRC. 
However those who had undergone or were planning to undergo medical procedures had to 
provide additional evidence of those procedures. It was argued therefore that the 
requirement to provide details of treatment could not be necessary to grant the GRC and 
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therefore “the requirement to provide details of the surgery is an unjustifiable interference 
with the applicant’s Article 8 rights”795 which is a perfectly logical argument to make 
based on the provisions contained in s.2 0f the GRA 2004.  
 
Mrs Justice Thirlwall observed in Carpenter that proving that such an applicant met the 
requirements in s.2(1)(b) and (c) “is not easily done in the absence of any treatment to 
modify sexual characteristics but the act allows for a certificate to be granted in such a 
case.”796 She continued: 
 
[u]ndergoing or intending to undergo surgery for the purposes of modifying sexual 
characteristics is overwhelming evidence of the existence now or previously of 
gender dysphoria and of the desire of the applicant to live in the acquired gender 
until death. No competent, conscientious medical practitioner could produce a 
report on gender dysphoria (past or present) which did not refer to treatment 
received.
797
 
 
Mrs Justice Thirlwall noted that the provision of medical evidence asked for by the GRP 
was not a choice of the applicant
798
 and nor did it require the applicant to disclose a 
particularly sensitive medical history.
799
 In relation to the argument that the GRA 2004 
placed a higher burden on those who had undergone medical procedures compared with 
those who had not because those who had were required to provide evidence relating to 
those procedures Mrs Justice Thirlwall held that there was no undue burden on such 
applicants. She noted that: 
 
[u]ndergoing gender reassignment surgery is physically and psychologically 
intrusive. It involves long term preparation and hormone treatment and then radical 
surgery, the purpose of which is to change fundamentally the appearance of a 
person so that the physical (and psychological) characteristics are those of the 
acquired gender. The state does not require anyone to undergo this. What the state 
does require is that the second report includes the name of or a list of the 
procedures undergone. An applicant who has not undergone surgery is required by 
the panel to explain his or her reasons. It might be thought that such a requirement 
is at least as intrusive as the requirement for the provision of the details of 
treatment.
800
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Although Carpenter was not about the role of the panel per se  it is clear from this case 
that the panel can ask for any other supporting evidence and that the applicant has to 
convince the panel that he or she meets the requirements in the legislation. It is not simply 
that the panel has a rubber-stamping role but rather that they have a gatekeeper role and 
can deny the individual’s quest for legal recognition should the applicant not match what 
the panel expect to hear. So both medical professionals and the GRP have gatekeeper roles 
to play in relation to transsexuals achieving legal recognition of their gender identity and 
this is problematic as at each of these stages a third party is given the ability to determine 
the applicant’s identity: either to confirm or to deny the individual’s sense of self as male 
or female. However there is also another problem which needs to be explored; the way in 
which the medical model, upon which the GRA 2004 is founded, has developed since the 
legislation was enacted. 
 
Changing medical knowledge and its impact on the GRA 2004 
One of the most significant developments in the medical model of transsexualism since the 
GRA 2004 was passed was the revision of the DSM, which was complete in 2013, and the 
ongoing revision of the ICD. The IDC-11 is still in the process of being developed 
therefore it is not possible to state with any certainty how transsexualism will be 
represented within the latest version which is due in 2018. However there are interesting 
proposals in place in relation to the revision of the ICD. On 3 and 4 February 2013 
WPATH held a discussion meeting in relation to the proposed ICD-11 criteria for 
transsexualism.
801
 The aim of the discussion meeting was to reach consensus on the 
following proposals: 
 
1. Deletion of the ICD-10 F66 categories 
2. Deletion of the ICD-10 F65 category Fetishistic Transvestism 
3. Renaming the ICD-10 F64.0 category Gender Incongruence (GI) rather than 
Transsexualism  
a. Name of the category  
b. Moving Gender Incongruence from the Mental and Behavioural 
Disorders chapter and alternative placement options 
4. Deletion or retention of the ICD-10 F64.2 category Gender Identity Disorder of 
Childhood.
802
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The debate preceding the publication of DSM 5 and revision of ICD-10 introduced the idea 
of completely removing any reference to GID from the DSM and transsexualism from the 
ICD i.e. depathologising the condition.
803
 The issue of stigmatisation and pathologisation 
of transsexual individuals by means of labelling as mentally unwell within the diagnostic 
manuals was specifically recognised by WHO when proposing reforms to the ICD. 
WPATH state that: 
 
WHO recognizes that questions that have been raised about the gender identity 
disorders in ICD-10 are in part based on objections to the stigmatization that 
accompanies the designation of a condition as a mental disorder in many countries 
and cultures.
804
  
 
The depathologisation debate continues today
805
 and it may be that in the next revision of 
the diagnostic manuals, beyond ICD-11, that the medical condition is completely removed 
which would have a major impact on UK law which, as discussed in depth above, requires 
a diagnosis to be made before the individual can be protected by the law. Although 
depathologisation of the condition was not brought to fruition in the published DSM 5, and 
therefore transsexualism is unlikely to be removed from ICD-11, the published version of 
DSM 5 substantially widens the medical model which, because the GRA 2004 preceded 
these medical reforms, is not reflected in UK law. Due to the fact that the latest revision of 
ICD is not due until 2018 the remainder of this section will focus on the developments in 
DSM 5. 
 
Developments in the DSM 5 
As noted in Chapter One in the earlier versions of the DSM GD was labelled as GID. It is 
thought that changing the name to GD in DSM 5 more accurately reflects the nature of the 
condition i.e. the level of discomfort, or dysphoria, experienced by patients with a 
transsexual identity and also that removing the label of disorder “is less pathologising as it 
no longer implies that one’s identity is disordered”806 which was one of the main concerns 
with earlier versions of the DSM.
807
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Interestingly for the purpose of this thesis the DSM 5 has widened the scope of who can be 
diagnosed with GD. It is noted that the term ‘experienced gender’ “may include alternative 
gender identities beyond binary stereotypes.”808 Therefore the distress experienced by the 
patient “is not limited to a desire to simply be of the other gender, but may include a desire 
to be of an alternative gender, provided that it differs from the individual’s assigned 
gender.”809 This is a much wider provision than in UK law as contained in the GRA 2004. 
Whereas the DSM 5 is open to much wider experiences and expressions of gender, UK 
law, with its insistence that the individual live as a member of the opposite sex for the 
remainder of his or her life is limiting gender experience and expression to solely male or 
female. This change in the DSM 5 begs the question of how far the law and medicine can 
be linked in relation to recognition of gender identity because medicine develops much 
quicker than law is reformed thus potentially rendering the law outdated. As a result of 
these changes in DSM 5 someone with a non-binary gender identity could conceivably 
meet the requirements for a diagnosis of GD but he or she would still not be able to access 
the provisions for recognition of his or her gender identity because of how the GRA 2004 
requires one to live in the acquired gender for two years prior to making an application for 
a GRC and also how one has to indicate an intention to live permanently in the acquired 
gender until death. Therefore, medicine, through the revisions in the DSM 5, is 
acknowledging that dysphoria which arises as a result of gender identity and gender 
assigned at birth not corresponding does not necessarily mean that the individual identifies 
as a member of the opposite gender or even has a fixed gender identity. These 
developments in medicine, should law continue to rely on medicine, will prove 
problematic for law in the future.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that the medical model of legal recognition with the GRA 2004 
has serious implications for the individuals seeking to rely on the legislation to provide 
them with rights and protections. The GRA 2004 clearly places limitations on whose 
gender identity is to be given legal recognition. Accordingly, it does not in fact operate to 
protect personal choice by self-declaration of gender but rather adopts a very medical 
approach to legal recognition of gender identity by classifying people qualifying (or not) 
for  recognition before the law. The GRA 2004 makes it clear that determination of identity 
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for the purpose of legal recognition of that identity is to be conferred upon the applicant, 
mostly, by reference to the medical profession and a panel of doctors and lawyers. 
 
The main problems with the legislation adopting a medical model of legal recognition is 
that the panel which has been established has a gatekeeper role in scrutinising applications 
which has the potential to result in a denial of a GRC which, in turn means that that the 
individual is unable to change his or her legal sex. The panel may refuse the certificate on 
the grounds that the applicant has failed to provide the medical, or other, evidence 
required. However, in addition to this the panel has a huge discretion to deny applications 
based on one of two provisions: that the applicant fails to meet the permanence 
requirement, which will be difficult to prove if he or she has chosen not to undergo 
medical procedures to modify his or her body; or that he or she fails to show that they have 
lived in the acquired gender for two years immediately preceding the application. This has 
problems for the individual seeking the GRC because the evidence which the panel will 
require to satisfy the GRP has not been clearly established nor has what it means to 
actually live in the acquired gender for two years. In addition I argued that the two year 
period, should it be deemed necessary at all to require an applicant to prove that he or she 
can live as a member of the opposite sex before making the application, is arbitrary and 
based on a misunderstanding of the two year real life experience which existed in the 
WPATH SOC version 6 but which has subsequently been amended to one year.  
 
However, even preceding the determination of the panel on the points above the individual 
may be prevented from making an application for a GRC because the Act requires 
evidence in the form of a diagnosis of GD to support the application. It may well be that 
the law has arrived at this point and given such an important role to medical professionals 
because transsexuals will often seek some form of medical involvement to alter their 
bodies to match their gender identification. Medical professionals will therefore be asked 
to diagnose GD and then provide hormonal and irreversible surgical procedures to alter a 
person’s body. However these are separate issues and should not be conflated: the issue of 
diagnosis is medically separated from the issue of suitability for treatment and indeed the 
legislation recognises this by providing that legal recognition can take place before any 
body modification. In addition to the separation of diagnosis and treatment in medicine it is 
important that the medical and legal are separated also. Although medically it may be 
appropriate to diagnose a patient with GD prior to providing body modifying treatment 
legally there is no need to have a diagnosis in place before one is able to express one’s 
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gender identity therefore there appears to be no need for the legislation to require a 
diagnosis of GD at all. This chapter has argued that that stage is potentially problematic for 
a number of individuals because it relies on there being specialist services available for the 
individual to access. In addition it relies upon the expertise and knowledge of medical 
professionals in diagnosing what is a notoriously difficult condition to diagnose as it is 
based solely on interpretation of the patient’s narrative and the experience of the medical 
professional who hears that narrative. Thus medical professionals have been established as 
gatekeepers within the legislation also. Establishing the gatekeeper role in this way has 
however meant that, in the UK, legal recognition of one’s gender identity is not purely a 
human rights issue to be solved by a model of recognition which is based wholly on the 
gender self-declaration of the applicant. Rather current UK law is a consequence of basing 
the law on the medical model of transsexualism, as outlined in Chapter One, which then 
places the medical professional in the position of being able to impact on the legal 
recognition of one’s gender identity because the law is concerned with only recognising 
those who are ill i.e. fit the medical model of transsexualism as of 2003/04 and ensuring 
that no recognition is given to those who seek to make solely a lifestyle choice about their 
gender. 
 
Neither of these hurdles, the role of the panel nor requiring a diagnosis, require to be in the 
legislation as will be shown in Chapter Six. 
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6. An Alternative Model for Gender Identity 
Recognition in the UK 
 
Introduction 
Until this point the thesis has examined the historical background, both in terms of medical 
and legal developments, to the Gender Recognition Act 2004 (GRA 2004) and it has 
shown that by the time the legislation was being debated gender variance was firmly 
medicalised and pathologised as a specific medical condition: transsexualism. It was this 
development of the medical condition, which began in the 1800s and continued throughout 
the twentieth century into the twenty-first century, which resulted in the legislature 
adopting a medical understanding of gender variance, the medical model of 
transsexualism, as the foundation for the legislation. This, as was shown in Chapter Five, 
resulted in a strong gatekeeper role being embodied in the legislation. The result of this 
gatekeeper role given to third parties, such as medical professionals and the Gender 
Recognition Panel (GRP), was that the legislation could be said to be firmly testing 
applicants to ensure that only ‘true’ transsexuals are able to obtain legal recognition of 
their gender identity. However this approach has the potential to result in applications 
being rejected where the individual cannot meet the strict legislative or medical criteria to 
be classed as transsexual. One of the problems with this is that one’s gender identity is not 
absolutely identifiable by any means other than self-identification: the only way that a third 
party can know whether or not an individual identifies as a member of the opposite sex, or 
indeed as agender, genderqueer etc., is through being told by that person. The problems 
with the legislation taking the approach that it does were outlined in detail in Chapter Five 
where it was shown that not only is there potential for third parties to derail applications 
for Gender Recognition Certificates (GRCs) but that the medical model of transsexualism 
which underpins the legislation itself continues to change and develop such that the one in 
existence in 2015 is not exactly the same as the one in 2004 when the legislation was 
enacted. This subtle change in the medical model, which now widens the medical 
understanding of Gender Dysphoria (GD) no longer fits the rest of the GRA 2004 
provisions, in particular the requirement to live in the acquired gender for two years prior 
to making the application and that the applicants must express an intention to live in the 
acquired gender until death. Therefore it is the very model of transsexualism upon which 
the legislation is founded which undermines the legislation a mere decade after the 
legislation came into force and which therefore allows us to consider reforming the law. In 
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addition to the changes in the medical model of transsexualism there has been calls from 
the Council of Europe (CoE) for member states to address the issue of trans* rights more 
broadly, as will be discussed in detail below and which allow the UK to consider reforming 
the GRA 2004 in light of CoE Resolution 2048 (2015). 
 
This chapter will explore possible reform of the legislation which, given changes in other 
jurisdictions in recent months, can no longer be said to be radical as it was when it was 
first enacted. In fact the reforms proposed in this chapter are broadly in line with the 
legislation itself because it is the GRA 2004 which opens the possibility of an alternative 
approach being taken to providing legal recognition of gender. The GRA 2004 protects 
one’s gender identity rather than provide legal recognition to the bodily changes which one 
has physically undertaken. This separation of body and mind in the GRA 2004 was 
ground-breaking at the time, as discussed in Chapter Four, but it could also be used as a 
means of enabling the law to change to maintain relevancy in light of other jurisdictions’ 
approaches and in light of changing medical knowledge on GD and gender identity.  
 
This chapter will begin by exploring the role that law plays in gender identity recognition, 
once that has been established the chapter will then examine the state of play in other CoE 
states and compare current UK law with that of other CoE states because it is important to 
show the different models of legal recognition which are available. The UK is not the only 
CoE state to legislate based on the medical model of transsexualism but nor is this the only 
model upon which to base such legislation as others, such as Denmark, Ireland and Malta 
legislate based on a self-declaration model which is a much more human rights based 
model than the medical one and, as such, is the model which I argue should be used to 
provide legal recognition of one’s gender identity in the UK. It will be argued in this 
chapter that the UK should reform the law to adopt a self-declaration model of gender 
identity recognition and the chapter will end by exploring the issues which would need to 
be considered when adopting such a model as the basis for the legislation. 
 
The role of law in transsexual recognition 
Bell argues that “[t]he legal system plays a central role in defining and constructing 
identities.  Through its boundary construction, people's rights and practices are shaped, 
confined, and even expanded.”810 As such the law is not only crucial in ensuring that those 
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whose sexual and gender identities differ from the norm are protected through legislation 
such as the GRA 2004 and the Equality Act 2010 but in addition there needs to be thought 
given to the role of the law in constructing the boundaries of these identities. Chapter Five 
clearly set out that the GRA 2004 only recognises gender identity which is of a binary 
nature and therefore the GRA 2004 clearly establishes that only those who fit the medical 
model of transsexualism as it was in 2004 are able to obtain legal recognition of their 
gender identity. However the approach taken in the GRA 2004 is somewhat at odds with 
that taken in the Equality Act 2010 which seeks to protect against discrimination based on 
gender identity and also at odds with the strand of case law which derives from EC law 
anti-discrimination provisions as discussed in Chapters Two and Three. Section 7 of the 
Equality Act 2010 ostensibly protects against discrimination on the grounds of gender 
reassignment which would, at first reading, appear to mean those who have undergone, are 
anticipating undergoing or are undergoing, gender reassignment as per s.7(1). However it 
is only on examination of this provision that it becomes clear that s.7 actually protects a 
much wider group of people. The examples given in the explanatory notes accompanying 
the legislation make it clear that the individual need not actually be under any medical 
supervision to be able to come within the protection of this provision.
811
 So the provisions 
in the Equality Act 2010, while still requiring that individuals live as either male or female, 
acknowledge that the medical profession do not require to have a role in this process. The 
combination of the EC law anti-discrimination provisions, the Equality Act 2010 and the 
GRA 2004 is such that an individual may be given protection from discrimination based on 
his or her gender re-assignment (without being under the supervision of the medical 
profession, having undergone any body modification or even intending to undergo such 
body modification) but still not be able to have the gender identity which led to him or her 
living as a member of the opposite sex legally recognised by the GRA 2004, or the 
individual may undergo medical procedures and live as a member of the opposite sex 
without obtaining a GRC but still be recognised as a member of the opposite sex under EC 
law anti-discrimination provisions;
812
 therefore the law is confused. The law has 
progressed since the enactment of the GRA 2004 to the extent that it can be argued that 
there appears to be a genuine attempt to provide for the legal recognition and protection of 
gender variant individual, however I am not yet convinced that the legal approach is as 
strong as it could be. Despite the developments in the law in the form of the GRA 2004 
and the Equality Act 2010 the law “has remained stagnant in its approach to defining 
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sex/gender, relying on the assumption of two discrete sexes that inherently correspond with 
two discrete genders.”813  The result of this rigid approach is that it has led to “negative 
results for transsexual individuals who do not fit neatly within the rigid legal sex/gender 
regime.”814 Although I am not, as of yet in this thesis, arguing that UK law adopts a non-
binary conceptualisation of sex it is important that such concerns with the legal system are 
acknowledged and raised because I believe that such an approach may be, and perhaps 
ought to be, taken in the future, particularly in light of CoE Resolution 2048 (2015), 
discussed below. The comments and criticisms of the law adopting a binary approach to 
sex are important as they highlight that there are many ways of thinking about sex and 
gender and therefore the current legal approach is merely one possibility. Bell argues that 
“[o]nce it is recognized that legal system definitions carry negative implications for 
transsexuals, it is necessary to formulate plans for reform. This question of change is 
complex, however.”815  Although the question of how the law should be reformed is 
complex it is not an issue which should be avoided because of the impact that the law has 
on individual lives; therefore it is important that we have in place the best possible law.  
 
In determining how to recognise transsexuals in law the legislature must consider the 
purpose and aims of the proposed legislation. What is the legislature trying to achieve, 
does it want to maintain the status quo, it is being forced to recognise transsexuals when it 
would rather not, does it want to be progressive and ground-breaking? These are all 
important questions to ask prior to enacting legislation and some of these issues can be 
seen in the Hansard debates surrounding the Gender Recognition Bill where it is clear that 
the Bill was proposed not out of a sense of seeking to provide a means of legally 
recognising gender variance but in response to the judgments in Goodwin and Bellinger: in 
a sense the legislation was introduced because it had to be not because the Government 
wanted it to be and this reluctance to introduce legislation is seen in the resultant Act 
which is confused. The GRA 2004 seeks to provide legal recognition of one’s gender 
identity without any corresponding bodily changes which on the one hand is extremely 
progressive and radical. However, on the other hand, it then strictly limits who can apply 
for legal recognition of their gender identity to those who meet very limiting criteria which 
reinforces that the only gender identities which will be recognised in the UK are those 
which are binary and which meet the requirements of third parties; medical professionals 
and the GRP and therefore “does not allow room for changing notions and perceptions of 
                                                 
813
 M Bell (n 242) 1751. 
814
 ibid. 
815
 ibid. 
202 
 
sex and gender.”816 The confusion would not have arisen had the GRA 2004 required that 
one undergoes body modification prior to seeking legal recognition as this would, by 
necessity, mean that the individual had to first seek a diagnosis of transsexualism or 
GD/GID before obtaining the medical treatment. This would have meant that the law was 
merely providing recognition to those whom medicine had already classified as transsexual 
and had treated. However such an option was, in reality, never an option. The issue of 
requiring body modification was considered during pre-legislative scrutiny and for various 
reasons was never intended to be part of the legislation. So, the question then is to what 
extent does the GRA 2004 actually recognise one’s gender identity or rather does it merely 
give recognition to diagnoses of the medical profession thereby making the individual’s 
experienced gender less important than opinions of third parties?  
 
UK law situated within the Council of Europe 
Trans* rights have been a focus of the CoE for some time.
817
 However this has not resulted 
in the protection of such rights in all CoE member states. Currently, as of October 2015, 
eight CoE member states have no provision for the legal recognition of transsexual 
individuals.
818
 However, although this seems like a small number, when methods of 
recognition across the other CoE states is examined it can be seen that there is a wide 
variety of means on offer across the CoE and so the actual number of states which do not 
give adequate protection is a lot higher. For example across the CoE states legal 
recognition can range from full recognition
819
 to merely allowing individuals to change 
their either their name
820
 and/or change their sex on official documents:
821
 the situation 
which existed in the UK prior to the GRA 2004 being enacted. 
 
Of those countries which do have a procedure in place to provide for legal recognition it is 
not uncommon to require applicants to formally interact with the medical profession. Of 
the 31 states which provide for full legal recognition 28 require at least a diagnosis of 
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Gender Identity Disorder (GID)/Gender Dysphoria (GD).
822
 However, some states go 
further and require compulsory surgery,
823
 sterilisation
824
 or both. Of those states which do 
not provide full legal recognition but merely the ability to change one’s name, as in 
Georgia and Macedonia, or change name and gender on official documents
825
 all but 
Moldova require medical intervention prior to being able to carry out such legalities. 
However all eight states require a diagnosis of GID/GD. Five of the eight states require 
surgical intervention
826
 and six require the individual to be sterile before being able to 
change name and/or sex on official documents.
827
 Therefore the GRA 2004 is not the worst 
piece of legislation in Europe in relation to trans* rights but nor is it the best and therefore 
there is considerable scope for improving the law, as will be argued throughout the 
remainder of this chapter. 
 
A renewed focus on trans* rights from the Council of Europe 
From the above discussion it is clear that trans* rights across Europe vary considerably and 
that it is not possible to identify a European approach or consensus in relation to this 
issue.
828
 However, despite these differences in approaches trans* rights across Europe have 
come to the forefront again in 2015. On 22 April 2015 the CoE adopted Resolution 2048 
(2015) which is intended to combat discrimination against trans* people in Europe. The 
Parliamentary Assembly, commenting on Resolution 2048 (2015) note that: 
 
[t]he Assembly is concerned about the violations of fundamental rights, notably the 
right to private life and to physical integrity, faced by transgender people when 
applying for legal gender recognition; relevant procedures often require 
sterilisation, divorce, a diagnosis of mental illness, surgical interventions and other 
medical treatments as preconditions. In addition, administrative burdens and 
additional requirements, such as a period of “life experience” in the gender of 
choice, make recognition procedures generally cumbersome. Furthermore, a large 
number of European countries have no provisions on gender recognition at all, 
making it impossible for transgender people to change the name and gender marker 
on personal identity documents and public registers.
829
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This echoes the data discussed in the above section. In relation to legal recognition of 
gender identity Resolution 2048 (2015) requires member states to: 
 
develop quick, transparent and accessible procedures, based on self-determination, 
for changing the name and registered sex of transgender people on birth 
certificates, identity cards, passports, educational certificates and other similar 
documents; make these procedures available for all people who seek it, irrespective 
of age, medical status, financial situation or current or previous detentions
830
 
 
In addition to this general requirement Resolution 2048 (2015) implores states to do four 
particular things in relation to the provision of legal recognition of gender. Firstly states 
should: 
 
abolish sterilisation and other compulsory medical treatment, including a mental 
health diagnosis, as a necessary legal requirement to recognise a person’s gender 
identity in laws regulating the procedure for changing a name and registered 
gender.
831
 
 
States must also “remove any restrictions on the right of transgender people to remain in an 
existing marriage upon recognition of their gender [and] ensure that spouses or children do 
not suffer a loss of rights”.832 This is an important issue. Of the 39 states which provide 
either full or partial legal recognition 19 require that individuals divorce prior to 
undertaking the legal process in question.
833
 In addition, although Scotland, by means of 
the Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014, and England and Wales, by means 
of the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013, have abolished the requirement to divorce 
it still remains in Northern Ireland. The issue of requiring individuals to divorce prior to 
being able to obtain legal recognition of their gender identity has been considered in cases 
arising from the United Kingdom
834
 and from Finland.
835
 In 2006 in R and F v United 
Kingdom
836
 the ECtHR held that it was not a violation of applicants’ Article 8 or 12 rights 
for a state to require divorce prior to one party being able to obtain legal recognition of his 
or her gender identity. Again in 2014 in the case of Hämäläinen v Finland
837
 it was once 
again held that such a provision requiring divorce was not a violation of the applicants’ 
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Article 8 or 12 rights. Therefore CoE Resolution 2048 (2015) goes further than the ECtHR 
has been willing to go in recent years and this aspect of the Resolution has largely been 
met by the UK by means of the reform of marriage law in 2013 and 2014. At the time of 
the enactment of the GRA 2004 the reason for this provision would seem to have been the 
need, at least in 2003/04 anyway, to maintain marriage as an opposite sex union. Tirohl 
and Bowers claim “[t]he argument for ending such marriages is possibly that they would 
be same-sex relationships and that this would be incompatible with current UK law.
”838
 
Tirohl and Bowers’ comments are reflected in the parliamentary debates which surrounded 
the progress of the GRB through the Houses of Commons and Lords in 2003/04 in which 
the worry of a number of parliamentarians was that the legislation would enable same-sex 
marriage in some instances.
839
 It would then appear that the provision to end a marriage or 
civil partnership prior to a full GRC being given is a clear restatement of the heterosexual 
nature of marriage at the time. As a result of the changes in marriage law in the UK (other 
than in Northern Ireland) there is no longer any need for this provision and the reform of 
the GRA 2004 which derived from the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 and the 
Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014 is welcome not only as it meets the 
requirements of Resolution 2048 (2015) but because it enables those in stable long term 
relationships to maintain those legal relationships while one or both seeks legal recognition 
of their gender identity. If the GRA 2004 is to be reformed to ensure protection of 
applicants’ Article 8 rights then it would be worth considering how the GRA 2004 interacts 
with civil partnership law as this remains one area in which there is limited protection of 
the rights of the individuals and arguably the Civil Partnership Act 2004 would require to 
be amended to enable opposite sex civil partnerships, however a further discussion of this 
is outwith the scope of this thesis. 
 
In addition to the above requirement on removing the obligation to divorce Resolution 
2048 (2015) provides that states must “consider including a third gender option in identity 
documents for those who seek it.”840 This provision goes further than the issues being 
explored in this thesis. However, in light of the discussion in Chapter Five surrounding the 
developments in the medical model of transsexualism this provision would be welcome as 
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it would enable legal recognition of gender identity for all on the gender spectrum not 
merely those at the polar ends. 
 
Another provision in Resolution 2048 (2015) is the requirement that states must “ensure 
that the best interests of the child are a primary consideration in all decisions concerning 
children.”841 This is an interesting issue and one that must be considered. If this provision 
is in relation to minors who seek legal recognition of their gender identity then it may 
prove problematic. There is currently no case law from Europe on this point however one 
Australian Family Court case can be used to highlight the difficult situation such young 
people may find themselves in. In the case of Re Alex,
842
 Alex was a thirteen year old 
anatomical female who had been diagnosed with GID, as it was called at the time, and who 
was being cared for by the local authority. An action was raised to determine whether the 
local authority was competent to consent to treatment for Alex’s GID. The court action 
centred on the following question: was the applicant, the local authority, authorised to 
consent to the following: 
 
(a) that Alex be administered a combination of oestrogen and progestogen on a 
continuous basis until he turned 16; 
(b) ongoing psychiatric assessment; and 
(c) that after Alex reached the age of 16, he be treated with luteinizing-hormone-
releasing hormone [LHRH] analogue and testosterone administered either in oral 
form, by monthly injection or by six-monthly subcutaneous implant. 
 
The problem was that, although some of these procedures could be reversed with no long 
term effects, the testosterone injections would produce some irreversible effects.  Initially, 
the local authority was given permission to enrol Alex in secondary school under a male 
name and for the hormonal treatment to begin which would suppress puberty and female 
development. The applicants were at no point seeking an order that would allow Alex to 
undergo surgical procedures to alter his physical body before he reached 18.  The case 
centred on whether the proposed treatment was in Alex’s best interests, a concept not 
unknown to child and family lawyers, but one that is difficult to define.
843
 The best 
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interests principle, when considering medical treatment, allows for the patient to be 
involved in decision making but only if the patient is deemed competent to understand the 
decision.
844
 In addition the patient’s expressed views may not necessarily be upheld by the 
Court. Therefore the best interests principle has the potential to severely restrict patient 
autonomy. The patient’s ability to understand the decision they are making is determined 
by the medical professionals providing treatment or by a court and therefore there is a 
substantial degree of discretion afforded to the person judging the patient’s competency. In 
this case Nicholson CJ found that the medical intervention was in Alex’s best interest.845 In 
determining Alex’s competency to participate in the medical decision making process 
regarding himself the Court was willing to discuss Alex’s self-perception and self-identity 
and to understand the difficulty he was in when his body did not correspond to his identity. 
The Australian Family Court was therefore willing to hold that a young person could be 
capable of participating in the decision making process regarding their treatment for GID. 
Therefore how this provision is, or indeed is not, included within the reformed GRA 2004 
will be explored below. 
 
It is crucial that CoE states adopt the principles in Resolution 2048 (2015). In the 
explanatory memorandum to the Resolution by Ms Schembri, rapporteur, it was 
acknowledged that “[l]egal gender recognition is for many transgender people the key to 
meaningful participation in society and to living in dignity, protected from 
discrimination.”846 Therefore the fundamental principles which must underlie reform in 
this area of law is personal autonomy and human dignity. However, in addition to this 
basis there needs to be careful consideration of the role of the medical profession. I have 
argued throughout this thesis that one of the main problems with the GRA 2004 is the role 
given to the medical profession, and indeed the GRP. The reasons for these roles in the 
GRA 2004 were explained in the previous chapter. However it is important to note that no 
longer is this a theoretical idea but rather the question of medicine in relation to legal 
recognition of gender identity is now gathering legal momentum as a result of Resolution 
2048 (2015) as Shembri commented in the explanatory memorandum that “[a] medical and 
legal limbo is inscribed in all existing legislation regulating gender recognition.”847 
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Whereas this was correct at the time it is no longer correct, as will be shown below, as 
Malta, Denmark and to some extent Ireland now provide legal recognition without the 
input of medical professionals therefore precedent exists for the UK to similarly reform the 
law in a manner which protects the rights of applicants. Shembri notes that “[a]ll too often, 
the requirements for gender recognition force individuals to give up one human right to 
gain another”848 for example the issue of forcing individuals to obtain a divorce or 
undergoing medical procedures which, it is argued, is contrary to the underlying principles 
of human dignity and personal autonomy and therefore contrary to the spirit of Article 8 
ECHR. When the legal positions across the CoE states is examined it is clear that this is the 
case across the region; only one state, Malta, protects the rights of citizens fully as will be 
shown below.  
 
In relation to the way in which law ought to provide legal recognition of gender identity 
the Parliamentary Assembly noted that: 
 
[a] number of Council of Europe member States have recently reformed their 
legislation on legal gender recognition or are in the process of doing so. Some 
regulations are based on the principle of self-determination and do not require long 
and complex procedures or the involvement of medical practitioners or 
psychiatrists […] [t]he Assembly welcomes, in this context, the emergence of a 
right to gender identity, first enshrined in the legislation of Malta, which gives 
every individual the right to recognition of their gender identity and the right to be 
treated and identified according to it.
849
  
 
Therefore it is clear that gender self-determination, or self-declaration as I have called it in 
this thesis, is of fundamental importance for the CoE. Within such a model there would be 
no role for the medical profession or for a panel such as the GRP. This would mean that 
legal requirements such as “diagnosis of mental disorder, medical treatment and invasive 
surgery, mandatory psychiatric institutionalisation, assessment of time lived in new gender 
identity and being single or divorced”850 no longer have a role to play in determining 
whether or not the individual’s sense of self is accurate and therefore worthy of recognition 
in law and this ought to be welcomed because “[s]uch requirements violate a person’s 
dignity, physical integrity, right to form a family and to be free from degrading and 
inhuman treatment.”851 
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Towards a legal model based on gender self-declaration  
Therefore, in light of the theoretical approaches to reforming gender recognition laws and 
the requirements of CoE Resolution 2048 (2015) which outlines the importance of gender 
self-declaration it is important that I outline how the law should be reformed based on the 
principle of gender self-declaration. As a result of reform in 2014 and 2015 only three of 
the European states, Denmark, Malta, and Ireland, allow for legal recognition to be given 
without any medical input either in the form of medical treatment such as sterilisation, 
hormone therapy or surgery or in the form of requiring a diagnosis. Denmark and Malta 
have, what could be called, absolute gender self-declaration in their laws however Ireland, 
does not; it has a quasi-self-declaration model where if the applicant is over the age of 18 
he or she has the absolute right to self-declare his or her gender and have that recognised 
by law. However if he or she is over 16 but under 18 years of age then the Irish Gender 
Recognition Act 2015 (GRA 2015) provides that the child’s parent(s) or guardian(s) must 
consent to the making of the application
852
 and evidence is required from the child’s 
medical practitioner
853
 therefore the Irish model appears to be something of a compromise 
and is rather confused. Each of these approaches will be discussed in chronological order 
below because when Denmark enacted its legislation it was hailed as wholly progressive 
but it has recently been surpassed by the approach taken in Malta, however I would argue 
that the Irish approach ought not be followed as it is a step back from that taken by Malta. 
 
September 2014: Denmark 
The first European state to reform their law based on a gender self-declaration model was 
Denmark. The reform was one by making an amendment to the Danish Civil Registration 
System.
854
 Acknowledging the reform in Danish law Shembri notes: 
 
[t]The new Danish regulations represent a turning point and the first time that the 
principle of self-determination is enacted in Europe. They make it possible to 
obtain legal gender recognition by requesting a new social security number. No 
surgical intervention or treatments such as hormone replacement therapy are 
requested. The law introduces a reflection period (the request needs to be 
confirmed six months after the original application) and a minimum age of 18.
855
 
 
This makes the Danish law straight-forward. Individuals over the age of 18 can make a 
written application to have their gender identity recognised in law. Following a six month 
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reflection period the individual must confirm the application in writing.
856
 The application 
will then be granted subject to the individual providing a written declaration that he or she 
bases their application on a sense of belonging to the other gender. The important aspect of 
the Danish law is that there are no gatekeepers, merely a period of reflection during which 
the individual determines for himself or herself whether the application is right for them. 
 
April 2015: Malta 
Following the 2014 Danish reform Malta reformed their law in early 2015 and went 
several steps further than the Danes. The Maltese Gender Identity, Gender Expression and 
Sex Characteristics Act (GIGESCA 2015) was passed in April 2015 and provides the 
mechanism by which an individual obtains legal recognition of gender identity in Maltese 
law. It was reported at the time that the reform of Maltese law meant that Malta became 
“the first European state to have gender identity in its constitution.”857 This was a huge step 
forward for Malta as in 2011 it was reported that despite Maltese law then requiring 
individuals to be sterile and undertake surgical procedures before being given any form of 
legal recognition of their gender identity there were no facilities in the state to facilitate 
such requirements.
858
 This was despite rulings of the ECtHR in L v Lithuania
859
 and van 
Kück v Germany
860
 which respectively provided that states are under a positive obligation 
to provide means for individuals to undertake medical procedures where these were 
required as a prerequisite to accessing the law and that trans* health care was to be 
included in health insurance plans. The law in Malta was one of the most restrictive in the 
whole of the CoE region. Prior to the reform it was reported that to enable an individual to 
change his or her name required “psychotherapeutic treatment, evaluation by a qualified 
mental health professional, real life test, confirmation of outer appearance, hormonal 
treatment, sex reassignment surgery (SRS) [and] permanent infertility.”861 However the 
situation changed radically in 2015 when the GIGESCA 2015 was passed. The 2015 
reform included gender identity as a protected ground within the Maltese constitution thus 
making Malta “the first country in Europe to have gender identity anchored in its highest 
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legal text.”862 According to Transgender Europe the Maltese legislation “recognizes the 
right of each person to their gender identity and the free development thereof” 863  and it 
“fulfils the Council of Europe standards of “quick, transparent and accessible” gender 
recognition procedures, based on self-determination.”864 The GIGESCA 2015 defines 
gender identity as referring to:  
 
each person’s internal and individual experience of gender, which may or may not 
correspond with the sex assigned at birth, including the personal sense of the body 
(which may involve, if freely chosen, modification of bodily appearance and/or 
functions by medical, surgical or other means) and other expressions of gender, 
including name, dress, speech and mannerisms.
865
 
 
Section 3 provides that Maltese citizens have four particular rights in relation to gender 
identity: (i) the right to recognition of their gender identity,
866
 (ii) the right to “free 
development of their person according to their gender identity”,867 (iii) the right to “be 
treated according to their gender identity and, particularly, to be identified in that way in 
the documents providing their identity therein,”868 and (iv) the right to “bodily integrity 
and physical autonomy.”869 Section 3(2) provides for the consequences of the recognition 
of one’s gender identity and s.3(4) provides that:  
 
[t]he person shall not be required to provide proof of a surgical procedure for total 
or partial genital reassignment, hormonal therapies or any other psychiatric, 
psychological or medical treatment to make use of the right to gender identity. 
 
All an individual is required to do to partake of the rights in this legislation is request the 
Director for Public Registry to change the individual’s legal sex based and/or name based 
on their self-declaration of gender.
870
 As noted it is not appropriate for the notary to then 
seek evidence of the person’s sex as the system is based entirely on self-declaration.871 
 
The Maltese approach allows minors to obtain legal recognition of their gender identity 
also but the requirements are slightly different than for an adult. If the person seeking legal 
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recognition is under 18 then an application must be made on his or her behalf by their legal 
guardian or parent.
872
 In deciding whether to grant legal recognition to the minor the best 
interest of the child
873
 and his or her views are given due consideration.
874
 In addition it has 
to be noted that parents may postpone inclusion of a gender marker on their child’s birth 
certificate until such time as the child’s gender identity is determined.875  
 
The approach taken in Malta is preferable to that taken in Denmark because it does not 
require a period of reflection. The literature on transgender identity, as explored in Chapter 
One, highlights that one’s gender identity is formed at a very early stage in the child’s 
development and no psychotherapeutic, or other, interventions will change one’s gender 
identity. Therefore if gender identity is so firmly fixed then why should an adult be 
required to wait six months following making an application to change legal sex to then 
confirm that requested change? It may well be that the six month wait in Danish law is 
about ensuring that individuals do not make hasty applications which are then regretted 
and seek to revert back to their sex assigned at birth. This, as noted above, was one of the 
concerns with the GRA 2004 when it was being debated in parliament. However, there are 
no irreversible consequences of obtaining a legal change of sex either in the GRA 2004, 
the Danish law or in the Maltese GIGESCA 2015 therefore, I argue that it is particularly 
difficult to uphold a waiting period in law and would argue that there should be no such 
period of reflection. Therefore the Maltese approach is preferred to the Danish one because 
it allows minors to obtain a change of legal sex, whereas Denmark requires that applicants 
be 18, and there is no waiting period. So, after deciding that reform of the GRA 2004 
should follow the Maltese model it is now important to consider the most recent reforms 
from one of the CoE states, Ireland, to determine whether or not any more 
recommendations for reform can be taken from the Irish approach. 
 
July 2015: Ireland 
The Gender Recognition Act 2015 (GRA 2015) placed Ireland as the third European state 
to allow legal recognition of gender identity without any need for medical input, however 
this is only partly true, as will be seen below, and this amounts to a failing of the Irish 
model. Under the GRA 2015 those over the age of 18 can apply based on written self-
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declaration of gender identity.
876
 The Minister receiving the application can either issue a 
GRC
877
 or refuse to issue a GRC.
878
 As in the UK it is possible for the Minister receiving 
the application to request further information or evidence.
879
 There is also a requirement, 
however, that the applicant must not be married or in a civil partnership.
880
 It will be 
interesting to see whether this provision is amended as a result of the recent vote in Ireland 
to accept same-sex marriages. There are a lot of similarities between the Irish GRA 2015 
and the UK GRA 2004. For example, in addition to the ability to request further 
information as mentioned above, there is also the requirement that the individual provide a 
statutory declaration that he or she intends to live “in the preferred gender for the rest of 
his or her life.”881 Although the Irish Act is excellent in that it removes the requirement for 
the medical profession to be involved (where the applicant is over 18) it retains a degree of 
gatekeeper functioning by means of the Minister receiving the application and the 
additional criteria which need to be fulfilled to support an application which is absent in 
the Maltese approach and for that reason the Irish approach is a step towards the reform 
that the UK should take but UK law should not mirror Irish law. 
 
Another reason why Irish law is not as good as it could be is that it creates a complex 
situation for those aged 16 and 17. As in Malta it is possible for those under 18 to apply 
however the Maltese approach is to be favoured as in Ireland those aged 16 and 17 require 
the input of two medical professionals
882
 and the consent of the child’s parent or legal 
guardian
883
 unless the parent or guardian cannot be identified, found or failed or neglected 
to respond to a request for consent or that consent could not be obtained because of the 
relationship between the parent/guardian and the child.
884
 It is not possible to apply for 
legal recognition of one’s gender identity in Ireland below the age of 16, whereas it is in 
Malta.   
 
Reform in Poland 
It should also be noted that on 7 August 2015 Poland enacted the Gender Marker Change 
Act which allows Polish people to change their legal sex. However, it has not yet been 
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possible to obtain a copy of this legislation. It is understood that the law, although 
progressive for Poland, is not progressive in relation other legislation across the CoE 
region in that it required that individuals not be married and provide reports of two medical 
professionals to support that the applicant is of the gender identity opposite to the sex 
legally assigned.
885
 
 
How to reform the GRA to adhere to a gender self-
declaration model 
So, based on the above discussion, and that presented throughout the preceding chapters, I 
am arguing that UK law requires to be reformed in light of Resolution 2048 (2015) and the 
problems which arise from the legislation being based on the medical model of 
transsexualism which existed in 2004. I argue that the model which ought to be adopted in 
the UK should base reform of the GRA 2004 on the approach taken in Malta; an approach 
based on self-declaration of gender identity which makes provision for minors to obtain 
legal recognition of their gender identity. I believe that this is the approach which ought to 
be taken because self-declaration of gender identity is the only reliable means of 
determining someone’s gender identity therefore having legal mechanisms which rely upon 
third party determination of applicants’ gender identity has the potential to deny 
recognition to those who should be given it. Reforming the GRA 2004 would be 
straightforward. All that is required to have a gender self-declaration model would be the 
removal of any third party intervention. This would mean that the GRP would be replaced 
by a more suitable application system which was not intended to test/scrutinise the 
application but rather merely ‘rubber stamp’ it as in Denmark and Malta. In addition any 
role given to the medical profession in the current legislation would need to be removed. 
Again the purpose of removing this role is to ensure that the individual’s identity is not 
being tested but rather accepted. In addition the reformed law could further ensure that the 
individual was at the centre of the law by removing the minimum age requirement 
contained in s.1(1) and by removing the requirements in s.2 such as the reference to gender 
dysphoria,
886
 the requirement for permanence
887
 and the two year lived experience 
requirement.
888
 The only reason the provisions in s.2 are in the GRA 2004 is because of 
how parliament accepted gender variance as a medical condition which had certain criteria 
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such as a desire to live as a member of the opposite sex etc. The two year period in s.2 is 
problematic as was argued in the previous chapter because it is based on a flawed 
understanding of the requirements of medicine at the time, and which have since been 
reconsidered by the medical profession. Further s.3 could be reformed to remove any 
requirement for evidence that the individual has or has had gender dysphoria,
889
 meets the 
requirements in relation to permanence and the two year experience,
890
 or has changed sex 
in an approved country or territory.
891
 The provision in s.3(5) could remain if the purpose 
of it was to ensure that UK law gave recognition to individuals who changed sex abroad 
before coming to the UK but I argue that this is not the purpose of this section. I believe 
that s.3(5) is concerned, again, with testing who should or should not be given recognition. 
If someone has legally changed sex in another jurisdiction then this ought to be recognised 
in UK law with no provision for UK law not to recognise it. However if someone has 
physically changed sex in another jurisdiction but without having that change legally 
recognised then it should not be for UK law to determine whether or not to recognise the 
procedures in that other jurisdiction but rather consider an application for legal recognition 
on the same basis as any other application under the reformed law i.e. that the person 
wishes to be recognised for legal purposes as the sex opposite to his or her sex assigned at 
birth. I fear that the inclusion of s.3(5) in the current legislation is connected to the medical 
model of transsexualism in that only countries or territories which adhere to the same 
medical criteria regarding transsexualism and sex re-assignment will be included in the list 
of approved countries or territories for the purpose of the GRA 2004 and for that reason 
this provision should be removed.  I would also remove any reference to other evidence 
which may be required either by the GRP or anyone else.
892
 The purpose of allowing for 
asking for additional evidence again returns to testing whether or not one is worthy of legal 
recognition and as such has no place in legislation based on gender self-declaration. 
Provisions in relation to marriage and civil partnership should remain as currently civil 
partnerships are only available to those in homosexual relationships and therefore it is 
necessary for one’s partnership status to be declared. I am not convinced that there should 
be provisions in relation to one’s marital status however, based on the discussion below in 
relation to the rights of partners in a marriage perhaps it is best to retain these provisions so 
that consent, or otherwise, of a spouse could be readily obtained. In addition I would 
abolish the two-tier recognition system which exists by means of the full and interim 
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GRCs. An interim GRC does not change one’s legal status therefore the question is why 
should it exist if it does nothing to change the person’s status? The interim GRC exists 
only as a means of terminating marriages or civil partnerships other than by through 
divorce/dissolution laws. Therefore I would remove the interim GRCs because there is no 
need to terminate a marriage if one of the parties obtains a GRC. Of course this would 
require consideration in relation to civil partnership laws and will be explored in more 
depth below. The current provisions in relation to consequences of obtaining a GRC would 
remain as would the other provisions not mentioned here. 
 
Issues to be considered with the self-declaration model 
Of course, the approach taken in Malta may not necessarily be the best approach for the 
UK therefore thought has to be given to which aspects of each approach should be adopted 
by the UK, and indeed should the UK go further, if possible, to ensuring full gender self-
declaration in law? A return to the concerns which arose during the passing of the GRA 
2004 will help to see which aspects of the current UK law should be retained and which 
aspects should be amended.  
 
The need for certainty 
One of the main concerns which arose in the debates preceding the GRA 2004 was that of 
certainty;
893
 both in ensuring that one’s legal sex could be certain to third parties and also 
that the law had to be certain that only those who ought to be given legal recognition were 
actually able to obtain it i.e. true transsexuals. The first concern is easy to deal with so I 
will start with that one. In relation to certainty of one’s legal sex this is maintained in each 
of the approaches taken in Malta, Ireland and Denmark because in each of those states one 
is either male or female, there is no possibility of a third legal sex being provided. 
Although Resolution 2048 (2015) and the current medical understanding of gender 
dysphoria provide for the possibility of non-binary gender I am not arguing that such an 
approach should, at the moment at least, be taken by the law. At the moment the UK legal 
system relies upon individuals being either male or female so an approach which 
introduced a third identifier would be unworkable; concepts such as maternity and 
paternity would have to be altered, as would any remaining gender specific offences and 
                                                 
893
 Joint Committee on Human Rights Draft Gender Recognition Bill, 20 November 2003 HL Paper 188-I 
& II, HC 1276-I & II [29]-[52], HL Deb 13 January 2004 vol. 657 cc 1-62GC [58]-[60], HL Deb 29 January 
2004 vol 656 cc357-436 [378]-[379], SC Deb (A) 9 March 2004 cols 3-30 [15]-[22]. 
217 
 
employment law provisions which allow for different treatment of the sexes, that is not to 
say that these changes could not be made but I am arguing that they should not be required 
at the present time. Therefore, at the moment, to ensure that the legal system does not face 
these additional challenges the proposal would be to retain the binary approach to gender 
identity in the reformed Gender Recognition Act. Although I would personally welcome a 
non-binary approach to legal sex in the UK such a quest is one for the future. So, retaining 
the binary model of sex means that the other aspect of certainty for third parties can be 
dealt with, and relatively quickly dismissed. If certainty for third parties is such a concern 
then the current GRA 2004 fails to ensure that certainty can be achieved. The main way in 
which a third party decides upon the sex of an individual is by means of observation and 
measuring that individual against what he or she expects to observe; if someone appears to 
be male they are likely to be sexed as male by others and vice versa for females. This is, of 
course, an entirely unscientific approach and it also has no legal consequence. However 
because the GRA 2004 does not require body modification it itself gives rise to legal men 
who appear to others as female and legal women who appear as male. Therefore, as this 
situation already exists in law, it is not crucial that it be explored further here: the current 
law undermines this concern itself and any reform would not result in any more confusion 
for third parties. 
 
The next real concern underpinning the GRA 2004 is that only those who are truly 
transsexual should be able to change their legal sex. The idea behind this approach is that 
one should not be able to ‘chop and change’ legal sex. The main way by which this 
concern was dealt in the GRA 2004 was by means of requiring the input of medical 
professionals. I showed in the previous chapter why this approach raised problems and so 
will not discuss the problems with this approach in this chapter. Suffice it to say, removing 
the diagnostic criteria in the GRA 2004 and removing the input of the medical 
professionals would not make the law any less certain. A system which provides legal 
recognition of gender identity without requiring a diagnosis and the input of medical 
professionals exists in Ireland, Malta and Denmark so there is precedent for such an 
approach to be taken. This may mean that non-transsexuals i.e. the wider trans* 
community could benefit from the rights in the reformed GRA but, in my opinion, this 
should be welcomed. Not all trans* people seek to abolish the categories of male and 
female and should someone who does not meet the medical criteria to be classified as 
transsexual but who still identifies as more male than female or more female than male 
decide that they would prefer their gender identity to be recognised in law as that opposite 
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to the sex assigned at birth then the question would be why should this not happen? This is 
really a case of flipping the question around and changing how these issues are conceived 
of, a bit like the approach taken by the ECtHR when determining Goodwin v United 
Kingdom,
894
 as discussed in Chapter Three. Rather than starting from the perspective that 
gender identity follows on from one’s physical sex and then assuming that gender identity 
which differs from sex is a result of an abnormality of psychosexual development perhaps 
it is better to approach the issue with a wider understanding of gender identity and 
experienced gender; an approach that would recognise the entire gender spectrum and 
recognise that gender variance is a natural part of being human. If this latter approach was 
taken the question for law would be how can the law be designed in such a way as to 
maximise recognition of gender identity and experience as opposed to the more restrictive 
how can we ensure that the law only recognises those who meet a particular way of 
understanding gender identity and exclude all other gender variant individuals.  It is clear 
that the UK legislature sought to answer the latter question when passing the GRA 2004, 
and as has been pointed out throughout this thesis, such an approach resulted in 
problematic legislation. Therefore in reforming the GRA 2004 I would remove the need for 
a diagnosis of GD and the need for medical reports to support the application and, for the 
reasons given above, this would not make anyone’s legal sex any less certain for third 
parties.  
 
The requirement for permanence 
Related to the need for certainty above is the need for permanence in the legislation which 
is based on ensuring that one cannot change one’s sex too often as this would cause 
confusion for the legal system or for third parties. This is a problematic stance to take and 
this argument cannot be sustained because the GRA 2004 already allows for subsequent 
changes so the proposal for the reformed law would not be any different to what already 
exists…albeit that it would be more difficult to change back under the GRA 2004 under 
the proposed law which would only require another application but without the whole 
scrutiny of the application as currently exists. The issue of requiring an applicant to state 
their intention to live permanently as a member of the acquired gender in the GRA 2004 
and the Irish GRA 2015 is problematic, as discussed in the previous chapter, and I am not 
convinced that such a provision requires being in the legislation. It was noted in Chapter 
Five that a major concern when debating the GRA 2004 was that if the law was not 
sufficiently robust individuals might revert to their birth sex. However, as noted several 
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times, there is nothing in the current legislation which prevents that and the reformed GRA 
2004 would not make any changes to this. To remove the permanence requirement from 
the legislation would mean that the legislation would adhere to the current medical model 
of transsexualism i.e. by recognising that experienced gender is not always permanently 
one gender or the other. However it would not amount to legislating based on this medical 
model of transsexualism because there would be no means of recognising those whose 
gender identity is non-binary. 
 
The concern with avoiding same-sex marriage 
At the time of the debates in parliament same–sex marriage was not an option in the UK 
and therefore this concern was valid at the time. However with the change in law recently 
in England and Wales and in Scotland arguably this should no longer be a concern. What is 
now of more importance is the rights of those couples in civil partnerships and of those 
individuals in a marriage where one of the parties seeks to obtain legal recognition of his or 
her gender identity. Currently the GRA 2004 requires that individuals must provide “a 
statutory declaration as to whether or not the applicant is married [or a civil partner]”895 
and I mentioned above that this provision required consideration. Although in theory this 
provision should not be required I think that it ought to remain for the time being. 
Declarations as to marital or civil partnership status are important because if one party to 
the marriage or civil partnership seeks legal recognition of his or her gender identity this 
impacts on the other party. There are provisions within the current GRA 2004 which allow 
for married couples to remain married following the issuance of a GRC so long as the 
couple are in a protected marriage and the other party consents. There ought to remain in 
the reformed legislation a similar provision that if the applicant is married then the consent 
of his or her spouse should be obtained before a GRC is issued. However this cannot be 
allowed to amount to a spousal veto whereby the spouse of the applicant can derail the 
application for recognition therefore the current provisions in the GRA 2004 are adequate 
for these purposes.  
 
Those who are in a civil partnership are in a different situation as there is no provision for 
heterosexual civil partnerships therefore the consent of the applicant’s civil partner is 
irrelevant, unless of course both partners seek to change legal sex at the same time but this 
is a situation which I have not yet seen any evidence of having occurred and is therefore 
merely theoretical. The issue of rights of those in a civil partnership is difficult to address 
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here as to change this provision within the GRA 2004 would require a change to the Civil 
Partnership Act 2004 to enable civil partnerships to be entered into by homosexual 
couples. The CPA 2004 is currently being challenged in the English Courts and it may be 
in the future that civil partnerships are available to heterosexual as well as homosexual 
couples. If this does happen then the provisions in the GRA 2004 for civil partners should 
mirror those above for spouses. So the proposed amendment to the GRA 2004 would not 
impact on marriage or civil partnership law at all and therefore this concern of parliament 
is not relevant to the changes that require to be made to the GRA 2004. 
 
The rights and interests of third parties 
The issue of rights and interests of third parties was debated at length in the Gender 
Recognition Bill (GRB) debates. Issues such as family members and employers being able 
to provide evidence to the GRP, rights of children when their parents seek legal 
recognition, rights of third parties who may enter into a marriage with the individual 
seeking legal recognition etc. The current GRA 2004 addresses these issues and the 
proposed amendments would make no changes to the current provisions. For example the 
rights and interests of those in formal intimate relationships with the applicant were dealt 
with in the section above. In addition the law already provides prohibitions on disclosure 
and the proposed amendments would not impact on this. As this concern was dealt with 
before the current law was enacted and the proposed reforms have no impact on this issue 
then this is not an issue that requires any more consideration. 
 
Concern with under 18s accessing the legislation 
Is it tempting to say that the Maltese approach on this is correct, however, on closer 
examination I am not convinced that the UK could not go further and remove the third 
party from the process altogether, however this needs examining. The only discussion of 
this during the parliamentary debates was when Baroness Buscombe asked at what age a 
person can apply for a GRC to which the reply from Lord Filkin was that he was “sure she 
will be glad to know that no one under the age of 18 will be able to apply.”896 Therefore 
there was no meaningful discussion of this provision prior to its acceptance within the 
legislation. I think that the minimum age requirement as it currently exists in the GRA 
2004, in the Danish model and in the Irish GRA 2015 is problematic because it gives no 
consideration to the growing capacity of the young person to be involved in decision 
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making in such an important area of their lives and in fact the UK and Denmark absolutely 
prohibits under 18s from having their gender identity recognised in law. The Irish model at 
least has the possibility of a young person obtaining legal recognition albeit without a full 
right to apply themselves and the Maltese model allows for the young person’s 
participation in the process but that decisions will be made based on the best interest of the 
child.  
 
The question therefore is to what extent should the young person be involved and actually, 
first, what is it the young person should be involved in? It is imperative to answer both of 
these questions because only then will an understanding of how to incorporate this 
provision into the reformed GRA be possible. Although Re Alex is not authoritative in the 
UK, the reasoning of the Court ought not to be ignored. As Barnes claims, the decision in 
this case “indicates that it is naïve to assume those under 16 lack the capacity to live in an 
acquired gender or consent to treatment for transsexuality.”897 It is this observation which 
is at the heart of the issue in question; although the current legislation prohibits young 
people from being able to have their gender identity recognised there is nothing to prevent 
that young person from living in the acquired gender or indeed even from taking hormones 
and/or having surgery. Now Barnes makes an important observation when she states that  
“[m]edical experts will almost certainly view prepubescent children as lacking the level of 
understanding required to consent to irreversible [sex re-assignment].”898 However such 
decisions can be challenged on the basis that the young person does in fact understand the 
proposed treatment and its consequences, in which case it will be for the court to decide 
whether such young person has legal capacity to consent. Although the situation is that 
transsexual teenagers in the UK are unlikely to be provided with any permanent body 
modification procedures before they reach the age of 18 but there is nothing to prevent that 
individual from accessing diagnostic services at one of the UK Gender Identity Clinics 
from any age. If diagnosed with GD/transsexualism then the adolescent patient can receive 
endocrine therapy, particularly before he or she has begun puberty, which is intended to 
halt physical development and therefore ease further dysphoria experienced during 
puberty.
899
 A diagnosis of GD/transsexualism can medically be provided to a person under 
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the age of 18 based on the criteria contained in either of the diagnostic manuals. The 
minimum age provision becomes even more complicated if the individual is deemed 
medically competent to consent to medical procedures to alter their appearance, even 
simply non-invasive procedures such as taking cross-sex hormones, because such a person 
would be able to take steps to physically appear to be of the opposite sex but the law then 
prohibits legal recognition until the age of 18. In addition when one combines the 
minimum age requirement with the provision that the individual must have lived in the 
acquired gender for two years ending with the date on which the application for a GRC is 
made then the individual, to be able to make an application when he or she reaches 18, 
must have begun living as a member of the opposite sex at 16 at the latest. It is therefore 
argued that if the adolescent transsexual patient is diagnosed before 18 and begins living as 
a member of the opposite sex, with or without medical treatment, then having to wait until 
18 before being able to apply for a GRC seems an unnecessary additional burden based 
only on the individuals age and not being capable of taking into consideration their 
personal circumstances and therefore this provision may not withstand ECHR challenge. 
This situation may lead to numerous difficulties for such young people such as 
“registration at school and university; production of a birth certificate for enrolment or 
employment; use of changing rooms and toilets”900 all of which may give rise to a human 
rights based challenge under Article 8 and 14 ECHR on the basis of an individual being 
unable to access the provisions contained within the legislation based solely on his or her 
age.  
 
As of October 2015 there have been no cases challenging the minimum age requirement. 
However, this provision may form the basis for human rights challenges in the near future 
as, Barnes argues, such an age requirement runs contrary to both the supposed aims of the 
Act - of increasing self-determination and respecting the private life of individuals.
901
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debate on this provision it cannot be said with any certainty that these are the reasons why 
the minimum age requirement was included in the legislation. 
 
However it must not be forgotten that the GRA in its current format nor in its amended 
format required body modification therefore we are not asking young people to consent to 
medical treatment and participate in the decision making surrounding medical treatment. 
We are asking that young people be able to articulate their identity and request that that 
identity be recognised by law; there is nothing irreversible about this and therefore the test 
regarding capacity of the young person to be involved at this stage ought to be much 
weaker than that required in relation to medical treatment, It would be possible to take the 
Maltese model and use it as the basis for reform of UK law. Such an approach would not 
be unfamiliar to the UK legal system, particularly in Scotland, where young people are 
given the right to participate in decisions about themselves but that ultimately the court, or 
other official decision maker will made the decision based on the child’s best interests. 
Such an approach in the UK could work by either removing the minimum age requirement 
from the GRA 2004 by rephrasing s.1(1) thus: 
(1) A person of either gender […] may make an application for a gender 
recognition certificate on the basis of –  
(a) living in the other gender, or 
(b) having changed gender under the law of a country or territory outside 
the United Kingdom. 
 
This would be all that is required to remove the minimum age requirement and avoid any 
potential future ECHR based challenges from those under the age of 18. If the legislature 
wanted to ensure that young people were protected, in essence, from themselves then a 
provision could be added into the GRA 2004 which provided for under 18s. The provision 
in the Maltese legislation is contained in s.8 and is as follows: 
 
(1) The persons exercising parental authority over the minor or the tutor of the 
minor may file an application in the registry of the Civil Court (Voluntary 
Jurisdiction Section) requesting the Court to change the recorded gender and 
first name of the minor in order to reflect the minor’s gender identity. 
(2) Where an application under sub-article (1) is made on behalf of a minor, the 
Court shall: 
(a) ensure that the best interests of the child as expressed in the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child be the paramount consideration; and 
(b) in so far as is practicable, give due weight to the views of the minor 
having regard to the minor’s age and maturity. 
 
There is no reason why the GRA 2004 could not be reformed by means of amending s.1(1) 
as noted above and also by adding a provision in relation to applications by minors such 
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that it mirrors GIGESCA 2015 s.8(2) above. One of the failings of GIGESCA 2015 is that 
it does not allow for applications to be raised by the young person himself or herself but 
rather requires that an application is made on behalf of the young person. I argue that this 
provision should not be in the amended GRA 2004 as to do so introduces another third 
party into the process of an individual acquiring legal recognition of their gender identity; 
the situation which, I argue, should be avoided. The problem then, of course, is raised in 
relation to how the state ensures that young people are protected from their own decisions 
which they may regret at a later point in time if there is no adult involvement in terms of 
applying for a GRC. Arguably this has already been dealt with above where discussions 
were made in relation to the ability to make subsequent applications for GRCs. It has to be 
remembered that at this point we are not discussing irreversible medical procedures, which 
arguably a young person could consent to if they are deemed to “understand the nature and 
possible consequence of the procedure or treatment.”902 Rather we are discussing an 
administrative procedure which can easily be changed should the person’s identity change. 
The fact that the GRA 2004 already allows for subsequent changes undermines the 
argument that young people should be protected from making this decision as it is not an 
irreversible decision. However, it would be difficult to completely remove third party 
participation in relation to young people given the legal framework which exists in the UK 
at the moment. Under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child Article 3 it states: 
 
1. in all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private 
social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or 
legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary 
consideration.  
 
This has been wholly embodied in decision making about young people in the UK. 
Therefore in a situation whereby a public body would be determining whether or not to 
issue a GRC the best interests of the child would have to be taken into consideration and so 
there is a strong argument for including such a provision. How this would work in reality 
may be different from how I would envisage it in law. In law it would be possible to mirror 
the GIGESCA 2015 approach but in effect this adds discretion into the process of 
obtaining legal recognition of one’s internally experienced gender; something that cannot 
be definitively known by a third party. In reality if the best interests provision was to be 
included in the reformed GRA 2004 then it may give rise to more and more tests being 
developed to ensure that such a decision was in the young person’s best interests and we 
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may end up in a situation which is similar to the one we are in now where medical 
professionals become involved in ‘testing’ the young person’s expressed gender identity 
against medical criteria, which is a situation that should be avoided. Therefore, for this 
reason I argue that such a provision would be required to be included but carefully 
monitored. However there should be a possibility in the legislation for young people to 
raise applications for GRCs on their own without having to rely on their parent(s) or 
guardian(s). 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined possible alternative models of providing legal recognition of 
gender identity. It has been argued that as a result of CoE Resolution 2048 (2015) and the 
changing understanding of gender variance from within the medical profession that it is 
now the ultimate time to consider reforming the GRA 2004. If reform was to be undertaken 
it ought to be based on the gender self-declaration model which has been outlined 
throughout this chapter. Although it may be tempting to think that the gender self-
declaration model cannot meet the requirements of the GRA 2004, in terms of addressing 
the concerns which existed when parliament initially drafted the GRA 2004, because the 
gender self-declaration model is so different from the medical model of transsexualism this 
would be inaccurate. As this chapter has shown it is possible to meet the main concerns of 
parliament and still take a very different approach to designing the legislation. This chapter 
has shown that all that would be required to fundamentally change the law to give 
individuals much more right to have their gender identity recognised is some minor 
amendments to the GRA 2004 namely removal of any role given to a third party. The 
proposals outlined in this chapter would secure long-term compliance with Article 8 ECHR 
by allowing the individual to develop his or her sense of self and to have that recognised 
by the state. In addition the proposals outlined in this chapter still give consideration to the 
need to maintain certainty in law, to ensure the rights and interests of third parties are 
protected where appropriate and that the minimum age requirement has been fully 
considered rather than merely accepted as in 2003/4. The issue with marriage and civil 
partnership is a bit more difficult to reconcile however it is possible. The proposals would 
be to ensure that those who do not wish to remain married to someone who obtains a GRC 
are not required to do so and thus the current law is sufficient here. It may well be though 
that in the next few years there will be further amendment to the GRA 2004 when civil 
partnership laws are examined and potentially reformed.  
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Conclusion 
As noted in the Introduction this thesis was inspired by a number of personal friends who 
sought to negotiate medical involvement in the realisation of their identities before UK 
law. In so doing I began this thesis with the intention of exploring the exact role of the 
medical profession in the process of acquiring legal recognition of one’s gender identity. 
However it quickly developed such that it ended with proposals to reform the Gender 
Recognition Act 2004 (GRA 2004) to adopt a model of legal recognition which is based 
entirely on gender self-declaration rather than on the medical understanding of 
transsexualism in 2003/4.  
 
Chapter One explored the medical model of transsexualism up to the date at which the 
legislation was enacted and I showed how the model developed up until it was accepted by 
the legislature. In so doing I showed the limits of the medical model as of 2003/04 which 
provided very strict boundaries on who could obtain a diagnosis of GD/transsexualism and 
consequently who could access the GRA 2004 provisions. It was shown in Chapter One 
that the medical model had its roots in legislation which sought to punish those who 
engaged in potentially non-procreative sexual practices which led, eventually, to 
sexologists separating those who could be considered homosexual from those who they 
classed as ill and eventually, by the 1950s, labelled as transsexual. This work of 
sexologists created a category of individuals whom medicine then sought to research in an 
attempt to understand why their gender identity was not as expected: why did some women 
identify as men and seek to take the necessary steps to live as men and vice versa for some 
men? This enquiry in itself highlighted the presumptions which exist around ‘normal’ and 
‘deviant’ sexuality and gender identity. The result of the work during this period was to 
classify transsexual individuals not as deviant but rather as exhibiting a disorder of 
psychosexual development: something went wrong in the development of their gender 
identity. As a result of these small incremental steps being taken transsexualism was fully 
accepted by the medical profession by the 1970s and 1980s and a whole industry was 
established to diagnose and treat this group of individuals. By the time the legislation was 
enacted in 2004 the model of transsexualism as a medical condition, the causes of which 
were not fully understood, was such that it became impossible to consider transsexual 
gender identity as anything other than a medical condition and it was this inability to 
reconceive of gender identity as anything other than medical which formed the basis for 
the GRA 2004 in its current form. 
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Chapter Two explored the legal consequences for individuals who identified as members 
of the sex opposite to the sex assigned at birth and it was shown how law refused to 
recognise any of the medical procedures undertaken by such individuals in an attempt to 
ease the dysphoria they experienced as a result of their medical condition. The chapter 
showed that there was no likelihood of reform of the law in the UK other than in areas 
which were directly influenced by EC law such as in the area of employment. It seemed 
then that UK domiciled transsexuals were condemned to a legal limbo of appearing to be 
one sex while being legally classed as the opposite.  
 
Chapter Three explored the impact of Goodwin v United Kingdom where it was established 
that law’s recognition of one’s gender identity is not dependent upon the medical model of 
transsexualism. The ECtHR managed to establish this by means of placing transsexual 
legal recognition within the realm of human rights law: specifically the wide Article 8 
jurisprudence which it had been developing since the 1970s. This case had a huge impact 
in UK Courts such that the House of Lords issued a declaration of incompatibility between 
UK marriage law and the ECHR. It was this that effectively forced reform of the law.  
 
Chapter Four showed that the GRA 2004, although hailed as radical and ground-breaking, 
and although being a positive piece of legislation in that it does provide individuals with a 
means of realising their gender identity in law, is built upon a particular medical model of 
transsexualism which existed in medicine as of 2003/04 when the legislation was being 
debated in Parliament. As a result of this medical model being accepted by the legislature 
without question and critique the legislation requires a diagnosis of GD and also medical 
evidence to be provided. It was my argument throughout this thesis that law did not have to 
adopt that particular model of gender identity recognition in 2004 when the legislation was 
enacted but rather law could have taken a wholly non-medical approach to gender identity 
recognition based on the Article 8 jurisprudence which influenced the ECtHR in Goodwin. 
 
Chapter Five explored the problems with law taking this approach and it was argued in 
Chapter Five that a lot of the continuing problems with the GRA 2004 which are a result of 
basing the law on this medical model could have been avoided had law chosen in 2004 to 
make this solely a human rights issue. It was also argued in Chapter Five that 
developments in the medical model since 2004 have undermined the GRA 2004 and 
therefore strengthened the argument that such a dynamic and evolving model was an 
inappropriate foundation for such important legal rights.  
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Chapter Six explored the possibility of reforming the law based on gender self-declaration, 
an approach taken in Denmark, Malta and Ireland. As a result of this examination it has 
been possible to propose reform of the GRA 2004 to adopt a more human rights based 
approach to legal recognition of gender identity but which still considers the concerns of 
parliament at the time the GRA 2004 was enacted.  
 
What this thesis has done has been to take a piece of legislation which has had a positive 
impact on the lives of individuals and critique it to show that it could be better; it could be 
better because it has underlying assumptions about what sort of people would try to access 
the legislation and therefore tries to ensure that only ‘true’ transsexuals i.e. those who are 
ill, are able to legally change sex in the UK. In order to do this the legislation as it 
currently stands requires to adopt a means of testing applicants and thus adopts the medical 
model of transsexualism which requires diagnosis of GD, that one seeks to live 
permanently in the acquired gender, that one undergoes a two year wait between obtaining 
the diagnosis and making the application for recognition etc. This thesis has shown that 
there are huge problems with the law taking this approach and that it does not need to be so 
complicated. In proposing a new model of recognition based on gender self-declaration the 
approach taken in other jurisdictions, Ireland, Malta and Denmark, have been examined 
and the proposals for reform of UK law are based on the best aspects of each of the 
approaches taken in these jurisdictions. Therefore this thesis has established that a simpler 
approach to legal recognition can be taken in the UK, an approach which still considers the 
concerns of parliament at the time the GRA 2004 was enacted but which does not have the 
associated problems inherent in the GRA 2004. Therefore, I propose that the law ought to 
be reformed based on the arguments put forward in Chapter Six; an approach based on 
self-declaration of gender without any third party ‘testing’ of the applicant’s professed 
identity.  
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